PMN1
3rd July 2008, 22:34
Target: Hitler’s Oil by Ronald C Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit
Bomber Command, from September 1939 onwards and the USAAF, after the latter had entered the European air war in April 1942, could choose form several alternative strategies. On the one hand, they could carry out ‘precision’ bombing. This meant the concentration of attacks on carefully selected individual targets, such as aircraft factories or oil refineries, which were believed to be of special importance to the enemy. On the other hand, they could avoid the difficulties of precision bombing by carrying out what became known as ‘area’ bombing. This was the bombing of whole districts within cities or towns, mostly industrial, without any attempt to single out particular targets. Behind this more or less ‘blanket’ approach lay the belief that at least some vital economic targets would be hit; also, that the casualties suffered by civilians, plus the loss of their living accommodation, would lower the morale of the population.
There was, in reality, a third possible policy in the earlier years of the war. It was to hold down the scale of strategic bombing to a justifiable level until the difficulties impeding it had been overcome. This would have been the level which appeared justified after comparing the results obtained and costs incurred during recent operations. The material and manpower resources saved by this policy could have been used in a more profitable way, perhaps by diverting them to tactical bombing. But this third alternative seems never to have been seriously considered.
How easy/hard would it have been to determine the point at which resources should be increased and what would be the chances of getting those resources diverted to the bomber fleets given the resources are likely to have been allocated elsewhere?
Bomber Command, from September 1939 onwards and the USAAF, after the latter had entered the European air war in April 1942, could choose form several alternative strategies. On the one hand, they could carry out ‘precision’ bombing. This meant the concentration of attacks on carefully selected individual targets, such as aircraft factories or oil refineries, which were believed to be of special importance to the enemy. On the other hand, they could avoid the difficulties of precision bombing by carrying out what became known as ‘area’ bombing. This was the bombing of whole districts within cities or towns, mostly industrial, without any attempt to single out particular targets. Behind this more or less ‘blanket’ approach lay the belief that at least some vital economic targets would be hit; also, that the casualties suffered by civilians, plus the loss of their living accommodation, would lower the morale of the population.
There was, in reality, a third possible policy in the earlier years of the war. It was to hold down the scale of strategic bombing to a justifiable level until the difficulties impeding it had been overcome. This would have been the level which appeared justified after comparing the results obtained and costs incurred during recent operations. The material and manpower resources saved by this policy could have been used in a more profitable way, perhaps by diverting them to tactical bombing. But this third alternative seems never to have been seriously considered.
How easy/hard would it have been to determine the point at which resources should be increased and what would be the chances of getting those resources diverted to the bomber fleets given the resources are likely to have been allocated elsewhere?