The "best" and its preconditions

[Romantic Technofreak]

This time I would like to start a real difficult discussion. We all know about the outstanding position of the Boeing B-29, but it must have been an immense effort to get it there. Once I read that firms over the whole U.S. were involved in its development and production. And this while the entire country established record after record in the production of any weapon that can be imaginated. This links says the B-29 was the most expensive project of the war:

http://www.acepilots.com/planes/b29.html

Not the same thing happened to the B-29s rival, the Consolidated B-32 Dominator(use the further link to the "Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft" for more).

http://www.daveswarbirds.com/usplanes/aircraft/dominatr.htm

Was it just impossible for America to develop a second very heavy bomber or were management failures responsible for the problems of the B-32 (PMN1, note its impressing tailfin!)?

It is the question if another country would have been even able to develop such an airplane and to bring it into action. For Germany, it is very questionable if it would ever have been possible to finish the development of the Messeschmitt Me 264. If you look on the flight evaluations of the Luft46 link, you see things like tail vibrations and rudder flattering, that should not occur in a proceeded status of development:

http://www.luft46.com/prototyp/me264.html

The other (maybe only simply "heavy", not "very") heavy advanced German bomber, could have been produced from summer 1944 on, when the whole German bomber production was cancelled. Surely the production of the He 277 could have started earlier, and it is very mysterious why this did not take place. It is not o.k. to make Göring responsible for this, if it is not for omitting. I have a source quoting him finding it "ununderstandable why this aircraft is still developped with two coupled engines". He ordered diving capability is not to claim from the He 177. So, if it was not the chaos in the RLM that produced that situation, and the "dive pope" Udet committed suicide in November 1941, there is only another possible culprit remaining. It is Ernst Heinkel. Not only that he took the contract for an over-heavy diver. Heinkel was very ambitious, and with the He 162 he produced another unusable plane, being very proud about the shortness of its development. I speculate Heinkel wanted to demonstrate that he was able to produce a diver of this unique size...

Although Italy, due to its poor level of production automatization, was the least of the bigger countries to produce a very heavy very good bomber, I am sure that constructor Filippo Zappata (at this thime still working for CANT) had one on his drawing board already before the end of the war: the later Breda-Zappata BZ 308 civil airliner. Should have not been to hard to convert it to a very heavy bomber, and could have been a nice within-Axis rival of the Me 264, if both could have been brought into service:

http://www.aerei-italiani.net/SchedeT/aereobz308.html

After the end of the war in Europe, also Britain had a competitor in this class, the Avro Lincoln. But the Lincoln was just a bigger Lancaster, and compared to the B-29 the concept looks obsolete and proved unnessecary also for the war in the Pacific. I did not find a very good link for it, but this one looks a bit interesting for quoting a Cold War incident:

http://www.spyflight.co.uk/LINC.HTM

I wonder if Britain´s development and production capacities were exhausted by the end of the war for to develop a new and really advanced very heavy bomber design. If I remember correctly, PMN1 mentioned British projects that fit to this imagination. Who knows more about that?

Hope this lengthy and complicated topic finds also some interest!

[GregP]

The Boeing B-29 was, indeed, the most expensive weapon system developed by the U.S.A. during WWII. It was fast (576 kph), carried a heavy load (9075 kg), had long range (5230 km), and had a very good service ceiling (9700 m). It used Wright R-3350 turbo-compound engines (1640 kW each). Each engine used two turbochargers. In case you don't know, the U.S.A. had very small amounts of alloying metals in the early WWII years, particularly Tungsten, so turbochargers and superchargers were in cricically short supply. The B-29 also used remote turrets and other advanced and complex systems.

The B-32 Dominator was developed as a stop gap measure in case the B-29 failed. Since the B-29 did NOT fail, development of the B-32 was cancelled. In the early form, the B-32 was just as fast (576 kph), carried a similar load (9072 kg), had longer range (6115 kM), and the service celing was 10,700 m. On paper it was everything the B-29 was and slightly more.

However, Boeing produced an excellent design that was well thought out, with attention given to ease of maintenance, and adaptability of the bomb compartment to many types of weapons. In the event, the Boeing B-29 was the aircraft of choice for the USAAF, so the B-32 had only a small test squadron formed and was not continued with. If you stop and think about it, why would we make two aircraft with the same capabilities? That means two different sets of spare parts, and two completely different training curriculums to develop so the USAAF mechanics and pilots couokd learn to fly and maintain their aircraft. What would be the point of the extra expenditure?

Yes, the U.S.A. COULD have developed two fast strategic bombers, but the best course was to develop one good one and go with it.

The Avro Lincoln was a good aircraft, but was no B-29. It was 100 kph slower than the B-29, carried 3,000 kg less load, had half the range, and had a ceiling 1000 m lower. That means it was much more vulnerable to enemy fighters and flak than was the B-29.

In point of operational fact, enemy fighters had one chance at the B-29 and that was the first head-on pass. Once they went by, they could not catch the B-29 and shoot at it since it was bombing at very near the top speed of opposing fighters.

As for the Germans, they could have fielded the He-277 and had a good airplane. They could have developed the Junkers Ju-488 and had the same. They could have developed the Messerschmitt Me-264 and had the same. But every time the German aircraft inductry came out with a new wonder plane, the top brass insisted on using it for things it was not designed to do.

Thank heaven the Nazi top brass were composed of idiots when it came to employing airborne weapons. If not for this fortunate happenstance, the war would have been much worse ... and it already was the worst, most destructive war in the history of the planet.

There WERE some good heavy bombers. The Piaggio P.108 was a B-17-like Italian bomber and could have made a difference. The Petlyakov Pe-8 was also a B-17-like Soviet bomber tha was pretty good, but was not built in numbers since the Soviets were primarily concerned with supporting ground forces rather than strategic bombing. The Nakajima G8N bomber was very close to a B-29 in capability, but never reached production. Why not is anyone's guess, but Allied air attacks in 1944 were not easy to avoid. The G5N was developed from the Douglas DC-4E, but was cancelled because Japan had no experience developing heavy, 4-engine aircraft. The Myasishev DVB-102 was pretty good, but was cancelled because the Soviet Union decided to copy the B-29! The Martin Mars could carry the bomb load of a B-29, but was slow and so not suited to strategic bombing in the face of determined fighter opposition and flak. The Junkers Ju-290 and 390 could have been developed, but were "too little, too late" like most of the Nazi developments. If they had concentrated on only ONE of the 4-engine heavies, they would have been better off in the long run. The French had a good plane in the Breguet Br 482, but were not able to do anything with it due to being occupied by Nazis at the time. The Bloch MB 162 was useful and very B-17-like but, again, the French were occupied at the time they needed to USE the MB 162s.

The Brits had the Lancaster, Shackelton ,and Lincoln. All were useful and performed well. They only came up short when compared with the Boeing B-29. As it happens, the B-29s were not used much in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), so the great difference in performance between the B-29 and the heavies in use was never evident and the British heavies were among the best-performing bombers used in the ETO.

Let's remember that the British heavies were as good or better than the B-17 and only came up short if they were compared with a bomber (B-29) not in use at the time in Europe. therefore, the British Avros were the best in use in Europe. If B-29s HAD been used, they would have had an edge in speed, payload, range, and ceiling ... but they probably could not have been deployed to Europe until sometime in 1944, by which time the handwriting was on the wall for the Germans. So, why deploy a new theater weapon system when the existing weapon system is winning the conflict and the end is in sight?

[robert]

quote:Originally posted by Romantic Technofreak

I wonder if Britain´s development and production capacities were exhausted by the end of the war for to develop a new and really advanced very heavy bomber design. If I remember correctly, PMN1 mentioned British projects that fit to this imagination. Who knows more about that?



There were several potential huge bombers that were looked at in the mid-war period (by Bristol, Vickers, and others) which never came to fruition. Post-war, aside from develping the Lincoln, there was no interest in developing large British piston-engine bombers, as jets were seen to be the wave of the future. The Canberra, of course, was conceived before the end of the war, and flew in 1949. The specification that led to the Avro Vulcan and Handley-Page Victor was issued in 1947. The use of nukes changed everything; one smaller aircraft carrying a nuke was as powerful as a whole fleet of conventional bombers. So there was no incentive to develop a large conventional bomber.

As for Britain being too tired to build large aircraft after the war, yes they were commercial failures, but if you're unfamiliar with the Bristol Brabazon

http://unrealaircraft.com/content.php?page=c_brab

http://www.aviationarchive.org.uk/stories/pages.php?enum=GE121&pnum=0&maxp=9

http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/VanTilborg/2887L.jpg

and Saunders-Roe Princess,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saunders-Roe_Princess

http://1000aircraftphotos.com/PRPhotos/SAROPrincess.htm

http://home.t-online.de/home/airbornegrafix/HistoricAircraft/SAROprincess.htm

wow, are you in for a shock. :)

[Romantic Technofreak]

Although I hear already some contradiction from Greg, I want to utter my point more precisely.

If you stop and think about it, why would we make two aircraft with the same capabilities? That means two different sets of spare parts, and two completely different training curriculums to develop so the USAAF mechanics and pilots couokd learn to fly and maintain their aircraft. What would be the point of the extra expenditure?


Because everybody did that except Germany starting the war with one easy fighter, one dive-bomber and one destroyer design. Any other nation used at least two designs for most roles (sometimes it was only one or even none, but only Germany restricted three classes of airplanes to just one chosen frame). The results of this misunderstood economism are well-known.

Also the USA tried to employ two very heavy bomber designs with the B-29 and the B-32, but failed with this. Surely, one was enough, because this one was outstandingly good. But what if the B-29 had shown structural mishaps that were not detected during tests?

My point is that even the USA were on the edge of their abilities with producing a bomber design of this quality, let only two. Also the B-29 development showed nearly unsurmountable difficulties, which could only be overcome by the strain of the whole country ("Battle of Kansas", see the link I set above, although this might be a bit exaggerated).

But the difficulties the B-32´s development had to face were not solved the same way. Contrary to Boeing, Consolidated was not able to keep up. What I like to know is: were America´s resources really exhausted by the development of all those weapons, or was it just Consolidated´s mismanagement that hampered the B-32? Consolidated/Convair suffered more than one defeat against Boeing (B-24 considered inferior to B-17; B-46 lost against B-47; B-60 lost against B-52; CV-990 lost against 707, I don´t know if B-36 and B-58 could slightly balance the result if they had to beat a Boeing competitor). So I think it is justified to suspect the company´s management abilities.

And this is why I put the same measure on any other country. If America was already on the edge of her abilities to produce such an airplane, how could this be done in another country, say Germany?
You don´t need the airframe alone, you need numerous things of the equipment to employ and test. And crew traing must be undertaken. The B-29 was service-ready within 19 months after its maiden flight, but for this the "Battle of Kansas" mentioned in the link above had to be fought. 19 months after its maiden flight the Messerschmitt Me 264 program was given up. Depending on the war situation, of course. But the Me 264 was far from serial production at that time. What was the reason? The overstraining of Germany´s resources? Or Messerschmitt´s mismanagement, that before produced the flops Me 209, 309 and 210 and added another drawing board champion, but was unable to grant the "simplest" functions working?

To Robert´s arguments, I understand them well, but there is still a quality gap between the Lincoln and the V-series bombers. If the war had continued, an airplane like the B-36 with compound propulsion might have been useful also for Britain. Brabazon and Princess are well-known in Germany, because they flew, and the Brabazon clearly showes the difficulties to develop such a big airplane during that time. But British super-heavy bomber projects are unknown here, and I am sure you cannot quote them from the net. So can you give me some denominations, for whenever I go to Britain and look for an appropriate book, I may know what to look for? Thank you!

[GregP]

Hi RT,

The B-32 was not a failure. It was not produced becasue the B-29 succeeded. It was developed solely as a stop gap measure in case the B-29 failed, and was at a nice stage in development to succeed if the B-29 had failed.

Consolidated Aircraft is a real can of worms. It was a consortium composed of the ultra rich. People who served on the United States Federal Reserve Board played key roles behind the scenes. They tried to eat up Northrop in 1949, and Jack Northrop said "No!" As a result, he was frozen out of winning significant contracts for the next 50 years or so.

Anyway, the U.S.A. was not at the end of its resources, the economics dictated the decisions. We COULD have spent a lot of money developing alternate aircraft but just because you CAN doesn't mean you SHOULD.

Likewise, Britain COULD have developed another heavy bomber if the war looked like it was going to drag on for another several years ... but the handwriting was on the wall by early 1944. Germany was beaten.

So, why spend money that you will only have to pay back later unless the return is sufficient to warrant the expense?

We can debate this endlessly, but the U.S.A.'s decisions were mostly motivated by whatever it took to end the war using mass production of weapons of sufficient effectiveness to do it. The B-29 was the best heavy bomber of WWII, so it was undoubtedly effective enough, and was later developed into the KB-50, a civil airliner, and a military transport for outsized cargo. That says a lot for the potential of the original airframe.

Yes, the U.S.A. was using more of its reources than we wanted to use. Yes the war was expensive. Yes, we were extended to the point of rationing. Were we at the end of our resources? No.

In point of fact, Britain was at the end of their indigenous resources and were forced to import many resources, but they were not at the end of those imported resources. The U.S.A. may have supplied a lot to England, but we weren't the only ones doing so, and the English were very clever in the use and disposition of the resouces they got. They weree and ARE resourseful.

Yes, they suffered greatly from German bombing and blockades by U-Boats, but the U-Boat menace was all but eliminated by mid-1944. The U-Boat arm suffered 75% casulaties due to advances in detection technology. Also, by mid-1944, the German bombing raids against England were nowhere NEAR the severity of the ones in 1940 - 1942. We had achieved air superiority by then and Germany was on the defensive on all fronts.

So, my contention is that, while the English and the US war industries were stretched thinly in 1940 - 1942, they were NOT stretched to anywhere near the breaking point by mid-1944 and were, in fact, rebounding to the point of designing new weapons (including new aircraft) in case the existing designes were not able to end the conflict soon enough to suit the respective governments. There were several designs ready for development in the U.S.A. and in England. They were simply not needed by September 1944, and so were not placed into production.

If the war had dragged on past 1945 in Europe, the Atomic Bomb would have ended the possibility of a Reich victory by that time anyway.

If you look at the U.S.A. and England, the period immediately following the war was one of development of a great many aeronautical prototypes. 1945 - 1955 saw more aircraft advances than at any other period before or since ... and that was right after you contend that the industrial bases of both countries were at their limits.

We went into WWII flying rag-wing biplanes and came out flying 500-600 mph jets. By 1950, England and the U.S.A. were flying Mach 1-plus jet fighters and 600 mph jet bombers. This was from the same industrial base that was present in 1944. I think that says a lot for the ability of both coutries to develop and field new designs when required.

I might point out that the Soviet Union wasn'r exactly sleeping at that time, either. The F-86 and Hawker Hunter (jsut to name two) were preceeded into service by the MiG-15, which came from the same Soviet aero industry that was almost wiped out by 1942 and was moved thousands of kilometers to put it out of range of the Luftwaffe, and was back producing within only months.

[simon]

"In point of fact, Britain was at the end of their indigenous resources and were forced to import many resources, but they were not at the end of those imported resources. The U.S.A. may have supplied a lot to England, but we weren't the only ones doing so, and the English were very clever in the use and disposition of the resouces they got. They weree and ARE resourseful."

Absolutely correct, and if it was not for supplies from the US Britain could not have survived, from the outset we were never a self sufficient nation (and still aren't), and could not even grow enough food to feed our population. (As a vaguely interesting side note, according to one former work colleague of Irish extraction, during the war Eire (A neutral) were able to charge such high prices for exports of food to mainland UK that they had to introduce rationing themselves, their farmers were selling everything they could to Britain!)

[robert]

quote:Originally posted by simon

Absolutely correct, and if it was not for supplies from the US Britain could not have survived, from the outset we were never a self sufficient nation (and still aren't), and could not even grow enough food to feed our population. (As a vaguely interesting side note, according to one former work colleague of Irish extraction, during the war Eire (A neutral) were able to charge such high prices for exports of food to mainland UK that they had to introduce rationing themselves, their farmers were selling everything they could to Britain!)


From what I understand, Britain could have fed itself, but only under strict rationing. Rations on some things were not lifted until 1955, believe it or not, long after the war was over! To quote John Singleton:

"Rationing, price controls, and subsidies were introduced during World War Two to ensure that supplies of food, clothing, and certain other consumer products were distributed on an equitable basis at fair prices. To a large extent, this policy was successful. Although people grumbled at the monotonous wartime diet of bread, potatoes, and vegetable pies, it was both nutritious and adequate in terms of bulk. In fact, the poor were better fed during the war than they had been in the 1930s."

The point was to prevent all of the good food going to the wealthy - there was enough food to go around, but only if those with money did not get all of it, which with the British class system, was a distinct possibility. At no point during WW2 was Britain anywhere close to starvation - the general populace may have hated the diet, and seemingly normal foods such as tropical fruits became almost never-seen luxuries, but everyone was fed adequately. Both of my parents were teenagers in England during WW2, and I've talked to them at length on this issue.

[GregP]

This is a bit off subject (I've never done THAT before, huh?), but I understand one of the things the U.S.A. inflicted on England was SPAM. This product is a mixture of several different meats, and tastes not like beef. pork, or chicken.

At any rate, I understand one of the many insults the English could heap upon an unsuspecting American was to call him a SPAM Can. They came to detest SPAM to a great degree, and so felt tahg anyone who would produce such things was less than a wonderful person.

True or not?

[robert]

quote:Originally posted by GregP

This is a bit off subject (I've never done THAT before, huh?), but I understand one of the things the U.S.A. inflicted on England was SPAM. This product is a mixture of several different meats, and tastes not like beef. pork, or chicken.

At any rate, I understand one of the many insults the English could heap upon an unsuspecting American was to call him a SPAM Can. They came to detest SPAM to a great degree, and so felt tahg anyone who would produce such things was less than a wonderful person.

True or not?


I'm not sure about that, but I do know two things:

1. The P-51 Mustang was often called the SPAM Can because it tended to wrinkle like, well, a SPAM can, and

2. If Monty Python's famous SPAM sketch is any indication of the British attitude towards SPAM, you may indeed be right!

http://www.detritus.org/spam/skit.html

[simon]

In some cases in Britain the word SPAM (Rather than SPAM-can) is still used to refer to the Americans today, I think the origins lie partly in the cans that the GIs and Liberty ships brought over with them, but also in the fact that SPAM standing for "Specially Processed American Meat" can also in the minds of the cynical be used to refer to the GIs themselves!

(He says hoping he causes no offence to our trans-Altlantic neighbours and bracing himself for the inevitable replies of "Hey Limey!")

To Robert,

Rationing to some degree was still in use as late as the Mid-1990s in British Forces bases in Germany, Soldiers, civilians and their dependants used to get alcohol and cigarettes at Tax free prices, so Tabacco and Spirits were all rationed to ensure that everyone got their fare share.

As for Britain never being in danger of starvation, I always understood that even Churchill considered Britain in greater danger of defeat during the Battle of the Atlantic than during the Battle of Britain. There could be many reasons for this, not least of which that the former Sea Lord had greater understanding and empathy with the sailors of the Royal Navy, US Navy and Merchant Navy than the Air Force, it could also reflect more on the lack of any real military impact that a withdrawal from the airforce bases in Kent may have had, or it could just be one of those enduring war-time myths!

Either way I cannot disagree with someone who actually lived at the time, so I stand corrected! [:I]

[Romantic Technofreak]

Dear Greg, I don´t like to seem know-all, but sometimes I can´t help myself. If you say the B-32 was not a failure, I only can quote from the link I have set in the beginning (from Joe Baugher´s Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft). There are so many problems that I nearly have to quote the whole article:


The first XB-32 (41-141) was rolled out at San Diego on September 1, 1942, nearly six months behind schedule.

The USAAF was already unhappy about the delays in both the B-29 and B-32 programs, and since the B-32 had actually been the first to be completed, the Army wanted flight tests to begin at once. Because of problems with the pressurization system and the gun turrets, these items had been left off the first XB-32 so that it could begin flight testing right away.

The first XB-32 took off on its maiden flight on September 7, 1942 from San Diego's Lindbergh Field, with test pilots Russell Rodgers and Richard McMakin at the controls. Problems with one of the rudder trim tab actuating rods forced an emergency landing at nearby NAS North Island after only 20 minutes in the air.

Development problems continued, and in February 1943 the YB-32 contract was cancelled. However, a month later a contract for three hundred B-32s was placed, although some USAAF officers were in favor of cancelling the B-32 program outright since the B-29 program was now proceeding forward rapidly.

On May 10, 1943, XB-32 41-141 crashed just after takeoff because of a flap malfunction, injuring six crewman and killing Consolidated test pilot Richard McMakin. This was a major setback for the B-32 program, since some vital test records had been destroyed in the crash, which meant that several tests had to be repeated.

The first flight of the third XB-32 (41-18336) was delayed by further technical problems. When finally completed in November of 1943, the machine by now incorporated several features that the Army deemed unsatisfactory. In December of 1943, the USAAF came to the conclusion that the B-32 as it then existed was obsolete by contemporary world standards. A host of changes were recommended in order to save the program from cancellation. The USAAF felt that the defensive firepower of the XB-32 was totally inadequate and recommended that the remotely-controlled turrets be replaced by manned turrets.

The first B-32 delivery was made on September 19, 1944 with the second Fort Worth-built aircraft (42-108472). However, it was written off the very same day when its nose wheel collapsed on landing. Production delays held up delivery of the next aircraft, 42-108475, until November 22.

By the end of December of 1944, only five aircraft had been delivered to the various test centers. In comparison, the B-29 had been in combat for nearly six months.

By mid-December 1944, the USAAF was quite unhappy about the delays and deficiencies in the B-32 program. Those B-32s already delivered were experiencing a high rate of mechanical malfunctions, and there were complaints about faulty workmanship on some of the delivered aircraft. Many in the USAAF were now recommending that the B-32 program be cancelled outright, with B-32 crews being transferred to B-29 units.

In service, the B-32 had numerous deficiencies. The cockpit had an extremely high noise level and the instrument layout was poor. Bombardier vision was rather poor. The aircraft was overweight for the available engine power, the mechanical subsystems were inadequate, and there were frequent engine fires caused by a faulty nacelle design. There were frequent undercarriage failures, which caused the type to be grounded briefly during May of 1945.

O.K. ,something positive too:

Many of the problems encountered during the B-32 service tests were eliminated in subsequent production aircraft, either through design changes or through better quality control during manufacture.


But to continue with negative aspects:

All three of the Dominators were to take part, but -108528 aborted on takeoff.

The last Dominator mission of the war was flown by four B-32s on August 28 in a reconnaissance mission to Tokyo. The mission was a disaster, although not because of any enemy action. 42-108544 lost an engine on takeoff and skidded off the runway. All 13 men aboard perished when the aircraft exploded and burned. On the way back from the target, 42-108528 lost power on two of its four engines. The plane's pilot ordered the crew to bail out, but two men perished.

No surplus B-32s were ever sold to foreign air forces, and the aircraft's complexity and reputation for mechanical unreliability made it unattractive on the postwar commercial market.

If you read this article sincerely, you also see the B-32 was originally planned as stop-gap-measure against a B-29 failure, but later played an important role in the USAAF planning, so, if successful, would have become the B-29´s wing comrade, like the B-24 was the B-17´s. But it did not come that way. Of course, you can turn every failure into a success if you put enough resources in. And that leads back to my initial question: If you overlook that all, do you still think a "Second Battle of Kansas" would have been possible for the USA to get the B-32 into service at nearly the same time as the B-29?

You still can say yes, but if you do, I ask you to consider the other armament (and more) production the USA undertook during WWII (hopefully I count correctly): atomic bomb, first nuclear powerplant, 10 fleet carriers, 9 easy carriers, 78 escort carriers, 4 battleships, 2 battlecruisers, some heavy cruisers(the only country that produced them during WWII), 1.700 Liberty ships, countless smaller warships, airplanes, tanks, motorized vehicles, artillery pieces and what else. Your organization and automatization was vastly better than Germany´s, but remember, your population was not so much bigger than ours (140 millions to 80 millions, if I remember correctly), and with millions of soldiers on the frontiers, even your resources must have come to a limit sometime.

So, Greg, if you still say the USA could have topped her performance, my question is, how much?

[GregP]

Hi Capilatus,

The USA COULD have fielded the B-32. No large airplane is without problems unless it is so simple as to be not an improvement over the previous aircraft. The B-32 was no exception. It had problems ... but they were overcome to the point where the B-32 COULD have been developed, if necessary, into a deployable product.

The B-29 had major issues. The worst was probably the engine overheating and engine fires. However, these issues were ironed out over time, and the B-32 was not needed in the event. So we didn't develop it further than necessary.

I have NO idea how much more the U.S.A. COULD have developed since we didn't need to do so. The B-17, B-24, B-29, and the many types of medium bombers were sufficient to win WWII when combined with the efforts from other allies, including the Air Force of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and other co-beligerent Air Forces.

Yes, we were strained, but we had not even BEGUN to hit the strain the Soviet Union was under. The Soviet Union picked up its aircraft design and manufacturing industry and moved it out of range of German bombers! They did this while at war with advancing German troops. Were THEY at the end of their design and production capability? I can't say, but the Soviet planes flying combat in 1945 were much different products than those flying combat in 1941.

The U.S.A. was under nowhere NEAR the same strain as the Soviet Union. We elected to keep the production lines going at the expense of new devlopments since the existing products were good enough to do the job. A case in point is the Grumman Hellcat. Studies showed it could be made to roll as well as the Corsair, but only if the flat center section of wing was removed ( and made parallel to the outer wing panels) and the total dihedral was reduced. The U.S. procurement boards was not willing to let the production lines be interrupted for a month to implement the changes, and the Hellcat never GOT the better wing ... IT WASN'T NEEDED.

I bet the Soviet Union didn't develop any more than was needed, either. Ditto the British and Australians. They developed the Commonwealth Ca-15, which was one of the highest performance piston fighters ever made (along with the F4U-5 Corsair, the P-51H, the Sea Fury, late model Tempests, the Martin-Baker MB-5, the VK-107-powered Yak-3, and a few others), but the Australians saw the handwriting on the wall, and knew jets were coming. So, they let the Ca-15 die a natural death, without even making a token number as we did with the B-32. Could they have manufactured it? Yes, but it was not needed at the time.

Same with the B-32.

[Corsarius]

I agree with GregP on this one (never thought I'd hear myself say that). The CA-15 was really great. Problems getting the engines from the US and continual development rehashes (high altitude fighter, medium altitude interceptor, multirole fighter, etc etc) stymied development. By the time it was up and running, we were on our way to Meteor Land, which did okay-ish against the superior MiGs in Korea.

Interestingly, I found a link to the B-32 Dominator and a forum such as our own. http://www.aero-web.org/specs/consolid/b-32.htm

Could anyone else verify the mission on Japan that this Fred Chevalier alludes to?

[GregP]

Actually, Caorsarius, I agree with a lot of things you say. I just tend to word it differently and usually have some other points to bring out since this IS a discussion board.

By and large, I think we both think similarly about a lot of WWII aviation-related subjects. I wouldn't be surprised if we agreed on most major points, but I confess I am not as "up to date" on the Australian contributions to WWII as I would like to be. This is no doubt due to the fact that literature on the subject is not widely circulated in the U.S.A.

Perhaps I am talking about myself too much here, but I am interested in the points of view from other countries as much as I am from out own point of view. There are some Americans who believe WE won the war pretty much on our own. I am NOT one of those.

Winning WWII was an Allied effort, not an American-only effort. We did our part. So did you, the British, the French Resistance, the Russians, the Poles that escaped to Britain, the Chinese, etc.

Hopefully, most peoples around the world see WWII as an Allied victory, too ... not an American or a British victory. We all needed each other to beat the Nazis ... with a nod to the famous Russian winter weather as a friend to us and a great hindrance to the Germans.

Sharing the credit is a thing that makes WWII victory a win-win situation. Saying that one country "won the war" creates dissention in even the most jaded of people. Everyone wants their efforts and suffering recognized, and it should not be too great an effort to do so, don't you think?

[Corsarius]

Sorry, GregP. I didn't mean to ruffle your feathers in that way!

But having said that..... Hear Hear!

[GregP]

No worries, Corsarius. As noted above, this IS a discussion board, and I generally don't get very "ruffled."

I don't feel I have "enemies" here (even if I disagree with a post) and neither do you. I think your comments add flavor, are usually incisive, well thought-out and, so far, pretty accurate. Can't ask for more. Many other posters here are, likewise, quite knowledgeable about the subjects we discuss.

I have tried other boards and forums on the subject, but the members in here are, by far, the most knowledgeable group I have run across. If people disagree with me in here, I usually find they usually have a point, even if I hadn't considered it before.

So go ahead and "ruffle" if you see fit. I won't mind a bit.

Thanks, Taglia, for having the best WWII forum on the web.

OK, now finish the new database! :)

[Corsarius]

Well, for me, as I noted once before: This is the ONLY forum I've ever been on where issues have ever been resolved, or people have formed a majority consensus.

And then we get back to the 'best fighter' thread..... 21 pages now? lol.

[Romantic Technofreak]

For Corsarius to verify Fred Chevalier´s mission, I quote again from Joe Baugher´s Encyclopedia:

During a reconnaissance mission over Tokyo on August 18, 42-108532 and 42-108578 were attacked by Japanese fighters. The American gunners claimed two kills and one probable, but -108578 was badly shot up and one of her crew was killed with two being injured. This was to prove to be the last combat action of World War 2.


You can read that here: http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_us/b032-01.html

To make my position about the B-32 clear, in the link Corsarius has set Charles A. Brown quotes his father, B-32 pilot Captain Alfred Neil Brown: "It wasn´t much of an airplane." He must know it, he flew it. Myself, I would never go this far. For me, the B-32 was a great airplane and a failure at the same time. I feel the same when somebody recommends the Ju 87 or the Me 163 to me.

Why the B-32 became a failure we cannot clear here finally, if the U.S. resources were near their limits or was it Consolidated´s mismanagement or kind of both. Maybe one day when I am retired I am going to put my lazy ass into the dusty archives and begin to study war economics.

I also find it great to have this great discussion forum about great airplanes with so many great contributors. But on war economy a net discussion is hopeless, I experienced this also in other forums.

[Lightning]

Hi Romantic Technofreak:

I have always read that it wasn't so much that the B-32 was a failure, but that the B-29 was such a success. Why change what's working so well. This sounds reasonable to me. What do you think?

[Romantic Technofreak]

Hi Lightning,

more or less, I think, we discuss about the definition of "failure". For itself, the B-32 was no failure. Compared with the B-29s success, it was one. What I wanted to know is why the B-29 was successful and the B-32 was not. This leads to the question if the USA could have done the same effort for the B-32 as she did for the B-29, and we could not clear this question satisfactorily. When you imagine that the most younger men are in uniform and the most older men work for the armament industry or to supply it and the military, how can you free the labourforce you need for a second "most costly" project ("most costly" means the B-29s were more expensive than the Iowa class battleships or the Essex class carriers). Employing housewives and young girls that are not already nurses?

[Lightning]

Hi Romantic Technofreak:

I think you have a point there. An astonishing fact that seems to have been forgotten is that the B-29 program cost more than the Manhatten Project-the devlopement of the atomic bomb!!

Also, the B-32 was accepted as a back-up to the B-29 from the start,in case the B-29 program ran into unacceptable problems and/or delays.

[ickysdad]

Actually guys the US wasn't as topped out as you might think in WW2 according to Alan Gupman's "The Myth of US mobilisation in WW2" the US industry didn't expand that much,we just converted consumer goods industrioes over to wartime production. There were alot of strikes during the war for one thing,something you didn't see elsewhere.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by ickysdad

Actually guys the US wasn't as topped out as you might think in WW2 according to Alan Gupman's "The Myth of US mobilisation in WW2" the US industry didn't expand that much,we just converted consumer goods industrioes over to wartime production. There were alot of strikes during the war for one thing,something you didn't see elsewhere.


Something I do rememebr reading once (god knows where or when) was that by the end of 1944 even the US was running short of available 'bodies' for combat and production.

I've only read it once and never seen it again.