Mossie range

[Lochness]

http://www.flexi.net.au/~bfillery/mossie02.htm :

No. 8 Group recommended for the 4,000lb bomb Mk IX/XVI, on 20/01/44, max take-off weight as 25,200lb and landing weight of 20,500lb, fuel capacity being 597 gal, operating from a 1,800 yd runway. Initial operating ceiling was set by this order at 28,500ft, rising to 29,500ft at target. [u]Still-air range was set at 1,470 miles, , max op RANGE as 1,100 miles and op RADIUS at 550 miles. Speeds: (8 Group listing) 329mph at S.L, max after leaving target 333mph S.L, max 408mph F.S gear at 28,500ft before target, 419mph after, all with unshrouded exhaust machines (standard). Length overall 40ft 6ins. Declared obsolete 14/04/49.

Berlin to London = 579 miles (shorter if you take off nearer the coast).

This appears, from elsewhere in the article, to include 2x50 gallon drop tanks. Would a mossie with a heavy load have had enough fuel for forming up large formations/synchronizing with large formations of escorts (even though they wouldn’t need as many escorts) and still deal with unexpected headwinds, etc?

regards,

loch

[Wuzak]

Good question.

http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/BARC/mosquito.html

This lists the range as "typically 1860 miles", though for what versions and how configured is anyone's guess.

http://www.xs4all.nl/~fbonne/warbirds/ww2htmls/dehamosqbfn.html gives the range of the B IV as 1110 miles, but does not specify if this is with or without external tanks.

We do know that BIX and BXVIs carried 4000lb "cookies" to Berlin and returned quite safely. I think generalll that there was some margin for differing routes, wetaher, etc, but not sure how much.

Thinking about this logically, I would suggest that loitering around waiting for a large formation of Mosquitos is not the best idea. The formations used by the USAAF were specifically designed to give the maximum defensive coverage for the formation, using the many guns mounted on each bomber. The idea was that they would need no escort....

The RAF Bomber Command sorties did not usually congregate over the base until all the aircraft had formed up. Instead they headed for the target forming up in their smaller formations as they go. Using precision timing and coordination a large BC raid would concentrate all its firepower into a few minutes at the target. After the target the aircraft were on their own. Usually BC flew at night, though, and close formations was risky and dangerous.

I'd suggest a major raid involving Mosquitos would not concentrate all the bombers in one area, spreading out their courses, but coordinating a concentrated attack. As the Mossies carried no defensive guns, a tight defensive formation really gives no benefit to them.

Fighter escorts were reasonably effective when they gave close support to the bombers, but they became devestatingly effective (at destroying the enemy's fighters) when they were allowed to roam relatively freely in the target area. The latter would be possible for fighter escorts for the Mosquito, but the former would be quite problematic.

The reason for this is the normal cruise speed for the aircraft involved. A Mosquito bomber has a cruise speed higher than most, if not all, fighter aircraft with similar range. The fact is that for fighters to get to Berlin and back they required long range fuel tanks.

http://www.mossie.org/stories/Norman_Malayney_2.htm has an account of a USSAF PR Mossie pilot flying with a P-51 escort (second story). To stay in formation with the P-51 he had to slow some, running at a less ecenomical speed, whilst the Mustang had to speed up, also destroying his range. The same would be true for long range missions to Germany.

The best option to use fighter coverage is to send the fighters to the target area independently to arrive at the same time, or before. They would then be able to hassle the German fighters before the bombers arrived, and even do so when they were on the ground. If fighter resistence is expected on the way to or from the target a similar strategy could be used - send the fighters out to areas where fighters are expected to be encountered.

[Wuzak]

Welcome to the forum, btw.

[Red Admiral]

Might be better off to combine the bombing with a fighter sweep. The bombers arrive and bomb their target getting the defending fighters up into the air. Just as the bombers are starting home the fighter sweep comes in and takes on the defending fighters, essentially a rear-guard action for the homebound Mosquitoes.

[Ricky]

What was the usual method for daylight raids undertaken by RAF light/medium bombers (Blenhiems, Bostons, etc) - did they form up then fly off, or fly off and form up on the way?

[Lochness]

Thanks for the welcome. Happy to be here.

I'm still a bit confused. You mentioned:

"Fighter escorts were reasonably effective when they gave close support to the bombers, but they became devestatingly effective (at destroying the enemy's fighters) when they were allowed to roam relatively freely in the target area. The latter would be possible for fighter escorts for the Mosquito, but the former would be quite problematic."


What did you mean by "relatively free" and "target area"? How far away could they get? Wouldn't even a loose "formation" like this require alot of time and fuel to co-ordinate if it were to include, say, 1000 bombers and 1000 fighters?

[Wuzak]

The fighters were encouraged to seek out the Luftwaffe fighters in order to destroy them - in the air, or on the ground. The bombers were, in a way, the bait.

I think that Mustangs had a little time over a target as far as Berlin, but later they got bigger tanks and could fly much farther, or loiter longer over target.

[Lochness]

But they still needed escorts, as your example indicates, especially when attacking places like Leuna in daylight. P- 51s flew escort duty quite often throughout the war because that's where they expected enemy fighters to appear.

This is a bit off the topic, but it seems that one reason the b-17 was preferred over the mosquito for long range daylight ops may have been because it had the endurance to form huge defensive formations that maximized escort coverage. Night campaigning was, of course, a different issue.

Any thoughts?

[Wuzak]

There were a few reasons why the B-17 was preferred over the Mosquito by the USAAF.

First amongst these was the NIH syndrome - ie Not Invented Here.

Also, when the 8th AF started flying over Europe, it was believed that the heavily armed bomber (eg B-17 and B-24) flying in appropriate formations would be able to defend itself against fighter attack. It took a year or so for the reality to sink in that even with heavy defensive fire the bomber was very vulnerable to attack.

When the B-17 first flew it was faster than any fighter available anywhere in the world. The USAAC theoriests and leadership believed that no fighter would be capable of staying with it - within a year the Spitfire and Bf109 both exceeded the performance of the B-17. The theory then became that no fighter was capable of the range of the B-17 and maintaining superior performance. This idea prevailed until late in 1943, when Gen Hap Arnold (Chief of the AF) opined that no fighter could keep up with the B-17 (on hearing this the B-17 crew response was that the German fighters seemed to have no trouble). This ideal somewhat delayed the development and deployment of long range escort fighters. against AAF orders by Lt Kelsey and Lockheed - lucky they did as they would not have been available until much later otherwise.]

So basically the formation was all about self (mutual) defence, and not about ease of being escorted.

After the P-51B became available and was capable of making target areas as distant ans Berlin the heavy bombers rarely, if ever, flew without them.

As to close escorts, a parallel can be found in the Battle of Britain. Early on in that conflict the Bf110 was to provide close support to the bombers, while the Bf109s were free to hunt the RAF fighters. The Bf109s were very successful, but the Bf110s were not. As a consequence the 109s were tasked with more closely supporting the bombers, and their effectiveness was reduced.

It is my thought that Mosquitos flying in close formations serve no useful purpose, and only stand to increase the requirement for fighter cover. Tight formations would also restrict the ability for the bombers to manoeuvre.

[Wuzak]

Mosquitos often flew without escort during daylight.

Escorts were often of little use at targets like Luena - as much of the opposition cam from heavy flak guns. In fact, Luena had more defensive guns than many large German cities.

[Kutscha]

The 1st daylight raid on Berlin was by Mossies. The end of Jan '43 iirc.

[Lochness]

For Hap Arnold to make such a statement within earshot of anyone with a pulse prooves he was so out of touch with the war that he, his entire staff (including doolittle, who championed the use of the mosquito against crossbow sites after EXTENSIVE studies), are not guilty of criminal negligence only because they were too insane to be responsible for their own actions. We can rule out that they were on Hitler's payroll because they were too incompetent to even keep their incompetence to themselves! They probably walked around with shoes on their heads believing the sky was the ground and everyone else was upside down.

- or -

1.) The American Aircraft industry just couldn't believe in wood construction (and, based on the mosquito's history in the Pacific, they were almost, but not quite, right)
&
2.) The Strategists believed money and time was best spent on the B-29 and mustang rather than building another Inglwood for producing mosquitoes.

[Lochness]

Regards,

Loch

P.S. Sorry. didn't mean to use the exclammation point.

[Lochness]

I feel I should expand a bit.

Firstly,
Although I don't doubt the possibility, I find it difficult to comprehend how Arnold and the Bomber Mafia could've been so out of touch. I know generals can be bloodthirsty primadonnas, but they also want to win. Can you give me some references and context to enlighten me on the nature of the Bomber Mafia?

Secondly,
I have read:
"Not everyone was happy about the (mosquito). America's General Henry Arnold, who saw the plane fly on the 20 April 1941, was very enthusiastic and could see the potential. However when he returned to the USA and passed his information to five American aircraft manufacturers for assessment they unanimously opposed the aircraft. One of them, Beech, said "It appears as though this airplane has sacrificed serviceability, structural strength, ease of construction and flying characteristics in an attempt to use construction material which is not suitable for the manufacture of efficient airplanes".(http://www.flexi.net.au/~bfillery/mossie01.htm)

and

Not all users of de Havilland's 'Wooden Wonder' were entirely impressed with the machine; its unconventional construction conspired against it during operations in the humid China-Burma-India Theater of operations. Squadrons equipping with the Mosquito after using the Bristol Beaufighter in Burma shortly swapped the 'Mossie' for the Beaufighter again due to failures of the Mosquito's wooden wing spar in the heat. Subsequently, all Mosquitoes diverted to the Far East had inspection panels cut into the wing roots to enable the spars to be inspected for weakness.
(http://www.airventuremuseum.org/collection/aircraft/de%20Havilland%20DH%2098%20Mosquito.asp)
I also know the RAF paid a price for premature introduction of the Typhoon. How would a large committment to The Mossie have played out if hundreds were grounded due to similar unforseeable structural failures? Could they really have trusted the aircraft earlier than 1943?
What role could these things have played in the USAAF's committment to the mosquito?

Thirdly,

I have read that the initial loss rates of the mosquito were quite high before tactics were developed that produced acceptable losses. Losses were finally reduced to 8% in early 1943 when night tactics were being adopted. What were their losses in daylight bombing raids? I've not read of a LOW LEVEL daylight mosquito raid that had less than 17% losses against UNDEFENDED (or lightly defended) targets. They were often much higher, whereas, Heavy losses were nil against lightly defended targets.
Also, after reading British success against the V-1s, both with interceptors and anti-aircraft guns, I can understand how low level raids with mosquitos against heavily defended targets could've raised serious doubts in the minds of air planners. But what about HIGH ALTITUDE OPERATIONS? What were their losses during high level daylight raids? And does anyone know the mosquito's accuracy at high altitudes? I know that the B-17 was the most accurate US bomber. How stable could a small sensitive mosquito be on a windy, flak-filled bomb run?

Finally,

Could the B-29 program or mustang production have played a role in their decisions? How much would building another Inglwood for mosquitoes have cut into the B-29 program or mustang production? How much time would retooling other production fascilities for mosquitoes cost? How critical was time? how far away from the atomic bomb or real mass production of jet fighters was Germany? could any interruption be afforded?

Thus, I have many theories, but little real knowledge about the USAAF's motives about the Mosquito. Any info anyone can give will be appreciated.

Regards,

Loch

[Wuzak]

To be fair, I doubt that the Mosquito ever entered the thoughts of the USAAF as a bomber. It was used extensively as a reconnaisance platform.

Now, the structural failures in the Far East were as a result of the unsuitability of the glue for the hot, humid conditions. This problem was solved during the latter part of the war. I have not read of any structural failures in service in Europe.

I think the Beech response to requests to build the Mosquito smacks of the NIH syndrome. The Mosquito was a very efficient structure, it was quite easy to build, and was very strong.

Not sure what you mean by your loss rates. The initial loss rate was high for Mosquito raids during the day, until they developed their defensive tactics. I have heard that the loss rate was initially about 8%, but was reduced after initial experience.

It must also be remembered that Mosquito attacks were often very high risk raids - at low level against well defended targets. Also, as the raids were usually of small numbers a loss of one or two a/c resulted in a significant percentage loss.

As to the USAAF heavy raids, they barely penetrated into France for much of 1942/43. Raids against the U-boat facilities in France introduced the USAAF to Flak and heavy losses.

The USAAF's bomber mafia had the dogma about high altitude precision bombing. They had discovered that the B-17 dropping bombs from 10,000ft in the desert sky in the US using the Nordon bomb sight was extremely accurate. They found that dropping bombs is Europe under fire from fighters and flak, with clouds, smog, wind, etc, was much less accurate. The bomber mafia believed that the heavily armed bomber could fight its way through to target and release its bombs.

They soon found early in the war that each bomber bombing independently - a requirement for maximum accuracy - produced poor results and exposed the bombers to greater risk.

The high altitude that the bombers used were not for any specific bombing requirement, but was instead a defensive measure designed to keep the bombers out of the reach of the defences.

[Wuzak]

quote:Originally posted by Lochness

Not all users of de Havilland's 'Wooden Wonder' were entirely impressed with the machine; its unconventional construction conspired against it during operations in the humid China-Burma-India Theater of operations. Squadrons equipping with the Mosquito after using the Bristol Beaufighter in Burma shortly swapped the 'Mossie' for the Beaufighter again due to failures of the Mosquito's wooden wing spar in the heat. Subsequently, all Mosquitoes diverted to the Far East had inspection panels cut into the wing roots to enable the spars to be inspected for weakness.
(http://www.airventuremuseum.org/collection/aircraft/de%20Havilland%20DH%2098%20Mosquito.asp)

I think the next line after that is interesting.....

quote:This was later disproved during weight testing for the 4,000lb (1814kg) Cookie bomb. A Mosquito, DZ594/G, with an all-up weight of 21,500lbs (9752.4kg) had already proved it could lift four times the load it was originally designed for. On one test it was mistakenly loaded with 10,000lbs (4536kg) of ballast which it also lifted with no problems.


quote:Originally posted by Lochness

I also know the RAF paid a price for premature introduction of the Typhoon. How would a large committment to The Mossie have played out if hundreds were grounded due to similar unforseeable structural failures? Could they really have trusted the aircraft earlier than 1943?
What role could these things have played in the USAAF's committment to the mosquito?


I think these groundings occurred after the USAAF would have decided against persuing the Mosquito (other than PR versions).

[Kutscha]

quote:Originally posted by Lochness

I also know the RAF paid a price for premature introduction of the Typhoon. How would a large committment to The Mossie have played out if hundreds were grounded due to similar unforseeable structural failures? Could they really have trusted the aircraft earlier than 1943?
What role could these things have played in the USAAF's committment to the mosquito?
Did the Typhoon have tail failures? Yes.

Is this a over blown WW2 myth? Yes.

What was premature about the Typhoon was the Sabre engine.

The wing failures of the Mossies in the CBI was traced to the lack of not enough glue being used. This was not confined to only CBI Mossies.

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by Kutscha

quote:Originally posted by Lochness

I also know the RAF paid a price for premature introduction of the Typhoon. How would a large committment to The Mossie have played out if hundreds were grounded due to similar unforseeable structural failures? Could they really have trusted the aircraft earlier than 1943?
What role could these things have played in the USAAF's committment to the mosquito?
Did the Typhoon have tail failures? Yes.

Is this a over blown WW2 myth? Yes.

What was premature about the Typhoon was the Sabre engine.

The wing failures of the Mossies in the CBI was traced to the lack of not enough glue being used. This was not confined to only CBI Mossies.

It was the use of casein glue. dH had lots of experience with glue, but none of their aircraft had spent months under humid tropical conditions (the cold rain of England wasn't a problem, the hot dry of much of Australia wasn't a problem). Apparently Geoffrey dH was on an inspection tour in NE India and spotted the delamination. The RAF wouldn't ground the aircraft so he hopped on a wing with a saw. RAF objected, dH pointed out RAF hadn't yet paid for these aircraft ... [this may be apocryphal, but it was in an otherwise technically correct Mosquito book from the early '70s ... comments/corrections?].
Switching to urea-based glues solved the problem.

[Lochness]

To be fairer still, we must remember that the USAAF heavies hadn't thoroughly prooven their weaknesses and exhausted all attempts to correct them until some time in 1943. By then, It was probably believed that effort was best placed in the B-29 and the Mustang. Building another Inglewood to produce Mosquitoes or engaging in some kind of re-tooling of assembly lines wouldn't have made sense.



By the way:
"This was later disproved during weight testing for the 4,000lb (1814kg) Cookie bomb. A Mosquito, DZ594/G, with an all-up weight of 21,500lbs (9752.4kg) had already proved it could lift four times the load it was originally designed for. On one test it was mistakenly loaded with 10,000lbs (4536kg) of ballast which it also lifted with no problems."

This IS interesting. Thanks for catching that.

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by Lochness



To be fairer still, we must remember that the USAAF heavies hadn't thoroughly prooven their weaknesses and exhausted all attempts to correct them until some time in 1943. By then, It was probably believed that effort was best placed in the B-29 and the Mustang. Building another Inglewood to produce Mosquitoes or engaging in some kind of re-tooling of assembly lines wouldn't have made sense.



By the way:
"This was later disproved during weight testing for the 4,000lb (1814kg) Cookie bomb. A Mosquito, DZ594/G, with an all-up weight of 21,500lbs (9752.4kg) had already proved it could lift four times the load it was originally designed for. On one test it was mistakenly loaded with 10,000lbs (4536kg) of ballast which it also lifted with no problems."

This IS interesting. Thanks for catching that.

You might like to look at what could be loaded under an FW190 ...

Some aircraft types could really exceed design, or official, specifications ... others never met them. This might make a nice topic ... over (and under) achievers of WW II.

[Wuzak]

quote:Originally posted by curmudgeon

quote:Originally posted by Lochness



To be fairer still, we must remember that the USAAF heavies hadn't thoroughly prooven their weaknesses and exhausted all attempts to correct them until some time in 1943. By then, It was probably believed that effort was best placed in the B-29 and the Mustang. Building another Inglewood to produce Mosquitoes or engaging in some kind of re-tooling of assembly lines wouldn't have made sense.



By the way:
"This was later disproved during weight testing for the 4,000lb (1814kg) Cookie bomb. A Mosquito, DZ594/G, with an all-up weight of 21,500lbs (9752.4kg) had already proved it could lift four times the load it was originally designed for. On one test it was mistakenly loaded with 10,000lbs (4536kg) of ballast which it also lifted with no problems."

This IS interesting. Thanks for catching that.

You might like to look at what could be loaded under an FW190 ...

Some aircraft types could really exceed design, or official, specifications ... others never met them. This might make a nice topic ... over (and under) achievers of WW II.


Not to mention overused, underused and misused aircraft.

[pmjwright]

quote:You might like to look at what could be loaded under an FW190 ...

Some aircraft types could really exceed design, or official, specifications
Yes, two examples that quickly come to mind: in Italy, where the experience gained by the Desert Air Force led to the routine loading of fighter-bombers with double their spec'd underwing bomb loads by the end of the war. And just about every B-29 that ever took off from Tinian was sigificantly overweight.

[Lochness]

So, once the B-17 had proven itself obsolete, (1943) Resistance to American Mosquito production could be explained by 4 things:




1.) The complexity of air to air combat and bombing itself led to
Exaggerated gunner claims and Misjudgment of bombing
effectiveness. Thus, the B-17's obsolescence wasn't,
exactly, "proven" to commanders.

2.) Undue favoritism to Boeing and Ford.
-Something the Truman committee missed (or was influenced
by!)
-This is by no means out of the question considering the
influence these huge companies must’ve had.

3.) Whenever a successful mosquito raid was publicized, it
merely motivated the USAAF to develop existing projects
(B-29, A-26) and increase production of the already existing
Mustang rather than say “Wow! We need Mosquitoes!”
- Hence, the immense pressure on Boeing for production of
the B-29. Whereas, Mosquito production never really
entered their minds.

4.) Stalin-like lunacy:
Some of this may be evident in the replacement of Eaker
with Doolittle and Spaatz. Even though Doolittle and Spaatz
came up with the same recommendations provided by Eaker -
More drop tanks, and P-51 fighters (by the way, drop tanks
were not just ignored by Arnold, but resisted by fighter
commanders as well)

Any thoughts?

[Wuzak]

quote:Originally posted by Lochness

So, once the B-17 had proven itself obsolete, (1943) Resistance to American Mosquito production could be explained by 4 things:

I should think that only one thing stood against US production of the Mosquito in 1943 - they'd already decided against it.



quote:Originally posted by Lochness

1.) The complexity of air to air combat and bombing itself led to
Exaggerated gunner claims and Misjudgment of bombing
effectiveness. Thus, the B-17's obsolescence wasn't,
exactly, "proven" to commanders.


It was only just mid to late 1943 when the B-17 was showing its vulnerability, and the fallacy of the idea of the self defending bomber was being demonstrated. Even so, the USAAF and 8th AF leadership were still convinced in their theories.

The other issue here is that factories were already set up to churn out B-17s and B-24s. In WW2 in the US production was king. Many improvements to existing aircraft were ignored or delayed in order to preserve production rates.



quote:Originally posted by Lochness

2.) Undue favoritism to Boeing and Ford.
-Something the Truman committee missed (or was influenced
by!)
-This is by no means out of the question considering the
influence these huge companies must’ve had.


Not sure where Ford comes into this. No sure how much influence Boeing had either. Anybody?



quote:Originally posted by Lochness

3.) Whenever a successful mosquito raid was publicized, it
merely motivated the USAAF to develop existing projects
(B-29, A-26) and increase production of the already existing
Mustang rather than say “Wow! We need Mosquitoes!”
- Hence, the immense pressure on Boeing for production of
the B-29. Whereas, Mosquito production never really
entered their minds.


I think that if the USAAF had adopted the Mosquito as a bomber it most likely would have replaced B-25s and B-26s at the front, rather than B-17s, B-24s, and especially not B-29s. The B-25 and B-26 were probably the closest in bombing aboility to the Mosquito. The A-26 could well have been the American metal Mosquito, but it only just made the war (deployed late 1944).



quote:Originally posted by Lochness

4.) Stalin-like lunacy:
Some of this may be evident in the replacement of Eaker
with Doolittle and Spaatz. Even though Doolittle and Spaatz
came up with the same recommendations provided by Eaker -
More drop tanks, and P-51 fighters (by the way, drop tanks
were not just ignored by Arnold, but resisted by fighter
commanders as well)


I think that Eaker, whilst instigating much of the improvements to come in early 1944, was more fixed in his ideas than Spaatz and Doolittle. It was Spaatz that started the oil campaign. And it was Doolittle that changed the role of the escort fighters - from defenders (as they would have continued under Eaker) to aggressors. So I don't think there was the "Stalin like lunacy".

Eaker was always under pressure. Pressure to put on raids, to have bigger raids, to get results. Initially he was pushed into starting the campaihgn before the 8th were truly ready, and he was always under pressue for not producing the results Arnold desired soon enough.

[Kutscha]

quote:The other issue here is that factories were already set up to churn out B-17s and B-24s. In WW2 in the US production was king. Many improvements to existing aircraft were ignored or delayed in order to preserve production rates.
It was not just a/c but tanks as well. The Soviets offered plans for the T-34 but was turned down. NIH as well.

[Wuzak]

quote:Originally posted by Kutscha

quote:The other issue here is that factories were already set up to churn out B-17s and B-24s. In WW2 in the US production was king. Many improvements to existing aircraft were ignored or delayed in order to preserve production rates.
It was not just a/c but tanks as well. The Soviets offered plans for the T-34 but was turned down. NIH as well.


I wonder how much the $$$$$$ came into the equation?

If the US started building equipment to other countries' designs then they would have to pay royalties. I have read comments that suggest some resentment at paying royalties for Merlin production.

The UK only recently (last 10 years or so ago) paid off their Lend Lease debt. I guess the Soviets never bothered with theirs.

[Lochness]

"I should think that only one thing stood against US production of the Mosquito in 1943 - they'd already decided against it."

I'm thinking the reason they decided against it way back in '41 is because they still believed that high altitude and defensive armament would save them. They had no reason to doubt that until '43.
Then, by '43, it didn't make sense to invest in the mosquito because they had other designs to concentrate on and, as you pointed out, production was king. Why interrupt it?


By the way , I didn't mean to say Ford. I guess I had B-24 on my mind. sorry.

[Lochness]

"It was only just mid to late 1943 when the B-17 was showing its vulnerability, and the fallacy of the idea of the self defending bomber was being demonstrated. Even so, the USAAF and 8th AF leadership were still convinced in their theories."

They ceased deep penatration raids until they had escorts and Doolittle was asking for fighters - just as Eaker was. How is it you say they were still convinced?

[Lochness]

"The other issue here is that factories were already set up to churn out B-17s and B-24s. In WW2 in the US production was king. Many improvements to existing aircraft were ignored or delayed in order to preserve production rates."

This is true. New crews of B-24s slept in a giant room at willow run waiting for their planes to come of the assembly line. Guess they had too many people to arm to spend alot of time on quality. And I, by no means, think this is necessarily a bad strategy. It Depends on your ratio of resources to manpower and how much area you need to cover.

[Wuzak]

quote:Originally posted by Lochness

"It was only just mid to late 1943 when the B-17 was showing its vulnerability, and the fallacy of the idea of the self defending bomber was being demonstrated. Even so, the USAAF and 8th AF leadership were still convinced in their theories."

They ceased deep penatration raids until they had escorts and Doolittle was asking for fighters - just as Eaker was. How is it you say they were still convinced?



Not strictly correct. Eaker would continue his campaign with or without fighter escort. The campaign did not cease because of their losses over Germany, or because they were waiting for escort fighter, but was stopped because weather conditions in the closing months of 1943 prevented any effective visual bombing over the target and/or the conditions at the bomber bases was too poor for the bombers to take-off.

General Arnold, Eaker's boss, was not convinced of the requirement for long range escorts until very late in 1943.

btw Spaatz and Eaker were both willing to lose large percentages of their crews (50% or more) on unescorted bombing raids on what they determined to be key targets. It was the dalys due to weather which prevented these raids from taking place, and also enabled the Mustang numbers to be built up.