The Doolittle Raid and the Battle of Midway.

[simon]

As this has been brought up already I thought I'd type out a separate post about it so as not to hijack RTF’s excellent Me261 thread.

The Battle of Midway was one of the turning points of the Pacific war, the destruction of the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu and the pilot attrition in the battle robbed Japan of the spearhead of her naval aviation and effectively started the rot that reduced her air force to a shadow of itself over the relatively short space of two years.

To set Midway into context the events leading up to it have to be considered. Firstly we have the Doolittle raid of April 18th 1942.

The Doolittle raid was not as has been mentioned a trap to draw the Japanese into an attack on Midway. The Americans had no wish to draw the Japanese into a naval battle at this point, the Japanese had at this point a significant advantage a numerically superior surface fleet, especially in carriers and capital ships in the Pacific. If anything was hoped of the Doolittle raid, bearing in mind the Hornet had been detected after the raid had been launched , it was that the threat of a repeat of the raid would force at least part of the Japanese forces to remain near the home islands as a deterrent.

The raid itself brought home to the Japanese the threat the US Carriers posed, combined with the loss of face that bombs on Tokyo had caused made the Japanese determined to eliminate the threat of these carriers. Remember at this point the Japanese still planned to establish a defensive line of Pacific Island bases against which the US Navy and Marine Corps would batter itself until there was a peace treaty.

Was the fact that the Carriers were at sea during the Pearl Harbour attack deliberate? I doubt it, only in the minds of conspiracy theorists. The reason I say this is as is covered in other posts, Navies the world over still believed in the fundamental supremacy of the Battleship. If the US conspired to save the most important part of her Navy whilst luring Japan into the attack then the Battleships would have been on manoeuvres, not the Carriers.

Coral Sea further enforced this where pretty much the presence of a US carrier Task Force thwarted the Japanese invasion plans, and although the ensuing battle could be technically counted as a tactical defeat for the USN (Loss of the Lexington and severe damage to the Yorktown vs. damage to the Shokaku and the loss of the Light Carrier Shoho), strategically the US could far better afford the losses than the Japanese, and perhaps as important, the US Sailors and Naval Aviators were learning skills that would prove invaluable to the US Navy as a whole as the war wore on.

It was the results of this battle that compelled the Japanese to look seriously into Yamamoto’s plans for an invasion of Midway. The logic was that once the weakly defended coral atoll was secured Betty bombers and search planes would detect the oncoming US response that was bound to attempt to recapture the strategically important position, and the remaining US Carriers would be destroyed by Nagumo’s waiting ambush. This base could then be used to detect and direct the Imperial Fleet’s response to any further US endeavours launched from Pearl Harbour via land based patrol bombers. This would of course have included any further Doolittle Raids, but this was not because the Japanese believed that they had been launched from Midway.

Good plan, but it was thwarted by the efforts of the CINCPAC code-breakers at Pearl Harbour who, bouyed by their success in the Coral Sea engagement, managed to trick the Japanese into revealing their objective and through a combination of skill, hard work and more than a little luck, the US counter ambush was prepared and the rest as they say is history.

My earlier comments with regard to RTF’s comments were I accept unwarranted, and I should have known that it was not his intention to insult the memory of the Doolittle Raiders.

Comments and Constructive criticisms…?

[GregP]

Nice summation of Midway. I think the US came out on top almost as a matter of luck. The Japanese carriers were doing a Chinese fire drill between bombs and torpedos when we found them, and that surely has to be a high point in bad decisions.

If they had simply launched when armed, we might have had a mucj harder time of it, and the CAP Zeros would have already landed and been refueled.

[Romantic Technofreak]

I always have the problem, I read something interesting, maybe from a book in a library or an obscure magazine, and after years or decades, not knowing about the source any more, I quote it from memory. So I cannot prove what I have read. I also have to admit that I often fall victim to conspiracy theories. And there is another possibility: of course I "quote" from German sources. Is it possible that the Anglo-American ones "polish" a little?

The military meaning of the Doolittle Raid was small. Due to the little number of airplanes used, the damage done was neglectable, all airplanes were lost, and the crews had big difficulties to make it home. To force the Japanese to undertake considerable home defence measures by this was an illusion. What remains is the propaganda success, and this was widely taken advantage of. Understandable after some months of defeat and retreat.

Searching the web for to support my arguments, especially in short time, is a hard thing to do. But what I found was that it was not uncovered how the B-25s managed to get to Japan. Asked where they had come from, Roosevelt answered: "From Shangri-La!" See this link for prove:

http://www.palmdigitalmedia.com/product/book/excerpt/12261

So, why was it necessary to hide that they did not come from the nearest land base, Midway? Of course for to make the Japanese believe they came from there! And what was the purpose of this if not to provocate an attack on Midway?

The American code-breakers were very good. Already before Pearl Harbor, when negotiations still were undertaken, the broke the Japanese diplomatic code. The American High Command knew exactly about the Japanese attack plans, and the conclusion that they consciuously laid the obsolete battleships there while they saved the valuable carriers is not very hard to do. Remember that Taranto and the fate of the Bismarck happened already 13 rsp. 7 months before. The Americans understood Yamamoto´s lesson to the world before he even told it, and they understood it better than he hemself, if you look on Midway.

If I had been Nimitz, I would not have defended Midway. Facing a superior Japanese power, I would have done what happened before Pearl Harbor, I would have sent my three carriers to a position in some distance to Hawaii and count on my superior land-based forces to push back the enemy. If the Japanese wanted to take Midway, they could do it. Sooner or later their main fleet had to leave, and then I could take Midway back easily, or even leave it to the Japanese.
But Nimitz had a better plan. He knew that the Japanese were already weakened from Coral Sea and they would not come in concentration, but also divert to the Aleutians for an effort to turn away the Americans from Midway. So he located his carriers there.

The Japanese, especially Nagumo, did not really believe in the possibility of American carriers staying in the region. So they made no preparation for this and were taken completely by surprise when the American carriers were detected, because they concentrated too hard on destroying this land target.

Midway was intended only as stepping stone for the Japanese on their way to Hawaii. But it also could have been left behind, like in December 1941, and taken after Hawaii had been conquered. So this strategically meaningless attack had only one reason: a psychological fixation, caused by the Doolittle raid.

Surely, I make lots of conclusions here. But I think, they are not less logical than another way of view.

[simon]

Yes Taranto and the fates of the Bismark and Prince of Wales should have shown the world that the Battleship was obsolete, but it didn't. I point to the newly built Iowa class Battleships that the US was making throughout their involvement in the war. If the Americans of the time truly understood as only we can the benefit of our 20/20 hindsight how vulnerable Battleships were to Carrier aircraft, then these hulls once layed down would have been completed as aircraft carriers, and the sunken Battleships at Pearl Harbour would not have been refloated, repaired and sent back into action.

The truth is that only really once the war was over and the world as a whole was able to take stock of what the Battleships had achieved as offset against the huge cost of their construction and maintainance and their relative vulnerability to relatively small, cheap and easily maintained aircraft that anyone in any position of authority appreciated that for the class as a whole, the were well past their prime.

Think I'm wrong? Then ask yourself why Battleships were still being built up till the war's end and why no more were built after. Yes they were maintained, modernised and adapted into the 1990s, but by then the really expensive part, the construction, had already been carried out.

Yes the codebreakers had broken the Diplomatic code, but this did not mean that they were privy to information on the attack on Pearl Harbour because the Diplomats themselves only found out after the attack had taken place.

Nimitz's only objective in the battle to was to cause the Japanese damage:

“…you will be governed by the principles of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean avoidance of exposure of your forces to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy.”

Admiral C. Nimitz’s Letter of Instruction to Admirals Fletcher and Spruance.

He was not hoping, nor expecting to defeat the Japanese, merely preserve his valuable carriers whilst hopefully causing the Japanese some damage, they were equally hoping to cause casualties amongst the invading Japanese Marines and had significantly increased Midway's ground based defences.

You say that the possibility that the attacks came from Midway was not discounted in order to make the Japanese believe that they might. This logic does not follow I'm afraid. The possibility that the B-25s had flown from bases in the Soviet Union was not discounted either, with the Soviet Union facing a second summer offensive from the Wehrmacht was Roosevelt really trying to encourage the Japanese into attacking the Russians through Siberia too?

If this kind of thing was the intention I would have expected Roosevelt to goad the Japanese into a direct attack on Pearl Harbour, not some tiny coral atoll that was difficult and expensive to defend, and indeed looking at maps if the Japanese were willing to believe the bombers came from Midway, Hawaii would have been credible too.

Finally I don't believe Midway itself was seen as a stepping stone to Hawaii merely a method of containing and detecting the US counters to Japanese manouevres, if you look up the Combined Fleet website (I'll see if I can dig out the precise link later), there are some excellent articles written about this phase of the Pacific war, including one on exactly how inpractical an invasion of Hawaii would have been.

The Japanese were overconfident, but they were not foolish, if they had decided to attempt and invasion they would have known the suicidal odds against them, and at that stage of the war there were still easier and possibly better targets elsewhere.

[simon]

Here's the Link: http://www.combinedfleet.com/articles.htm

[Romantic Technofreak]

O.K., Simon, another argument battle between us. I enjoy it, hope you do the same!

Your argumentation has five main lines. Let me answer to each of them separatedly.

1. The obsolescence of the battleship
The battleship was not generally considered obsolete in the beginning of WWII. First, it looked opposite when the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the British carrier Glorious. The battleship could also not be considered obsolete as long as the enemy had some. So, remebering e.g. the Renown always covering the Ark Royal, convoys and carrier groups had to be covered by battleships or battlecruisers as long as the enemy´s heavy ship classes had to be expected on the scene after a possible slipping through the aerial reconnoisation.
I only wanted to say that the battleships located in Pearl Harbour were considerd obsolete, and neglectable, by the American leadership. Not only the carriers, also the newly built North Carolina were not dislocated there. Roosevelt and his team were exceptionally good psychologists. While the Japanese believed their attack on Pearl Harbour would demoralize the American public, the American leadership knew that the contrary would come out, the more the bigger the damage was that could be shown.
I can imagine that such words are still not very pleasurable to hear in American ears, because they mean that Roosevelt consciously sacrificed his ships, and their crews, for to produce a moral boost for war in the American public. I admit that I cannot quote that correctly, and if I could, many people would call a lie what is written in the book I quote from. But for me, this kind of view is not illegitimate.

2. Knowledge of the Japanese attack plan against Pearl Harbour
My argumentation above implies that the American leadership was exactly informed about the Japanese attack plan, and the information was consciously not proceeded to Kimmel and the Army Commanding General (don´t remeber his name), and later both had to take over responsibility for what happened. Again, I don´t want to disparage the remebering of somebody. I also did not invent that. I read it somewhere or saw it in a tv documentation, and I wonder why you never heared about that, given you really never did.

3. Nimitz´s order
Nimitz ordering Fletcher and Spruance to be cautious is not a counter argument against mine. I never claimed that Midway was an absolutely sure game for the Americans. They still ran a high risk, the enemy was still strong. The point is, why to seek a battle at Midway at all, if not for to surprise the enemy there?

4. The Soviet variant
Unbelievable, even for the Japanese, after at least one Doolittle crew got interned in Siberia. The Japanese, and the Russians before VE-day, had no interest in waging war against each other. Roosevelt, who always wanted to have a deep agreement with Stalin, would never have tried to trick his biggest ally for to involve him in a conflict unnecessary for American interests.

5. Hawaii as an invasion target
I have a German book that clearly describes Yamamotos June´42 attack strategy, so his big landing fleet was rather intended for Hawaii than for the small Midway islands. This does not mean Hawaii would have been an easy walk for the Japanese, as your link clearly says, but it also does not say that the Japanese might not have tried it if they had succeeded on Midway. I told you already how I would have tried to defend Hawaii. I would have used the carriers for a counter attack after the Japanese landing force had entangled within the Hawaii defence system rather than risking them at Midway. But this is the difference between a great admiral like Nimitz and a hobby strategist like me!

Simon, probably this time we have to part without an agreement. I still conclude: an attack on Midway made no strategic sense, nor did the defence. Were there not special circumstances: the Japanese forcing need to attack it and the Americans waiting in ambush there for them...!

[simon]

Well, I'm willing to agree to disagree on that one, but I will allow myself a parting shot.

The Battleships sank and damaged at Pearl Harbour were obviously not considered that obsolete, since the US Navy refloated and repaired them, not just for use as training vessels or to remove harbour obstructions, but as fighting ships, and a number saw action again in the only true Battleline action of the war at Leyte Gulf.

Midway did make strategic sense. From there the Japanese could move onto the planned defensive phase of the war using patrol bombers to keep a close watch on the US Navy and shipping moving in around Pearl Harbour, this intelligence could have proved vital as Island bases were built and re-inforced.

I believe that you are correct in that an attack on Pearl Harbour would have motivated the US to war, but I also believe that the very act of bombs dropping on American soil would have been enough, certainly along with Hitler's declaration of war to incite the increasingly less isolationist US to war, regardless of whether any casualties were caused.

I do not believe that the US had advanced warning of the attack. The diplomats did not know themselves and Nagumo's strike force operated under radio silence until after the attack. The fact that CINCPAC had broken the radio codes was no advantage since their was no radio traffic to decode.

Regarding Midway itself, what I was trying to establish was that the Americans were not really hoping to defeat the Japanese just cause the Japanese at least the same number of casualties as they inflicted. On this at least we seem in agreement.

The Americans did not seek battle at Midway, Yamamoto chose this as his objective independantly of the Americans because he believed the US would counter attack to recapture Midway and the remaining US Carriers could be lured into an ambush by Nagumo. That CINCPAC were able to decode much of the Japanese plans meant that the US was able to plan their own counter ambush to blunt what they could of the Japanese attack. What they achieved, with more than a little luck and skill, was one of the most decisive victories against a superior enemy of all time.

The Japanese and Russians had been involved in a protracted war in all but declaration for quite some time thinly disguised as border skirmishes, however I was not seriously suggesting that this was Roosevelt's intention, merely trying to show that the lack of a statement saying that the raid did not come from Midway does not mean that the US were intending to goad the Japanese into attacking the island since Roosevelt never implicitly stated that the raid did not come from Siberia, or for that matter Mongolia or China either. Not stating the raid did not come from Midway cannot therefore in my mind be taken to mean that he wanted the Japanese to assume that it did.

The invasion fleet was not just intended for Midway, but also remember that the Japanese were not just expecting to have to capture Midway but also defend it (Minus casualties caused by the initial defenders) against the US counter attack and build defensive contructions in the time they had.

Ah, well. I guess we're not going to agree on this one, as I said if I were trying to goad the Japanese into attacking somewhere, I would have picked somewhere far easier to defend and there were choices.

Perhaps next time we'll reach agreement...! ;)

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by Romantic Technofreak

Hawaii as an invasion target


The logistics of getting even the ships that carried out the attack was a strain on the Japanese let alone supporting a full invasion.

http://b4.ezboard.com/falltheworldsbattlecruisersfrm1.showMessage?topicI D=690.topic

http://b4.ezboard.com/falltheworldsbattlecruisersfrm1.showMessage?topicI D=423.topic

http://b4.ezboard.com/falltheworldsbattlecruisersfrm1.showMessage?topicI D=462.topic

http://b4.ezboard.com/falltheworldsbattlecruisersfrm1.showMessage?topicI D=439.topic

[Romantic Technofreak]

As I feared, Simon, this is going to become a believe-believe story.

1. Obsolescence of the battleship
Even today, this discussion is not completely over. Pro-battleship enthusiasts (correctly) state that no weapon can undertake a dense and cheap coastal bombardment as a battleship can. For propaganda, it was not only appropriate to let the Pearl Harbor fleet sink as "innocent targets", but also to recommission a part of them with pathetic celebration. But they only saw action in a state of war when the Japanese Air Forces were no longer a considerably dangerous enemy.

2. Soviet variant
As much as I know the Siberian-Manchurian border was calm since the end of the Nomonhan conflict, and this was also Russia´s interest. Remeber in June 1942 the Soviet Union was still under a potentially deadly threat from the German armies standing deep in Russian territory. It would have made no sense that the Soviet Union opened a new frontier at this point of time, breaking an non-attack treaty with Japan either and this way morally discrediting herself, this means loosing the advantage the unwarranted breaking of the same kind of treaty by the Germans gave them. Remember Stalin was not the same crazy like Hitler, he was a cold calculator. I am also sure that the Russians assured the Japanese on question that they had nothing to do with the matter.

3. Origin of Doolittle´s bombers
With the Soviet variant excluded and the carrier variant "impossible", there was only one chance for the bombers to come from: the nearest American base, Midway.

4. Japanese mentality
In the Japanese society, until today, there are figures of imagination travelling like "loss of face", e.g. when Yakuza gangsters get information about a police search action in their offices, they conciously leave some little evidence that the police will not "loose face" by finding nothing. Bombs on Tokyo were a considerable loss of face for the Japanese leadership of WWII. Because of this, they had to launch an attack on Midway, and the Americans knew that. What kind of damage they could expect to cause is irrelevant for the discussion, they were also only calculators, not prophets.

5. Midway´s strategic position
is very unstable when its possessor does not have Hawaii at the same time, no matter who he is. Remeber that islands like these have to be supplied, and I am sure that the supply of Midway could have been interrupted if an enemy on Hawaii has considerable air and sea forces to do so. Midway as a watch post could have been important for the Japanese (especially if they could have used Me 261s for reconnoisance and opportunity attacks on ships:D), but only if they could keep it!

The knowledge of the Japanese attack plan on Pearl Harbor is another believe-believe question. I am going to study that when I have time and find appropriate sources. But one thing I would like to know from you:

quote:as I said if I were trying to goad the Japanese into attacking somewhere, I would have picked somewhere far easier to defend and there were choices.


O.K., what would be your proposal for this?

Regards, RT

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by Romantic Technofreak



1. Obsolescence of the battleship
Even today, this discussion is not completely over. Pro-battleship enthusiasts (correctly) state that no weapon can undertake a dense and cheap coastal bombardment as a battleship can. For propaganda, it was not only appropriate to let the Pearl Harbor fleet sink as "innocent targets", but also to recommission a part of them with pathetic celebration. But they only saw action in a state of war when the Japanese Air Forces were no longer a considerably dangerous enemy.



They did come in quite handy at the Battle of Surigao Strait (25th October 44)and freed the modern battleships from shore bombardment roles allowing them to accompany the fast carrier task groups.

[simon]

"1. Obsolescence of the battleship
Even today, this discussion is not completely over..."

And even today in Britain there are people who adamantly refuse to believe that the world is round, the Flat Earth Society, it doesn't make it any less ludicrous.

"The knowledge of the Japanese attack plan on Pearl Harbor is another believe-believe question. I am going to study that when I have time and find appropriate sources. But one thing I would like to know from you...O.K., what would be your proposal for this?"

As I've already said, if Midway is a credible launching point so is Hawaii, Mongolia or China, infact if I was going to try and goad the Japanese into an attack I would have either drawn them as close as possible to Hawaii and made the most of the resources there (A sort of US equivalent of Tsushima Strait), or drawn them West further into China away from Hawaii and the Eastern Sea Board of mainland USA, at least until I had finished rebuilding the losses from Pearl Harbour and Coral Sea.

I mentioned the Soviet Union merely to illustrate that the very act of not denying the attack came from Midway did not mean that the Americans were trying to draw the Japanese into an ambush. Heck, Roosevelt didn't explicitly deny that the Doolittle bombers came from the Moon either, was he trying to force the Japanese to waste resources by drawing them into a Space-race? :D

To accept that the Doolittle raid was part of a complex plot to lure the Japanese to eventual defeat at Midway I'm afraid requires belief in an American sense of precognition and conspiracy theory that I just cannot subscribe to.

I will and do accept that the Japanese had to retaliate to the Doolittle raids, but here is where you and I will continue to differ.

That attack did not have to be on Midway, as a face saving retaliation it could have been an even wider number of targets than just as a direct military retaliation for the Doolittle Raids. A Submarine bombardment of a US coastal city would have been an alternative and appropriate retaliation.

The Japanese chose Midway completely independant of any US intervention, and by a combination of Nagumo's incompetance, bad luck, an unnecessarily complicated plan, and the skill of the US naval airmen and CINCPAC decoders the Japanese lost. Not as a result of a complicated, unlikely and chancey conspiracy.

Here I suggest again, we agree to disagree since we are unlikely to reach a consensus. Till the next time... :D

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by simon

The possibility that the B-25s had flown from bases in the Soviet Union was not discounted either,

Didn't they fly from Shangri La? (incidently the name of one of the late WW2 Essex class finished in '45 in time to conduct raids on Japan)

[BuzzLightyear]

IMO, the US and Japan was at war, if not in declaration then at least in spirit, well before Pearl Harbor. The US knew an attack SOMEWHERE was imminent. In the days and weeks preceding Pearl Harbor, USS Lexington and USS Enterprise were busy reinforcing Wake, Midway and performing anti-submarine patrol.

[B-24WillowRun]

first I want to say that this disscussion is great because it is a PTO thread and not ETO[:p]

So a respons to all this in three main sections: the Raiders, Pearl Harbor, and Midway.

The Raiders, One quoted Rosevelt and his shangrala quote, that was to the press shortly after the raid was made public. The Japanese new the fleet was aproching so carriers were not totally out of the question. As for Midway being the base it would not have been! the vast ocean between midway and Japan would have made that imposible in 1942. It was not even done latter with the B-24. The Japanese did unleash the great anger and revengeful Wrath on China. We seem to forget that. In the Book "The Rape on Nanking" (I have misplaced the authors name) It is a new book published in english in 2003) the point is made that some 250,000 Chinease were killed for helping the downed raiders and because it was thought the point on origain was infact China. The raid was mostly a great moral boost to help the US war machine tool up. Also it did keep units in China and Japan that might have come out to the Pacific. stalin would not alow USAAF aircraft in Eastern Russia until late 44 or early 1945.

Pearl Harbor:(
I am getting a little tiered of reading that the US Government was in any way trying to provoke the attack and goad the Japanese. both saides as said before knew that the war would start at some point. The US also was moving more and more ships and material to the Atlantic to cover the Lend-Lease convoys to Britten. The Pacific comand was trying to understand what the IJN was up to and prepair for an attack at any of its vastly spred out posts. The Notion that Pearl was just housing the older Battleships is not strong because they were all raised and reentered save the Arizona and the Utah (Please double check that of the Utah). building the ships as said before is the most expensive bit. to raise up and modernise them was fast. As my sig says, Amamoto already knew he had a short time to try and cripple the Pacific fleet and astablish the Japanese Pacific empiere before U.S. industry started to grind Japan into dust. Pearl was a very good attack that save for the translations being sloed because the diplomats were doing the work, would have been a declared act of war. I will have to rea about the USS North Carlonina, not being at Pearl, but I would ges it wa with the Carriers working on manuvers. As it dose take time to get the crew used to a new boat.

Midway:
When the code was broken and the IJN tricked to reviel the location, a truely great bit of tacked and a bad slip by the Japs, then the Pacific comand could make a push to draw out and destroy the reminning IJN carriers. The coral Sea was the first carrier battle to never see the oher navy ship to ship. It was a draw with the USN posible comming out on top a little. Midway could really draw out the carriers and destroy them. Nimitz made each move with calculation. Send one fleet North, but only to let the IJN think he took the bait. The Alutions were sacraficed because nothing was really hapening and it was always bad weather;)
So the Japs come in and hit midway, the ambus is on. The USN carriers send the torpedo planes in no fighters and as the B-24s do with out "little friends" the poor tordedo bombers, the whole squadren was cut down. the brought all the Zeros on to the deck and the two divebomber units had clean are of sorts to go get the carriers. As to them rearming on deck that was a bit of luck in timing, but I think it was also part of Nimitz plan. Lossing the Yorktown was sad but Hell she was really lost in the coral Sea towed back to Pearl and Rebuild almost for Midway, so that was a feet to the US war effort.
Midway was a gret bit of skill and sacrafice, with some luck, for the USN. It truely halted the IJN advance. as for the notion that the IJN could have passed on Midway and gone to Pearl is just not even rational. Why leave a well devened and large base that can hassel your supply and communication while you have no land base like it for our self. The fleet needed it to sestain the drive to Pearl and also to great the strong position in the Central Pacific.

I have now ranted a bit long, but please try to take it all in. These three events hav been mistreated and represneted hear.;)

[simon]

I agree with you in most respects.

A couple of things I will pick up on. First it was the B-26 Marauder, not B-25 Mitchell used at Midway. The Rape of the Nanking happened before America was even at war and was in no way a retaliation for the Doolittle raids, I have scanned through information on this, although I admit I have not researched it in detail, but I believe most sources agree that the total killed, not including rapes and injuries, and anything that went on post the initial attrocities was around 300,000. 250,000 is close enough to be a conservative estimate.

Thirdly at Midway the slaughter of the initial waves of Torpedo bombers was not a calculated sacrifice, merely a battle expediency since for both the Midway based and Carrier based Torpedo planes the initial sightings of Nagumo's Carriers came when they were either far out of reach of the fighter escort available to either, or the fighters available got lost en route. Only one wave of torpedo bombers had fighter escort. They had no choice but to go in unsurported, or risk loosing the advantage of surprise.

Finally, Midway was not, nor was it ever a really usefull base or harbour for any fleet. It was a couple of coral islands in the middle of the Pacific, but it could have been a useful staging ground or observation post for either side.

[B-24WillowRun]

Simon, I did not claerify i my bit of ranting on the Rape of Nanking time line. I should have said that the slaughter I was refferancing was in responce to the b-25 raid. Villages up and down Eastern China were ground into ash. As for the Rape numbers the 300,000 is thought to be on the low to meddium side. But in trueth the numbers are all very fuzzy because documentation is so hard to come by. More resurch needs to come to it. [B)]

As for Midway being a base of operations I think it could have been a staging ground posible if left untoched for sub activities. But if the forces on the attols were left they could have at lease anouyed and hasseled the IJN fleet.

This is good discussion [:p]