Long range Luftwaffe fighter during the BoB

[PMN1]

The effect of German fighters having drop tanks or longer range on internal fuel on the outcome of the battle of Britain is quite often discussed.

In his book ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy – a history of the Battle of Britain’ Stephen Bungay makes an interesting argument, what do you think of it?

‘Suppose the Bf109 had the range of the Mustang. What would the Luftwaffe have done with it? Similar endurance would have enabled the Germans to send escorted bombers to John O’Groats. Why would they have wanted to do that? Given the goal of establishing local air superiority, there was no point in attacking any target north of London. A bit more endurance would have helped in raiding Hornchurch, North Weald and Debden, but unless the RAF could be caught on the ground, attacking airfields was not in itself going to win the battle. The key aircraft factories (at the time) were at Kingston-upon-Thames and Southampton, which were within range. The range of the fighter escorts was only critical if the plan was to conduct economic warfare as part of a long-term siege. It was not critical to gaining air-superiority over the invasion beaches.

Had they had an extra margin of 15 – 20 minutes, the 109 pilots would probably have been able to do a bit more damage and somewhat reduced their losses. They would certainly have been more relaxed. However, their cannon only had seven seconds worth of ammunition and although they had sixty seconds worth machine gun rounds, their two machine guns alone would have greatly reduced their effectiveness. So if their fuel had not been used up, their ammunition would have been. Any pilot who spent more than five minutes in a dogfight would have been exhausted anyway. When the Mustangs went to Berlin they spent most of their time in getting there and back, not dogfighting. When RAF Fighter Command took the offensive in 1941, the pilots carrying out sweeps over Northern France in order to draw up the Luftwaffe complained about many things, but not the range of the Spitfire. It was only when the target was further away that range became critical’

Note he is making a difference between the Luftwaffe goals (air-superiority over the invasion beaches) and the later Allied goals (economic warfare as part of a long-term siege).

[simon]

An interesting argument.

Firstly I'd like to point out that the Battle of Britain should always be considered on two levels, military and political, the latter I believe was the most important.

Militarily the issue is somewhat cloudy, quite ignoring the question of ammunition (Which I make as 6 seconds rather than 7), as the Luftwaffe never actually had any clear directive throughout the Battle although it is generally accepted that local air superiority over Kent and Sussex was their most achievable aim.

So consider what a difference the extra endurance could have made. The comparison between the Bf109s and the Rhubarb sweeps is not a valid one, the Luftwaffe were escorting bombers, the RAF conducting fighter sweeps, two very different types of operations.

Stephen Bungay says: "When RAF Fighter Command took the offensive in 1941, the pilots carrying out sweeps over Northern France in order to draw up the Luftwaffe complained about many things, but not the range of the Spitfire."

This may be true, but as I say above it is not a valid comparison, and let's face it if you read accounts of the Battle the one thing Luftwaffe pilots don't complain about is their ammunition, the one thing they do complain about is the lack of fuel.

One of the biggest problems Fighter Command faced during the Battle was the sheer numbers of experienced pilots and officers who were being killed through exhaustion. Some respite was afforded by transfering tired units from the heaviest fighting in ten group to quieter areas, north of London in the Midlands, to the North of England, or even Scotland. If however the Luftwaffe had Mustang ranged 109s, there would have been nowhere for these tired units to rest, attrition of the most experienced pilots and leaders would reach a disasterous rate, and the results to the airforce as a whole would concievably equal the fate of the Japanese Air Forces around 1945. Whether faced with this an, at that point unpopular government could have resisted the calls to make peace with Germany is another matter.

As is often pointed out as well, the RAF was never actually short of planes throughout the Battle, if however the Luftwaffe had been able to fly escorted daylight raids over any aircraft factory anywhere in the country, this situation could have been different.

Finally as I said, there was more at stake for the British than just local air superiority over Kent, from the embassies in London the world had a grandstand view of the latter phases of the Battle, and much of this information was fed back to the various governments and intelligence agencies. Let's face it, we needed American backing, we needed the supplies that American was sending and we needed Lend-Lease.

The US could not have justified backing Britain unless Britain could fight on. If long range Luftwaffe fighters were shooting down large numbers of exhausted and weary RAF fighters over the nation's capital who could blame the international community for deciding that Britain was finished?

[PMN1]

Here is an answer to the same question I put on the warships1 board

http://pub165.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussionboardsfrm8.showMessage?topicID =1603.topic&index=2

I guess the idea of extending the range of the Me-109s is a double edged sword. If you assume that the Germans could have used drop tanks on a routine basis (if they could have made several hundred per day for the entire battle), I think you would have to assume that the British could do the same. Certainly, if the Germans alone could have done it, their effective ness would have increased greatly, being able to cover the bombers for longer periods and to more distant targets. t would however, also have increased their time in hostile territory, increasing the possibility of attack/duration of attack. As pointed out, the longer the Me-109s were in combat, the less effective their armamant became.

Had the British done it as well though, the odds swing dramatically in their favour. They would have been able to send their fighters up earlier to get into a better position (mainly with regards to altitude), and decoy raids would not have caught them short of fuel. Their ammuntion loads would have been better in a longer combat situation, and they still would have been fighting over friendly soil, always a huge advantage. I think that had the Germans used the tactic, the British would have quickly worked it out and would have done it as well. Both sides very quickly adapted to new tactics/weapons employed by the other side, so neither had a large advantage over the other for long. With the British fighting over their own land, I think the winning advatange in the Battle always rested with them.

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by simon

An interesting argument.

Firstly I'd like to point out that the Battle of Britain should always be considered on two levels, military and political, the latter I believe was the most important.

Militarily the issue is somewhat cloudy, quite ignoring the question of ammunition (Which I make as 6 seconds rather than 7), as the Luftwaffe never actually had any clear directive throughout the Battle although it is generally accepted that local air superiority over Kent and Sussex was their most achievable aim.

So consider what a difference the extra endurance could have made. The comparison between the Bf109s and the Rhubarb sweeps is not a valid one, the Luftwaffe were escorting bombers, the RAF conducting fighter sweeps, two very different types of operations.

Stephen Bungay says: "When RAF Fighter Command took the offensive in 1941, the pilots carrying out sweeps over Northern France in order to draw up the Luftwaffe complained about many things, but not the range of the Spitfire."

This may be true, but as I say above it is not a valid comparison, and let's face it if you read accounts of the Battle the one thing Luftwaffe pilots don't complain about is their ammunition, the one thing they do complain about is the lack of fuel.

One of the biggest problems Fighter Command faced during the Battle was the sheer numbers of experienced pilots and officers who were being killed through exhaustion. Some respite was afforded by transfering tired units from the heaviest fighting in ten group to quieter areas, north of London in the Midlands, to the North of England, or even Scotland. If however the Luftwaffe had Mustang ranged 109s, there would have been nowhere for these tired units to rest, attrition of the most experienced pilots and leaders would reach a disasterous rate, and the results to the airforce as a whole would concievably equal the fate of the Japanese Air Forces around 1945. Whether faced with this an, at that point unpopular government could have resisted the calls to make peace with Germany is another matter.

As is often pointed out as well, the RAF was never actually short of planes throughout the Battle, if however the Luftwaffe had been able to fly escorted daylight raids over any aircraft factory anywhere in the country, this situation could have been different.

Finally as I said, there was more at stake for the British than just local air superiority over Kent, from the embassies in London the world had a grandstand view of the latter phases of the Battle, and much of this information was fed back to the various governments and intelligence agencies. Let's face it, we needed American backing, we needed the supplies that American was sending and we needed Lend-Lease.

The US could not have justified backing Britain unless Britain could fight on. If long range Luftwaffe fighters were shooting down large numbers of exhausted and weary RAF fighters over the nation's capital who could blame the international community for deciding that Britain was finished?
c

[curmudgeon]

quote:Originally posted by simon

An interesting argument.

Firstly I'd like to point out that the Battle of Britain should always be considered on two levels, military and political, the latter I believe was the most important.

Militarily the issue is somewhat cloudy, quite ignoring the question of ammunition (Which I make as 6 seconds rather than 7), as the Luftwaffe never actually had any clear directive throughout the Battle although it is generally accepted that local air superiority over Kent and Sussex was their most achievable aim.

So consider what a difference the extra endurance could have made. The comparison between the Bf109s and the Rhubarb sweeps is not a valid one, the Luftwaffe were escorting bombers, the RAF conducting fighter sweeps, two very different types of operations.

Stephen Bungay says: "When RAF Fighter Command took the offensive in 1941, the pilots carrying out sweeps over Northern France in order to draw up the Luftwaffe complained about many things, but not the range of the Spitfire."

This may be true, but as I say above it is not a valid comparison, and let's face it if you read accounts of the Battle the one thing Luftwaffe pilots don't complain about is their ammunition, the one thing they do complain about is the lack of fuel.

One of the biggest problems Fighter Command faced during the Battle was the sheer numbers of experienced pilots and officers who were being killed through exhaustion. Some respite was afforded by transfering tired units from the heaviest fighting in ten group to quieter areas, north of London in the Midlands, to the North of England, or even Scotland. If however the Luftwaffe had Mustang ranged 109s, there would have been nowhere for these tired units to rest, attrition of the most experienced pilots and leaders would reach a disasterous rate, and the results to the airforce as a whole would concievably equal the fate of the Japanese Air Forces around 1945. Whether faced with this an, at that point unpopular government could have resisted the calls to make peace with Germany is another matter.

As is often pointed out as well, the RAF was never actually short of planes throughout the Battle, if however the Luftwaffe had been able to fly escorted daylight raids over any aircraft factory anywhere in the country, this situation could have been different.

Finally as I said, there was more at stake for the British than just local air superiority over Kent, from the embassies in London the world had a grandstand view of the latter phases of the Battle, and much of this information was fed back to the various governments and intelligence agencies. Let's face it, we needed American backing, we needed the supplies that American was sending and we needed Lend-Lease.

The US could not have justified backing Britain unless Britain could fight on. If long range Luftwaffe fighters were shooting down large numbers of exhausted and weary RAF fighters over the nation's capital who could blame the international community for deciding that Britain was finished?

[curmudgeon]

AAArrgh finger trouble

quote:Originally posted by simon

An interesting argument.



One of the biggest problems Fighter Command faced during the Battle was the sheer numbers of experienced pilots and officers who were being killed through exhaustion. Some respite was afforded by transfering tired units from the heaviest fighting in ten group to quieter areas, north of London in the Midlands, to the North of England, or even Scotland.


11 Group surely

The Germans never understood the importance of RAF ground control using radar and observer corps data (then neither did Douglas Bader ...). The Dowding/Park tactic of feeding fighters in would have necessitated dropping tanks fairly early (earlier if very early interception had been important with fighters sent further out). It is an interesting point what difference another 20 minutes would have been. This would need to be offset against greater vulnerability when tanked up and the unreliability of early drop tanks (this wasn't a mature technology in 1940).

[simon]

Correct, 11 not 10 group, that's what typing a reply like that from memory does for you... [:I]

The RAF had a huge tactical advantage throughout the Battle of Britain by fighting over their own land, however taking the extreme of the "Mustang-109" if these were available during the period of the concentrated attacks on airfields I'm not sure that the RAF would have had the chance to adapt, or the experienced commanders at squadron or section level to implement any changes in tactics or policies. Don't forget exactly how much pilot attrition hurt fighter command, especially toward the end of this phase.

"They would have been able to send their fighters up earlier to get into a better position (mainly with regards to altitude), and decoy raids would not have caught them short of fuel."

Fuel was never an issue for the RAF during the Battle of Britain, in fact I've read a reference in one book to the RAF sending aircraft up with half full tanks since the lower overall weight meant that they could climb slightly quicker, were slightly faster and slightly more manoueverable.

The real problem with the decoy raids was not necessarily that of the fighters being caught refuelling, although this was an issue, the main problem was actually how much additional stress and strain it placed on the Pilots scrambling them for yet another sortie, when they may then have to land, refuel and rearm and scramble again. It made them tired, played havoc with their nerves and in many cases meant that they made mistakes that got them killed. The Luftwaffe knew this and it was deliberate.

So overall extra fuel tankage would not have helped the Spitfires and Hurricanes that much, especially when neither carried more than 15 seconds of gunfire for their machineguns.

What it would have meant for the Luftwaffe though would be that the bombers would have more time under an escort of friendly fighters before the latter had to break off and run for home, especially over the south east, Leigh-Mallory's insistance on the "Big-Wing" tactic would mean that in all liklihood his group would continue to miss the bulk of the heaviest fighting by spending so long forming up, until 11 group's position became untenable, at which point Leigh-Mallory's airfields could have been targetted, or the Luftwaffe could have begun bombing London more or less at will.

It could have allowed the Luftwaffe to indulge in a little target-of-opportunity strafing on the way home. Two machineguns may not have been an impressive armament for a 1940s fighter, but even then a couple of tracer rounds would turn a bowser (and any attached ground crew and aircraft) into a fireball very quickly.

So overall the Luftwaffe would have lost fewer planes, the RAF would have lost more, and crucially would have lost more of their experienced and veteran pilots and junior commanders.

If Fighter Command had to concede local airsuperiority over Kent, or even worse part of London, the remaining international backing for Britain would have probably evaporated, and without this backing, especially from the US, we would have had no choice left but to negotiate a conditional cessation of hostilities. I have deliberately left out the word "Surrender" because it may not have come to that.