Military Blunders.

[simon]

OK, time to try a new approach.

What I'm after this time is what you think were some of the worst, most humourous or just the most classic military blunders of the war. Try to make them aviation related, since this is a Plane forum ;), but beyond that they can be pretty much anything from individual acts of foolishness, errors, command decisions or missed opportunities, and of course the reasons why you feel this/these event(s) qualify.

[andyo2000]

I think this may just be too broad of a topic, but I think Germany takes the crown here.

After conquering France, Hitler took a month off to celebrate and tour his WWI battlegrounds. What a monumental mistake! Almost all historians will agree the war may have been won against the UK had Adolf not waited. The war-weary RAF was no match for the superior Luftwaffe, but the break gave them time to repair and renew their forces. Operation Sea Lion came this close to success, and failed because of the air forces becoming equal again.
There are countless other ones in terms of research and reconaissance, troop movements, organization, and of course, leadership.

Of course, as GregP well knows, the Me321 and Me323 were also German blunders. Giant wooden deathtraps.

Japanese blunders: The first combat trial of the Okha Type 11 springs to mind. The Betty Gm3 bombers released all (12?) into the sea miles before the target. There were no alternate routes or evasive action planned.

Besides these, there were hundreds of individual aircraft that were blunders in new thinking, way too many to count. These include many Italian and French airplanes, many German untested prototypes of new types of aircraft, and many examples of inferior Japanese technology.

[GregP]

Aside from General George Armstrong Custer's attack on the Dakota Indians, the worst military blunder I can think of was Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor before officially declaring war.

It awoke the isolationist USA and turned a population that wanted nothing to do with the war into a feeding frenzy looing for revenge.

Hitler's delay of the invasion of England was almost matched by his abandonment of the attack when the Battle of Britain started. He had just about won when he decided to stop!

Thank heavens for idiots!

Oh yeah, who can forget that he was at peace with the Soviet Union when he invaded. BAD move. Along with other blunders, it cost the Nazis the Reich.

Argentina seriously underestimated Great Britain's desire to maintain the Falklands as a territory, wouldn't you say? Smart attack on a very determined opponent that turned out to be a blunder but, in most similar situations, they would have prevailed easily. Argentina showed a pretty good air force with limited weapons and limited range doing a lot of damage to a superior force that was a long way from home with no support except themselves. I admire both forces for their courage, but fail to see why Argentina started it in the first place.

In any case, the Argentinian Air Force did very good work with their resources, and the Royal Navy did a superior job of stopping the enemy with only Harriers ... which turned out to be pretty good air-to-air weapons indeed. In other circumstances, these two opposing air forces would probably be very good friends and would no doubt complement each other's skill sets.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by GregP



Hitler's delay of the invasion of England was almost matched by his abandonment of the attack when the Battle of Britain started. He had just about won when he decided to stop!




PLEASE DONT START A SEALION THREAD!!!!!

(I mentioned it once but I think I got away with it!)

http://b4.ezboard.com/falltheworldsbattlecruisersfrm1.showMessage?topicI D=487.topic:)

[R Leonard]

Somewhat tongue in cheek . . . :)

Thursday, 4 June 1942 . . .

“Okay, launch the attack group and neutralize the airfields on the island. Keep the extras aside to attack their fleet . . . yeah, right, like they’re going to get here anytime before Saturday or Sunday . . . if they get past our subs.”

“Oops, here come some torpedo planes . . . look at those twin engined jobs and what are those other big ones? . . . whew, they all missed!”

“Look out, here come some dive-bombers . . . whew, they missed, too!”

“Are you kidding me? Launch another attack on the island? Well, okay, that’s where these attacks on us are coming from. Take the naval ordnance off the extras and replace it with land attack ordnance.”

“What do you mean he says he ‘spotted enemy ships’ what ships did he see? Find out!”

“ Look out, here come some more torpedo planes . . . Hey, those are carrier planes! Hot damn, we got them all!”

“Now he says he sees a carrier? No joke, really?”

“Okay, take the land attack ordnance off the extras and put the naval ordnance back on. When you’re done, bring them up on the flight deck and warm up the engines.”

“Wait a minute, stop everything and recover the morning strike group and bring them down to the hangar deck”

“ Look out, here come some more torpedo planes . . . Those really are carrier planes! There must be one out there somewhere . . . hurry up with the ordnance change. Looks like the CAP is getting most of them, too.”

“Oh crap, here come some more torpedo planes . . . Let the CAP take care of them . . . When are those strike planes going to be ready to come up for warm up? Hey, are those dive-bombers?”

BOOM, BOOM, BOOM, BOOM, BOOM, BOOM, BOOM, BOOM, BOOM!

“Damme, I hate open boats on an open sea.” [8D]

Rich

http://ihost.it-mate.co.uk/users/rdkcleon/files/VF-11-Sundowners.jpg

[Romantic Technofreak]

Among the hardest and most crucial German blunders is the action of the Bf 110 and its successor Me 410 as daylight fighters, while the in-between model Me 210 was even a technical catastrophy.

Over Britain in 1940, the Bf 110 showed itself inappropriate as escort fighter, a task it was designed for. By 1944, both Bf 110 and Me 410 had some success as bomber destroyers, but suffered heavy losses against American escort fighters as soon as they appeared on the scene.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by Romantic Technofreak

Over Britain in 1940, the Bf 110 showed itself inappropriate as escort fighter, a task it was designed for. By 1944, both Bf 110 and Me 410 had some success as bomber destroyers, but suffered heavy losses against American escort fighters as soon as they appeared on the scene.


I think there was a unit that used the Bf110 quite successfully as a low level fighter-bomber (EprGr 210)- trouble was it was too small a unit and wasn't exploited enough.

[robert]

quote:Originally posted by GregP



Hitler's delay of the invasion of England was almost matched by his abandonment of the attack when the Battle of Britain started. He had just about won when he decided to stop!



This is, without a doubt, the biggest myth of World War Two.

The RAF clearly beat the Luftwaffe in the BoB, fair and square. The Germans lost because they were fighting a strategic battle with tactical weapons; had poor intelligence and high-level leadership (their leadership at squadron level was exceptional); and were facing a foe that had prepared for this exact situation, and had the proper weapons, infrastructure, and leadership to repel it. The Germans never really had a chance of achieving their objectives. The RAF's supply of both aircraft and trained pilots actually increased during the battle, rather than decreased.

The RAF was never actually close to annihilation. Germany was losing a war of attrition to the RAF; the RAF destroyed 1,733 aircraft during the BoB for the loss of 915, a ratio of 1.84 to one. Even with the overall numerical superiority that the Luftwaffe had at the start of the Battle, it would have been unable to keep up that attrition for long. For example, the Luftwaffe opened the BoB with 237 serviceable Bf 110s - and lost 223 of them.

Although pilot strength was more of a problem than replacement aircraft, at no point during the BoB did Fighter Command operational pilot strength drop below 1,000 pilots. The number of trained, operational pilots actually increased at all stages during the BoB, from 1,094 on June 15 to 1,422 by August 31 to 1,737 by October 19. By October 12, the RAF actually had a surplus of trained operational pilots, with not enough operational squadrons to send them to.

British fighter strength during the BoB (their production of new fighters, incidentally, outstripped the Germans) actually increased from the beginning of the BoB to the end. On June 22, Fighter Command had 565 aircraft available for operations; on October 26, it had 747. At no point during the Battle did Fighter Command have less than 127 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes in storage, ready to go to the squadrons as replacements; this was in the first week of September, and by late October, the figure was up over 200.

The success of the Luftwaffe attacks on RAF airfields and facilities has been greatly puffed up over the years. Alfred Price has pointed out that the Germans destroyed only about 20 British fighters during the entire segment of the attacks on the airfields.

My source is the two-part article in Aeroplane Monthly, October and November 1997, by Dr. Alfred Price called "Myth and Legend", in which Price debunks ten well-known myths about the Battle of Britain. His first myth is:

"Myth 1. By the beginning of September 1940 Fighter Command was in poor shape following repeated attacks on its airfields. Goering made a big error in shifting the forces of the attack to London, instead of continuing to hit the airfields. That saved the defenders.

This notion rests on the supposition that the German attacks on airfields were considerably more effective than was the case. During August and the first week of September the Luftwaffe mounted an intensive 3-1/2 week campaign against Fighter Command airfields in Southern England. On each day that weather permitted there were attacks on two or more airfields. Yet despite the scale of this effort, the attacks were largely ineffectual as a means of putting Fighter Command out of action.

First, consider their effectiveness in destroying RAF fighters on the ground. RAF fighter squadrons based in the South of England maintained high states of readiness throughout the daylight hours. Backing them was an excellent control and reporting organization, using information from radar sites and Observer Corps posts. Almost invariably the fighter squadrons were airborne and clear of their airfield before an attack on it could develop. Aircraft able to fly but not fight took off and headed for a safe area to the north of the Thames until the threat had passed. Aircraft unable to fly were pushed into revetments or otherwise dispersed around the airfield, making them unsuitable as targets for a pattern-bombing attack.

The most reliable source, The Battle of Britain, Then and Now(Ed. Winston Ramsey, After the Battle Publications, 5th Ed., 1989) reveals that during the series of attacks fewer than 20 Spitfires and Hurricanes from front-line squadrons were destroyed on the ground."

True, damage was being done to the airfields, but Spitfires and Hurricanes could operate from any grass strip, and there were enough farmers' fields around! The attacks on London didn't start solely because Hitler wanted revenge; they started in part because the Luftwaffe realized the airfield attacks were having little effect. Luftwaffe intelligence was so poor that the most devastating attacks came against trainer and bomber bases, which hardly helped defeat the fighters, but that's another story. Attacking London, which the RAF was going to defend at any cost, may actually have been a good strategy. The Luftwaffe certainly wasn't winning a war of attrition, as far as aircraft were concerned, by attacking the airfields.

The Luftwaffe also erred in selecting targets. The Supermarine factories at Woolston and Itchen, near Southampton on the South coast, were an inviting target for the Luftwaffe. At the start of the BoB, they were the only factories in Britain producing Spitfires. Yet the factories weren't bombed until September 26, by which time the shadow factory at Castle Bromwich was up and running, and despite the destruction of the two Southampton factories, Spitfire production carried on with only a small blip. The Luftwaffe also ignored the Rolls-Royce factory at Derby, the only factory, at that time, producing Merlin engines.

The oft-repeated assertion that the Luftwaffe should have spent more time attacking the radar stations is another myth. German intelligence assumed that the power and receiving rooms were underground, and could not be put out of action by bombing, when in fact they were generally not underground at all, although Price states that “The diminutive buildings housing the transmitter and receiver equipment were protected by revetments and it required a direct hit inside the blast wall to cause serious damage.” The aerials themselves were not easy to hit or bring down; in fact among the weapons in the Luftwaffe arsenal they could only be hit by accurate Ju 87 Stuka strikes, which were only possible under conditions of air superiority – something the Luftwaffe didn’t have. When the Ju 87 was taken out of the BoB after August 18, that option disappeared. The first major attack on the radar stations, on August 12, saw five stations attacked; all except one were back on line the next day. On August 18, Poling station was attacked and put out of operation, but a mobile unit was moved into the area, with only a very small interruption in service. As Price notes, “Thus, of the six radar stations attacked, only two were put out of action for more than a day, and those two were soon replaced by mobile radars set up nearby.”

Germany had no chance to win the BoB, period...

[andyo2000]

OK, here's two more, closely related

1: Hitler's declaration, in (1940?) that all programs not beneifical within 2 years be stopped. Quite obviously, that single decision had huge effects on the German war effort! Planes like the Me-262 could have stopped the Allied bombing campaigns when it was still possible to save the Reich. Better machine guns and troop technology might have turned the tides of D-day. Many events in history that had only one possible outcome might have drastically changed had these programs not been stopped. After all, the war lasted a bit longer that 2 years, did it not?

2: I think everyone will agree with this comment. Hitler's demand that the Me-262 serve as a light bomber instead of interceptor/fighter was a huge mistake. Had he reconsidered, the bombing would have been slowed. The jets would have become menaces in the skies. Heck, if Udet's leadership had been good, the 262s might have even been able to turn the war around, with better aramaments.

Now, to tie it all together. Hitler's greatest weapon throughout the war, and in my eyes had more potential than the infantry, could have saved the Reich. With the Me-262 debuting 2 or 3 years earlier, and with it serving as a fighter, all of you British forum contributors might be speaking in German. Who knows what good things could have come out of the Me-262 when at full potential. A blunder indeed.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by andyo2000

OK, here's two more, closely related

1: Hitler's declaration, in (1940?) that all programs not beneifical within 2 years be stopped. Quite obviously, that single decision had huge effects on the German war effort!


Beaverbrook did more or less the same thing when he took over at MAP, luckily there were enough people around who were brave enough (he had Churchill's full backing at the time)to ignore him or go round him and continue some of the R + D effort that was needed to replce the existing generation of aircraft.

[robert]

quote:Originally posted by andyo2000



2: I think everyone will agree with this comment. Hitler's demand that the Me-262 serve as a light bomber instead of interceptor/fighter was a huge mistake. Had he reconsidered, the bombing would have been slowed. The jets would have become menaces in the skies. Heck, if Udet's leadership had been good, the 262s might have even been able to turn the war around, with better aramaments.

Now, to tie it all together. Hitler's greatest weapon throughout the war, and in my eyes had more potential than the infantry, could have saved the Reich. With the Me-262 debuting 2 or 3 years earlier, and with it serving as a fighter, all of you British forum contributors might be speaking in German. Who knows what good things could have come out of the Me-262 when at full potential. A blunder indeed.


Sorry, but I'd disagree with you 100% on that. Hitler's decision to make the Me 262 a fighter/bomber had absolutely no effect whatsoever on the date of the Me 262's introduction to service. The problems were with the engines, pure and simple.

William Green points out in Warplanes of the Third Reich, after citing the often-given theory that it was Hitler's interference that held back the program,

"...the simple fact remains that Junkers failed to resolve the problems poised by series manufacture of the turbojet powering the Me 262 until mid-1944, and thus could not commence volume deliveries to Messerschmitt until the following September/October. Furthermore, the consensus of opinion of those actually engaged in the design development and testing of the Me 262 was to be that the fighter was introduced to service at the earliest practicable stage in its evolution; that any earlier deployment of the warplane on a large scale would have been entirely premature."

The fact is that the British introduced the Gloster Meteor to squadron service prior to the Me 262. It's a commonly held belief that the Me 262 was the first jet fighter to enter regular squadron service. It's also wrong - the Meteor was first.

It's also true that Frank Whittle had his jet engine up and running before the Germans, and that it was only government indifference that prevented the British from flying a jet before the Germans. Given the proper government backing, it's completely possible that the RAF could have had a jet fighter in 1940 or 1941, instead of 1944. That scenario is far more likely than the "what if the Me 262 was introduced two or three years earlier" scenario...

[simon]

I completely agree with Robert on this and especially regarding his excellent post on the Battle of Britain.

I also don't believe the Me262 had any real chance of turning the war around. For a start look at the real impact it had when actually in service, it was an interesting departure from the strictly conventional but had too many issues that were never really ironed out. Engine and undercarriage reliability being two that spring to mind.

Had it come into service any earlier I doubt it could have prevented the US strategic bombing offensive. As I've said in other threads, the US was largely restricted to bombing targets within the range of Thunderbolts and Spitfires, it was only the arrival of the Mustang that allowed the US to begin deep penetration raids. The Mustang, Spitfire and Thunderbolt were all capable of taking down Me262s in combat, and as noted elsewhere, the US had developed tactics which largely prevented the Luftwaffe from making the most of fighting on their own soil.

At best the early entry of the Me262 might have dragged the war on another couple of months, and all that would have achieved would have meant that the Iron Curtain began a little further West, and Berlin would probably be still glowing in the dark.

[andyo2000]

I think there was a slight misunderstanding :D

I agree as well that Hitler's dispositong towards what type of plane the 262 should be did not affect when it was introduced to combat, invented, made first test flight, etc. However, his cancellation of non-essential programs certainly did. Yes, there were many problems preventing an earlier release of the airplane, but only with the situation they went through. If Adolf hadn't cancelled programs, the 262's research might have been done by 1942. Then, in 1944, when bombing campaigns really started to hit the Reich hard and cripple it, many of the 262's problems would probably have already been worked out, and it would be as airworthy as anything else in the skies. As Simon notes, there were many problems with the 262. More time in combat and more mechanics experienced with the jet engine might have really turned into something great. The 163 had huge rocket fuel problems, but with a few more years of use, something would be done to make the plane better and safer.

Of course, had the plane debuted earlier, the RAF probably would have speeded up release of the Meteor, so there may not be that big of an inequality. It is just as much of a blunder, you might say, that the RAF didn't take an interest to the jet engine. But they won the war, so it doesn't stand out as much.

All the same, it was two series of events that led to the ineffectiveness of the 262. I'm not saying that the plane in question could have turned the war around in 1944; they were too far gone. But had the program been completed earlier due to better funding and interest from the government, who knows what might have happened.

[simon]

"If Adolf hadn't cancelled programs, the 262's research might have been done by 1942."

More likely that the He280 would have seen squadron service. Ah... back to the old Heinkel War thread again... :D

Seriously though, as is repeatedly noted, hindsight is always 20/20. What we see as obvious sat behind our monitors sixty years after the event was not as obviously apparent at the time and really which one of us would have pushed in 1940/41 for a Rocket and Jet powered interceptor to be developed for Germany? I wouldn't because there was just no apparent need for either types.

Germany had a myriad of secret weapons projects, as did the US and to a lesser extent Britain. The differences between the three is that Britain had the US and lend-lease to take up much of our non-military essential production and the US had a huge industrial and financial base to begin with. The US could afford to persue some of the bizarre projects in the hope that one may come to fruition, for Germany every Reichsmark wasted in backing a failed project was a Reichsmark more than they could really afford.

[GregP]

OK, I'm back after an absence.

The British almost being defeated in the Battle of Britain was a myth, huh? I don't THINK so.

They successfully recovered many downed pilots and replaced the losses, but were near the end of the production capability of fighter aircraft replacements. My contention is simple, the British could not have replaced many more aircraft or skilled pilots.

But, the Germans simply quit!

Ergo, the British pretty well won since they did NOT lose their entire air force, and the Germans COULD have put a major hurt on the RAF if they had STEPPED UP their attacks.

Thing is, the Germans COULD have stepped up their attacks, but were cautious, just like the German High Seas Fleet at the Battle of Jutland/. The Luftwaffe WANTED to attack, but Hitler said "Enough!, Stop the attack!" ... and they DID.

yes, the RAF had a pretty much full size air force left, but they COULD NOT HAVE SUSTAINED the losses much longer.

Not a myth. A fortunate happenstance for the Allied Forces.

[simon]

I really don't know where you get some of your information from Greg but the RAF was never in danger of running out of fighter aircraft during the Battle of Britain. This is why aircraft like the Miles M.20 never had to go into production.

It is now widely acknowledged that all that stuff about getting civilians to turn in their old aluminium pots and pans was purely for the civilians morale benefit, and it worked, they felt like they were helping.

Yes, pilot attrition was another matter, but whilst it did get serious did not reach critical levels during the Battle, certainly nowhere near the levels of the German or Japanese airforces!

I think you underestimate how much the Luftwaffe had also been hurt during the Battle, bomber crew's morale was low, so was fighter pilot's and they had lost far more aircraft than the RAF, the difference being that (as is widely noted) an RAF pilot who baled out uninjured could be returned to his unit, a German pilot or crew was lost, whatever their circumstances.

[robert]

quote:Originally posted by GregP

OK, I'm back after an absence.

The British almost being defeated in the Battle of Britain was a myth, huh? I don't THINK so.

They successfully recovered many downed pilots and replaced the losses, but were near the end of the production capability of fighter aircraft replacements. My contention is simple, the British could not have replaced many more aircraft or skilled pilots.

But, the Germans simply quit!

Ergo, the British pretty well won since they did NOT lose their entire air force, and the Germans COULD have put a major hurt on the RAF if they had STEPPED UP their attacks.

Thing is, the Germans COULD have stepped up their attacks, but were cautious, just like the German High Seas Fleet at the Battle of Jutland/. The Luftwaffe WANTED to attack, but Hitler said "Enough!, Stop the attack!" ... and they DID.

yes, the RAF had a pretty much full size air force left, but they COULD NOT HAVE SUSTAINED the losses much longer.

Not a myth. A fortunate happenstance for the Allied Forces.


Actually, you've got it exactly backwards. The RAF gained strength during the battle - the Luftwaffe lost strength. The Germans quit - yes, because they were beaten, and unable to sustain the losses they were suffering.

Let's just look at a few facts here. First, from my original post, regarding pilot strength:

Although pilot strength was more of a problem than replacement aircraft, at no point during the BoB did Fighter Command operational pilot strength drop below 1,000 pilots. The number of trained, operational pilots actually increased at all stages during the BoB, from 1,094 on June 15 to 1,422 by August 31 to 1,737 by October 19. By October 12, the RAF actually had a surplus of trained operational pilots, with not enough operational squadrons to send them to.

That's pretty darn simple. The RAF had more pilots by the end of the Battle than they could use.

As for the rather amazing statement that the British "were near the end of the production capability of fighter aircraft replacements", that's simply historically inaccurate. If anything, the opening of the Castle Bromwich Spitfire factory, well out of the range of Luftwaffe bombers, in late August 1940, increased the British fighter production capacity multi-fold. The RAF lost 915 aircraft, all of types, during the entire Battle of Britain. In August, 1,087 fighters rolled off the production lines. In September, 908 new fighters rolled off the production lines. In October, 917 new fighters rolled out. In other words, the British aviation industry was producing as many fighters every month, as the Germans shot down during the entire battle. The British production capacity was just getting started - it was nowhere near exhausted, and that's a fact, not an opinion.

UK aircraft production, WW2:

1939 8,190
1940 16,149
1941 22,694
1942 28,247
1943 30,963
1944 31,036
1945 14,145

Total 151,424

On the other hand, while British operational strength was gaining by leaps and bounds, the Luftwaffe was being weakened. On May 10, the Luftwaffe had 3,527 serviceable aircraft; on August 10, they had 2,550. Serviceable fighters dropped from 1,076 to 805. And the German aircraft industry was much less capable of making up their losses than the British. In 1940, total German aircraft production was 10,247 - meaning that the British aircraft industry made 58% more aircraft in 1940 than the Germans. One side was taking losses it couldn't sustain, and that was the Luftwaffe, not the RAF.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by GregP



They successfully recovered many downed pilots and replaced the losses, but were near the end of the production capability of fighter aircraft replacements. My contention is simple, the British could not have replaced many more aircraft or skilled pilots.


According to Stephen Bungay in his book 'The Most Dangerous Enemy - A History of the Battle of Britain', when Park arrived at 23 Group< Flying Training Command in December 1940, he found it was working at two thirds capacity and following peace-time routines. H