Kill ratios

[Alex H.]

Hi Guys!

In other posts on the board I've seen a few kill ratios like the F6F had a 19 to one kill on Japanese planes. I was wondering what other ratios were out there? In particular I'd like to know Spitfire and Hurricane vs Me 109 over England during the Battle of Britain and any figures anyone has for the various Allied offenses over Europe.

Alex.

[R Leonard]

USN Credited Victories Ratio for major types was:

FM - 32.46 to 1
F6F - 19.12 to 1
PB4Y - 11.36 to 1
F4U/FG - 11.31 to 1
PB2Y - 7.00 to 1
PBM - 6.00 to 1
F4F - 5.08 to 1
PV - 3.33 to 1
SB2C/SBW - 2.39 to 1
TBF/TBM - 2.09 to 1
SBD - 1.75 to 1
PBY - 0.47 to 1

Total - 8.53 to 1


Regards,

Rich
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[andyo2000]

R Leonard -

Nice figures!

However, is the average kill ratio you listed adjusted for the number of planes of each type served? Is the 'total' number the average kill ratio between major planes or is it the total kill ratio of the entire USN?

[R Leonard]

"However, is the average kill ratio you listed adjusted for the number of planes of each type served? Is the 'total' number the average kill ratio between major planes or is it the total kill ratio of the entire USN?"

I'm not sure I follow your question.

The general format of what is sometimes referred to as a "kill ratio", but more properly called a "credit to loss ratio" is the number of enemy planes credited for each type loss incurred. Thus, on the first line for the Eastern FM series of aircraft the ratio is 32.46 credits for every FM lost.

I can, however, see now that the "Total" I reported is in error. Admittedly, I looked on the wrong place on the chart. Total should be 10.6 to 1 for the USN types listed, NOT 8.53.

I deliberately left out the F2A and the TBD out of the mix due to their relatively limited service … none after 4 June 1942.

While the 15 F2As lost at Midway can be readily ascribed to combat with IJN aircraft, there is some question as to their scores in return. The USN officially credited the F2A pilots at Midway with 10 victories and the IJN certainly lost that many aircraft, but only if you consider those ditching from damage on the way back to their carriers, if you want to call that 'shot down', okay by me. That gives the F2A a credit to loss ratio of 0.67 to 1. Frankly, I am not in the business of debunking anyone's claims/credits. That opens a whole can of worms where it always ends up being the other guy's numbers are too high but our guy's numbers are exactly correct. That's not an argument I get into.

TBDs are another story … Frankly it's a little tough to determine how many of the TBDs lost at Midway were shot down by the Kido Butai's CAP and how many were knocked down by AAA. The USN reports that for the entire war: 11 TBDs brought down by AAA, 25 by enemy aircraft, 8 operationally, 1 on a non-sortie flight, and 14 lost onboard ship. My suspicion is that some of these numbers are a lot of guesswork and that at least some of operational losses were ditches resulting from combat action. I can count, off the top of my head without looking it up, operational losses … two from VT-5 at Jaluit, one from VT-5 at Guadalcanal, one from VT-6 during Midway, two from VT-3 from battle damage and fuel exhaustion at Midway, that's six of the eight. Probably a couple of ditches at Coral Sea in May? The one non-sortie loss was a VT-6 TBD that ditched in an Enterprise landing wave off and the 14 lost aboard ship were on Lexington and Yorktown. It's tough to come up with real combat loss numbers when there were only a handful of survivors who were pretty busy keeping themselves alive at the time instead of keeping track of what happened to their squadron mates, kind of boils down to: "Did you see what happened to Smith?" "He went in." "AAA or CAP?" "I dunno … CAP, I guess." And so on down the roster. The 59 TBDs lost in the first 6 months of the war in the Pacific constituted 45% of all the TBDs ever in the USN inventory.

Anyway, due to their limited exposure, I chose to leave them out. I suppose I could go back through the reports and see what there is to glean, but the USN statistical data was drawn from the same sources.

I suppose, at one extreme, if one wanted to consider the number of aircraft produced it would be possible to render that into a ratio, but that would be a little misleading as the number produced usually far exceeds the number entering into combat. Then you’d have to worry about production vs. accepted for service … no always the same number. Another way of looking at it is the number of sorties resulting in engagement with enemy aircraft. That can give you something of a survivability index … "X number of aircraft lost for Y number of actual action sorties" … and doesn’t really consider the number of enemy planes encountered or even shot down. Similarly, though, a measure of effectiveness of one’s entire program would be the ratio of actual action sorties to credited victories as you are considering "X number of aircraft credited for Y number of actual action sorties" which instead of considering individual aircraft in action against an enemy is considering operational tempo against the enemy.

When you look at carrier operations, the operational tempo is a major factor. Lots of time spent at sea interspersed with short periods of intense operations … a far cry from the steady day after day grind experienced by, say, the Luftwaffe operating on the Eastern Front. An appropriate comparison would have to revolve around the operational tempo data as opposed to straight "X number of Russian planes for Y number of," for example, "Fw 190s." An appropriate question, then, would be "How many Russian plane for shot down per action sortie flown by Fw 190s?" That way the personnel part is kept out of the mix.

And of course you have to decide what defines a action sortie. I find the USN definitions to be fairly equitable. The USN used a system where a given element, usually a division or a section, boring holes in the sky while on a patrol and having no contact with the enemy constitutes a sortie for however many aircraft are in the element. So, if you have a 4-plane division of F6Fs flying a CAP during a quiet time, that’s four sorties. On the other hand, if even only one plane in the division engages in combat with the enemy, then the four sorties become four action sorties, theory being that if one plane is engaged then the other three are, at the very least, providing cover if not actually shooting themselves. Through its reporting system, then, starting in 1944, the USN was able to account for both sorties and action sorties and it is a fairly simple exercise to determine various rates of performance in terms of credits or losses per action sortie. Prior to 1944 only the action sortie information is available, but since that’s a more important piece of the puzzle than sorties overall, there’ still plenty to work with. There’s a whole world of statistical data to examine and all kinds of inferences to be drawn, depending upon at what you want to look.

There’s many ways to look at it.

Regards,

Rich

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[GregP]

OK, I give up. What is an "FM?"

An FM-2 is a Wildcat, and they didn't have anywhere NEAR that kill ratio. In fact, the highest kill ratio ever recorded for a US piston-engined Naval type was for the F6F Hellcat at just over 19-to-1. In fact, it topped all piston engine types for the United States in kill ratio.

Wildcats as a group were MUCH lower. Don;t give me any crap about sub-types ... a Wildcat is a Wildcat. The Corsair as a group was close at 13.2-to-1 or something near that value, but the Hellcat was the best ... kill ratio-wise, anyway.

So, exactly where did you get the "FM" and what the heck IS it?

The kill ratio as stated by the US Military is VERY misleading. It is composed of air-to-air victories versus immediate-air-to-air losses. If a US plane gets shot up and exits the combat in a damaged state, and later must be ditched or crash-landed as a result, that DOES NOT count as an air-to-air loss in the eyes of the US Military. It must be shot down in the heat of combat and be seen to crash at the time of the shooting.

Bull Dookey.

The kill ratio does NOT take into account for operational losses in the theater of operations (check the Bf 109 takeoff and landing losses), losses due to running out of fuel, losses due to damage sustained in combat but which manifested themselves much later in time in the mission ... on the way home, or any OTHER losses.

Just so you know, I am a US citizen who served in two US Military services, the USAF and the US Army, and I love US aircraft.

But it doesn't mean I support disinformation or misleading statistics. Let's all remember that Dick Bong was a GREAT pilot and GREAT shot, but he only got 2/3 of the kill tally of the top Allied Ace, Ivan Kozhedub, and he wasn't even in the ballpark with Hartmann. Heck, he wasn't even in the same county with Hartmann.

Germany had over 100 pilots with a better record than Dick Bong. I think Bong was among the best of all time, but that's just MY opinion. Any German would be completely coirrect in disputing my claim.

We also must remember that Japan, Romania, Poland, and several other countries ALSO had some great pilots ... with great scores; sometimes obtained in relatively obsolete aircraft.

On the Axis side, the Germans were the absolute masters of aerial combat when it came to ace-to-ace fighting. In the end, quantity triumphed over quality. We had many GOOD pilots and they had a few GREAT pilots combined with a good number of average pilots. Both of us had some poor pilots and some poor airplanes. The Bf 110 was an Axis example and the P-40 was an Allied example. Sure, it did yeoman work but, then again, it was also a poor excuse for a modern fighter aircraft after 1940 or so. Even a Merlin couldn't turn the P-40 into a silk purse ... it remained a sow's ear even with a good engine. In the end, Curtiss closed after WWII and their first attempt at a jet fighter.

Messerschmitt is still around. So is Mitsubishi. So is Nakajima, as Fuji Heavy Industries. They made Japanese versions of the F-86, their own derivative, a piston and a turboprop version of the Beech Bonanza as a military trainer, and some Japanese versions of the Jaguar and F-15 Eagle.

Curtiss just faded away.

[JoeB]

Quote "The kill ratio as stated by the US Military is VERY misleading. It is composed of air-to-air victories versus immediate-air-to-air losses. If a US plane gets shot up and exits the combat in a damaged state, and later must be ditched or crash-landed as a result, that DOES NOT count as an air-to-air loss in the eyes of the US Military. It must be shot down in the heat of combat and be seen to crash at the time of the shooting.

Bull Dookey."

Hi,

I happened across this forum by google search that turned up list of KW aces on adjacent thread.

I'm not sure about format of above quote, whether poster Greg P is saying this or saying it's bs.

AFAIK it's mainly bs, a statement that comes from Russian writing about the KW, as part of explaining why their claims were so much higher than US recorded losses. Then it has gotten repeated endlessly til it's become a web pseudo-fact, IMO. It's just not supported by any specific evidence, that I've ever seen. The standard by which US a/c were judged lost in air combat did differ from one war, theater or unit to another. However it was never that planes that couldn't make it back to base on their wheels after being shot up by enemy a/c were "not lost to e/a". Or I would like to see specific incidents in specific wars where that was true.

In case I'm most familiar with, and the root of this supposed practice, Korean War, it's demonstrably not so. Record keeping was not absolutely consistent but in general if planes didn't make it back to base after being shot by MiG's, sometimes even if just ran out of fuel after MiG combat, they were counted lost in air combat. Some wheels down landing writeoffs were even counted lost. Some not. However the idea planes that limped south of 38th parallel weren't counted lost is without any foundation I can find.

Therefore I much doubt that any similar practice existed in WWII. There will always be doubts cause of a/c loss (just didn't come back), and record keeping stuff (carrier landing accidents of damaged planes, planes pushed over the side afterwards, all rigorously recorded as original damage cause?). Therefore the "standard" air combat loss numbers for famous US fighters are probably a bit on the low side (78 F-86's in Korea is really more like 90 main issue being bad adding, but also adding in writeoffs and subtracting pure fuel losses, etc.; 280-some Hellcats I'd be willing to bet is probably a bit low too). But probably not a lot.

More variable number would be the numerator, kills. 19:1, 5.08:1 etc. are based on claims not real enemy losses. Most of those numbers for WWII have never been rigorously verified for the whole war. For F4F in 1942 only the real ratio was 2-3:1, vs. Zero's only it was right around 1:1, that's pretty exactly documented. For later in the war it's hard to do that because the scale of combat was larger.

Joe

[robert]

quote:Originally posted by GregP

OK, I give up. What is an "FM?"

An FM-2 is a Wildcat, and they didn't have anywhere NEAR that kill ratio. In fact, the highest kill ratio ever recorded for a US piston-engined Naval type was for the F6F Hellcat at just over 19-to-1. In fact, it topped all piston engine types for the United States in kill ratio.

Wildcats as a group were MUCH lower. Don;t give me any crap about sub-types ... a Wildcat is a Wildcat. The Corsair as a group was close at 13.2-to-1 or something near that value, but the Hellcat was the best ... kill ratio-wise, anyway.

So, exactly where did you get the "FM" and what the heck IS it?



An FM was a Wildcat built by the Eastern division of General Motors. Eastern delivered 839 FM-1s, equivalent to the F4F-4, to the USN before switching production to the FM-2. The FM-2 was the Eastern-built version of the XF4F-8, the two prototypes of which were designed and built by Grumman, but the entire production run was built by Eastern, 4,437 of which were delivered to the USN. The USN/USMC did differentiate between the Grumman-built F4Fs and Eastern-built FMs when compiling their official statistics. For the entire war, the FM was credited with destroying 422 aircraft in air-to-air combat in the Pacific for the loss of 13, a ratio, as R. Leonard correctly noted, of 32.46 to 1. This includes a 235-12 (a 19.58 to 1 ratio) record in 1944, and an incredible 187-1 record in 1945.

This doesn't include operations in the Atlantic; FMs gained some victories against the Germans (FMs of the 38 composite squadrons were credited with 432 victories overall), but I don't have a figure for losses in the West.

[R Leonard]

"OK, I give up. What is an "FM?"

"An FM-2 is a Wildcat, and they didn't have anywhere NEAR that kill ratio."

And your basis, your supporting data on FM-2 credits to loss ratios, beyond, of course, just an opinion, is what?


"In fact, the highest kill ratio ever recorded for a US piston-engined Naval type was for the F6F Hellcat at just over 19-to-1. In fact, it topped all piston engine types for the United States in kill ratio."

F6F series noted as 19.12, never said it wasn’t.


"So, exactly where did you get the "FM" and what the heck IS it?"

FM, in this case, does refer to the FM-2. Where did I get it? US Navy. Opinions aside, the USN seems to think the F4F and the FM-2 are different enough and thus accounted for them separately. I might suggest that as the practitioners at the time, their opinion on what constitutes a particular separate type would tend to carry a little more weight than that of the casual observer. There were not inconsiderable structural, power plant, and armament differences between the F4F-4 and the FM-2 and it is externally readily identifiable by its taller tail, repositioned exhausts (different, more powerful engine), and only four .50 cal guns instead of six. The FM-2 had improved performance over the F4F. The FM-1 was a carbon copy of the F4F-4 and most of them that saw combat did so in the RN’s Fleet Air Arm, though there was some few land based in the Pacific. The USN does not, interestingly enough, differentiate between the F4F-3 scores and the F4F-4 scores, I suspect that is due to the limited exposure of the –3’s to combat . . . early carrier raids during the winter and early spring of 1942, Coral Sea, and six of them flown by Marines at Midway. By October 1943 all the F4Fs had been phased out of frontline combat units; the last two F4F squadrons in combat in the Pacific, I believe, being VF-11 and VF-21, in the Solomons; in the Atlantic, VF-9 and VF-41 turned in their F4Fs after Operation Leader.

The FM-2 in combat was primarily based aboard CVEs and spent a considerable amount of time during the late war campaigns performing close air support or fending off the Kamikaze threat.

If you look at the period 1 January 1944 through 15 August 1945, operating FM-2 squadrons in aerial combat against the Japanese resulted in 422 credits of all aircraft types to 13 combat losses. During these 20 months FM squadrons flew some 751 aerial combat action sorties. This works out to 1.7 action sorties for every Japanese aircraft credited and slightly more than 57 action sorties for every FM aerial combat loss. Losses to AA fire in the same period were 62 for some 5533 action sorties with Japanese AA present, or 89 action sorties encountering Japanese AA for every AA loss.

Comparatively in the same time period, F6F squadrons flew 6397 aerial combat action sorties with 1.3 action sorties per credit and 27 action sorties per loss. F6F losses to AA fire were 527 in the course of some 38,427 action sorties in the same 20-month period where Japanese AA was present, or 73 sorties for every AA loss.

For F4U squadrons there were 1.7 action sorties per credit and 26 action sorties per loss for around 2495 aerial combat action sorties. AA losses for F4Us were 331 for 24,058 action sorties facing AA fire, some 79 sorties encountering Japanese AA for every AA loss.

From 1 January 1945 to the Japanese surrender, operating FM-2 squadrons (an average of 11 squadrons in action per month, though none were in combat in July and only 2 in combat in August) were credited with 187 victories to 1, (yes, I said "one") aerial combat loss in 362 aerial combat action sorties. Remember, of course, that a high number of these credits were scored against some rather single minded adversaries who really weren't paying much attention to the niceties of aerial combat, focusing primarily on just getting through the CAP defenses to work their mischief on whatever ship to which they could get the closest. Credits per aerial combat action sortie were 1.9 and aerial combat action sorties per loss were 362.

And Action Sorties, for which I paraphrased the definition in a previous post, are officially defined thusly:

"[u]ACTION SORTIES</u> - Number of planes taking off on a mission which eventuated in an attack on an enemy target or in aerial combat, or both. This basis of tabulation was the number of planes of one squadron taking off on the mission. If any of these planes had action, the entire squadron’s planes on the mission were counted as action sorties, including abortive planes, planes which reached the target but did not attack, and planes which escorted or patrolled but did not engage in combat. Thus if 16 VF took off as escort, 2 returned early, 2 engaged in combat, and 4 strafed, all 16 were counted as action sorties. Likewise if 8 planes took off for CAP, and only 2 engaged in combat, all 8 were action sorties. On the other hand, if 8 VF took off for escort, and none engaged in any sort of attack or combat, then none were counted as action sorties, even though they reached the target, and even though the escorted bombers attacked the target. Likewise, CAP planes missions, none of whose planes engaged in combat were not counted as action sorties." – Naval Aviation Combat Statistics World War II (OpNav-P-23V No. A129) –


"Wildcats as a group were MUCH lower. Don;t give me any crap about sub-types ... a Wildcat is a Wildcat. The Corsair as a group was close at 13.2-to-1 or something near that value, but the Hellcat was the best ... kill ratio-wise, anyway."

Okay, let’s look at F4F-3s, -4s and FM-2s lumped together . . . for the entire war:
1327 credited victories to 191 combat losses. So if we create a category we’ll call “stubby little barrel shaped fighters” we can give them a credit to loss ratio of 6.95, which is higher than that for F4Fs and, true, lower than that for FM-2s. I’d point out, however, and again, that the USN official documents tend to disagree with your opinion of type identification and lists the F4F and FM as separate major combat types. On a micro level, I have a ready access to an F4F ace type pilot (2 F1M, 2 B5N, 2 A6M) who has flown both, not to mention some 60 other individual types and another 20 type variants from the N3N-1 to the F8U, and will tell you the two were quite different in performance and handling and that about the only operating similarity was the need to hand crank up the landing gear. The FM-2 was a much better mount than the F4F.


"The kill ratio as stated by the US Military is VERY misleading. It is composed of air-to-air victories versus immediate-air-to-air losses. If a US plane gets shot up and exits the combat in a damaged state, and later must be ditched or crash-landed as a result, that DOES NOT count as an air-to-air loss in the eyes of the US Military. It must be shot down in the heat of combat and be seen to crash at the time of the shooting."

And, by the same token, nor were enemy losses credited for enemy airplanes that left the area of combat and later crashed, ditched, written off for damage, or otherwise permanently out of combat. A look at the Guadalcanal Campaign illustrates this amply as not an insignificant number of Japanese aircraft and pilot losses occurred on the long haul back to Rabaul or Buin post-combat. The USN numbers are all derived from actual combat reports and obviously squadron ACIO scribes at the time would have no knowledge of the final disposition of a damaged enemy aircraft. See below.


"Bull Dookey."

Says you.


"The kill ratio does NOT take into account for operational losses in the theater of operations (check the Bf 109 takeoff and landing losses), losses due to running out of fuel, losses due to damage sustained in combat but which manifested themselves much later in time in the mission ... on the way home, or any OTHER losses."

That is an interesting position, but not exactly true:

"[u]LOSSES OF OWN AIRCRAFT</u> - Loss data have come primarily from two sources: (1) action reports, squadron and ship, covering losses from all causes on missions involving actual combat with the enemy, and (2) loss reports, covering losses from all causes whatsoever.

"The losses on action sorties reported herein have been taken primarily from action reports, in which the exact cause of loss can be determined more accurately. Two major exceptions to this practice may be noted: (a) losses on unreported or poorly reported combat missions have been added from loss report sources; these may sometimes be inflated, because of a tendency in the early loss reports to ascribe to ‘combat’ or ‘enemy aircraft’ losses whose cause was unknown; (b) aircraft listed in action reports as seriously damaged rather than lost, and later indicated in loss reports to have been scrapped or jettisoned because of this damage; these have been added as losses on action sorties.

"Losses other than on action sorties have been taken from the loss reports, with some confirmation from carrier and squadron reports. The accuracy of loss reports, particularly with respect to cause of loss and date of loss, is frequently debatable, and many adjustments have been made where indicated.

"[u]LOSSES ON ACTION SORTIES</u> - Includes all planes counted as action sorties, which failed to return to a friendly base or were destroyed in landing at base plus planes returning and later destroyed because of damage sustained during the mission, plus planes lost on unreported missions which apparently involved action with the enemy. All loses on action sorties have been classified by cause under the three categories Enemy A/A, Enemy A/C, and Operational. Where the exact cause was not given in the action report (planes reported missing) the cause most likely under the circumstances of loss described was arbitrarily assigned, or if the circumstances were not stated, the cause stated in the loss report was assigned.

"[u]LOSSES ON OTHER FLIGHTS</u> -These are limited to losses, during each month, of planes assigned to squadrons which reported engaging in action against the enemy during that month. For these squadrons these figures represent all operational losses of airborne planes, on missions not involving action against the enemy; they include also planes later stricken because of operational damage sustained on such flights.

"[u]LOSSES ON SHIP OR GROUND</u> - These figures are also limited to losses, during each month, by squadrons reporting action during the month. For these squadrons they included all losses, regardless of cause, of planes not airborne at the time of the loss, or at the time the damage was sustained that ultimately resulted in the loss of the plane. Principal causes of these losses included: struck by aircraft landing, taking off or taxiing, or by automotive vehicles; explosions and fires; storms, typhoons; enemy bombing or strafing or suicide attacks on carriers; own gunfire. It should be noted that all losses of grounded aircraft to enemy action are not included (some such losses were of aircraft assigned to pools or to squadrons not in action) nor is the greater part of the listed losses on ship or ground attributable to enemy action. The carrier losses in this category, however, do include all carrier planes lost in enemy attacks on carriers.

"It should be noted, in connection with all categories of loss, that the figures for carriers represent all losses in active carrier combat operations (excluding strictly patrol and escort operations) in Pacific combat areas, while the land-based figures represent the bulk of, but not all, the losses of squadrons in active combat areas." – Ibid –

So, okay, how do you want to apportion operational losses, beyond what the accounting includes, as resulting from combat damage, fuel exhaustion, or simply a crappy landing, or take off for that matter, on a carrier? Just in flight deck crashes or take off accidents you’re talking about around one per combat operating day per carrier. Carrier flight operations were, and are, inherently dangerous and accident-prone. Would one bullet through a canopy- pane wounding a pilot who subsequently cracks up on a carrier landing, for what ever reason, and the plane pushed overboard due to the tempo of operations constitute a combat loss? Does one bullet somewhere in the aft fuselage, through and through, without any other damage to the airplane and the pilot cracks up on a carrier landing, for whatever, outside of any other damage or reason, and the plane pushed overboard due to excessive irrepairable damage constitute a combat loss? What about one bullet in the fuselage and one in the left wing? Where would you draw the line?

The USN records do provide an accounting, as noted, by determining the most likely cause of the loss, except where they are listed all together under the category of general Operational Losses. General Operational Losses on Action Sorties are those without any apportionment of cause, e.g., pilot error, LSO error, Flight deck error, fuel exhaustion, engine failure, or any number of loss sources up to and including a shifting deck in heavy seas. I’d point out that an aircraft launching on a combat mission that loses power and crashes 200 yards in front of the carrier is an action sortie operational loss as long as just one the other planes in its element makes contact with the enemy. Is that an aerial combat loss as well since it occurred in the course of an action sortie? Again, where would you draw the line?

Examples of some of the accounting:

F6F for the entire war (include all versions) combining USN and USMC carrier and land based:
Action Sorties – 66530
Losses on Action Sorties –
- To enemy AA – 553
- To enemy aircraft – 270
- Operational – 340
Losses on other flights – 885
Losses on ship or ground – 413
Enemy aircraft destroyed in combat
- Bombers – 1445
- Fighters – 3718
Tons of bombs on targets – 6503

Or:
For F4Fs (USN & USMC carrier and land)
Action Sorties – 2628
Losses on Action Sorties –
- To enemy AA – 24
- To enemy aircraft – 178
- Operational – 50
Losses on other flights – 112
Losses on ship or ground – 68
Enemy aircraft destroyed in combat
- Bombers – 418
- Fighters – 487
Tons of bombs on targets – 6

Or:
FM-2 (USN only carrier and land, no USMC usage)
Action Sorties – 12925
Losses on Action Sorties –
- To enemy AA – 62
- To enemy aircraft – 13
- Operational – 75
Losses on other flights – 283
Losses on ship or ground – 71
Enemy aircraft destroyed in combat
- Bombers – 194
- Fighters – 228
Tons of bombs on targets – 148

Or even:
SBD's (USN & USMC carrier and land)
Action Sorties – 52687
Losses on Action Sorties –
- To enemy AA – 153
- To enemy aircraft – 79
- Operational – 109
Losses on other flights – 224
Losses on ship or ground – 90
Enemy aircraft destroyed in combat
- Bombers – 31
- Fighters – 107
Tons of bombs on targets – 22942


"Just so you know, I am a US citizen who served in two US Military services, the USAF and the US Army, and I love US aircraft."

Good for you, and thank you, been known to wear a funny green suit myself in my younger days, not to mention a few years in cadet grey, though I fail to see how that is germane to the topic.


"But it doesn't mean I support disinformation or misleading statistics. Let's all remember that Dick Bong was a GREAT pilot and GREAT shot, but he only got 2/3 of the kill tally of the top Allied Ace, Ivan Kozhedub, and he wasn't even in the ballpark with Hartmann. Heck, he wasn't even in the same county with Hartmann."

Care to point me to a reliable source that would indicate that anything I’ve posted is misleading or disinformation? Frankly, from my observation of this forum you, on occasion, exhibit a remarkable tendency to voice your opinion without much to back it up. I suggest you do a little more research. I’ve posted nothing on USN victory credits to losses ratios is not readily available to those who would make the effort to seek the information.

And as I said earlier, I’m not in the business of debunking anyone’s credited victories. My only comment on the subject would be that it would appear that the greater ones exposure to combat situations the more likely it is one would have a high score. In my poor mathematically inclined mind it kind of goes back to the relevance of action sorties as they relate to the number of credits as a means to normalize the data.

Further, I generally don’t comment on the events or statistics from the European Theater except to as where US carrier based aviation is involved … Operation Leader or Operation Dragoon/Anvil come to mind, nor do I comment on the North African Theater, particularly, except for carrier operations in support of Operation Torch, and not at all on the Eastern Front since no carriers were involved. Not interested in the events, personalities, or statistics at all. If that makes me narrow, so be it, but in the area I choose to study, i.e., US carrier operations, I just may know more, or have greater resources available, than the casual observer … like a couple of file cabinets full of USN sourced reports and documents plus numerous boxes of the same that I haven’t even bothered to look at in years.


"Germany had over 100 pilots with a better record than Dick Bong. I think Bong was among the best of all time, but that's just MY opinion. Any German would be completely coirrect in disputing my claim."

Exactly, see my position on personal victory claims, posted above. I’m not getting into a discussion of whose score is accurate and whose isn’t … that’s about as valuable as playing the “what if” game. You apparently accept the Luftwaffe statistics at face value … that’s fine, your prerogative. And I accept the USN statistics. Again, I’m not in the business of casting aspersions on anyone’s combat record. I’ve seen some pretty lively discussions on Battle of Britain claims, from both sides, that could cause some raised eyebrows in terms of evaluating claims veracity, but … not my business, no particular interest, and absolutely no desire to delve into it.


"We also must remember that Japan, Romania, Poland, and several other countries ALSO had some great pilots ... with great scores; sometimes obtained in relatively obsolete aircraft."

Never said that they didn’t, did I?


"On the Axis side, the Germans were the absolute masters of aerial combat when it came to ace-to-ace fighting. In the end, quantity triumphed over quality."

And, in my opinion … note: my opinion … a somewhat simplistic viewpoint.


"We had many GOOD pilots and they had a few GREAT pilots combined with a good number of average pilots. Both of us had some poor pilots and some poor airplanes. The Bf 110 was an Axis example and the P-40 was an Allied example. Sure, it did yeoman work but, then again, it was also a poor excuse for a modern fighter aircraft after 1940 or so. Even a Merlin couldn't turn the P-40 into a silk purse ... it remained a sow's ear even with a good engine. In the end, Curtiss closed after WWII and their first attempt at a jet fighter.

"Messerschmitt is still around. So is Mitsubishi. So is Nakajima, as Fuji Heavy Industries. They made Japanese versions of the F-86, their own derivative, a piston and a turboprop version of the Beech Bonanza as a military trainer, and some Japanese versions of the Jaguar and F-15 Eagle.

"Curtiss just faded away."

IMO Curtiss built crappy single-engined airplanes once they stopped making biplanes. Historically, Curtiss was way, way behind the curve when it came to jets and that’s what killed it in terms of military aircraft production contracts … no military contracts for a company like Curtiss means its time to lock the doors. I mean, jeez, there was Curtiss in 1947 putzing around with the XF15C for the Navy running on an R2800 and a Goblin and there’s McDonnell is producing the FH-1 with 2 J-30’s. At the same time the Navy’s planning on phasing out their few Ryan FR-1s (R1830 and J-31). You’d have thought Curtiss would get the hint. Chance Vought survived to eventually become LTV; Douglas became McDonnell-Douglas, Grumman soldiered along for years by itself but is now Northrop-Grumman, and let’s not forget Lockheed-Martin. I fail to see the point of bringing up the demise of Curtiss; lots of companies go belly up, especially when their technology is OBE. Let’s see … Stanley, Rambler, Desoto, LaSalle, Stutz, and, today, even Oldsmobile - all ceased automobile production, were gobbled up by another company, or went belly up, and automobiles are still being produced. Not that it has any bearing on the issue.

Regards,

Rich


http://ihost.it-mate.co.uk/users/rdkcleon/files/VF-11-Sundowners.jpg
Scanned from VF-11 F4F side panel

[JoeB]

"And, by the same token, nor were enemy losses credited for enemy airplanes that left the area of combat and later crashed, ditched, written off for damage, or otherwise permanently out of combat. A look at the Guadalcanal Campaign illustrates this amply as not an insignificant number of Japanese aircraft and pilot losses occurred on the long haul back to Rabaul or Buin post-combat. The USN numbers are all derived from actual combat reports and obviously squadron ACIO scribes at the time would have no knowledge of the final disposition of a damaged enemy aircraft. See below."

First very interesting info. But I don't why you concede much on that point. I know of no info indicating any US service arm was in the habit of counting its own planes that *crashed* eventually, failed to return home safely, after being shot up by e/a, as *not* lost to e/a just because they didn't fall in the combat area. Not as any kind of consistent habit anyway. As to planes that returned safely, on their wheels not wrecked, but were cannibalized, stricken etc. I don't know if they were treated statistically completely 100% consistently (in USAF in Korea it wasn't 100% consistent, sometimes counted lost sometimes not, but not a really statistically significant portion of losses). Anyway this would seem to apply to all air arms always.

On enemy a/c damaged but eventually crashed, if you count all those for a campaign like Guadalcanal (see eg. Lundstrom's "First Team in the Guadalcanal Campaign" or Frank's "Guadalcanal Campaign") the real JNAF losses were still typically order of 1/2 or less the US claims. Later in WWII US claim verification got tighter but early campaigns v. the Japanese not as good. Again F4F v. A6M was just about 1:1 in 1942, to within a few planes either way. Altogether F4F ratio rises to as high as 3:1 in 1942 counting the many non-fighter targets. Other types fair less well. I was always fascinated as a kid by the SBD v. A6M claims of success but for the 1942 carrier battles almost very few of the A6M claims by SBD's can be verified as real losses, lower % than the fighter-fighter engagements (Lundstrom, "First Team" and "First Team in the Guadalcanal Campaign").

Joe

[BuzzLightyear]

Outstanding post, Leonard, and I agree with almost all of it!

Except that part about Curtiss building crappy planes. [:0]

IMO, one of the most underated planes of the immediate pre- and WWII era was the Curtiss Hawk 75/P-36. It was a wee bit slow in 1940, but an outstandingly manueverable and tough fighter it was, significantly superior in this regard to the contemporary Spitfire I.

Here are just 3 pages from a roughly 45 page report comparing the Spitfire I and the Hawk 75.

http://members.cox.net/us.fighters/hawk1.jpg
http://members.cox.net/us.fighters/hawk2.jpg
http://members.cox.net/us.fighters/hawk3.jpg

[BuzzLightyear]

Leonard, you wrote:

I can count, off the top of my head without looking it up, operational losses #133; two from VT-5 at Jaluit, one from VT-5 at Guadalcanal, one from VT-6 during Midway, two from VT-3 from battle damage and fuel exhaustion at Midway, that's six of the eight. Probably a couple of ditches at Coral Sea in May?

VT-2 on Lexington had at least one operational loss on May 8 at Coral Sea.

I, on the other hand, have to look it up and I'll refer to my copy of The First Team for the answer :).

[robert]

Rich:

A question - we're working from the same basic source, so I agree 100% with your figures. But I'm wondering if the statistics for the FM-1, the Eastern-built version of the F4F-4, would be included in the F4F totals or the FM totals. The majority of FMs that served with the US were FM-2s, but 839 FM-1s were delivered to the USN, and some of those did see combat.

You'd think that if the FM-1s were included with the F4F totals, it would be noted, in a similar fashion as the F4U and FG totals which are specifically grouped together. They're not specifically noted as such, and that makes me wonder if the FM-1 totals are combined with the FM-2 totals under the heading FM, and how that would affect the data, if at all.

[BuzzLightyear]

I would think the FM-1 totals would be counted among the F4F figures. Afterall, the FM-1 was GM built F4F-4 with 4 guns instead of 6.

[R Leonard]

Buzz My Man!

I’ll concede a little on the Hawk 75; a sweet little machine for it’s vintage. They were rather roughed up, though, by VF-41 and VF-9 in Operation Torch.

And as you know, if you really want to fill in the blanks on early WWII USN aviation in the Pacific, John’s First Team(s) are the place to go. We’ve a couple of loose-leaf notebooks around here somewhere with some of the rough drafts for ‘Pearl Harbor to Midway’. When you look up VT-2, check out the Forward first. That guy is on the other side of the wall from where I sit right now.

Oh hey, I ran across some a couple of transcripts of interviews of JS Thach and NA Gayler conduct in BuAir in summer and fall of 1942. Both of them mention the N2 sight. I'll drag them back out and sent you their comments.

Regards,

Rich

http://ihost.it-mate.co.uk/users/rdkcleon/files/VF-11-Sundowners.jpg

[R Leonard]

Robert –

Looking at Table One. For carrier based, F4F and FM are listed separately. That FM is the FM-2. I believe that the vast majority of the FM-1’s went to either training or to the VC squadrons. Look at Table 5 and the note at the bottom specifically refers to the withdrawal of F4Fs by October. But land-based VF-11 and VF-21 were out of Cactus by the end of July and VF-28 left USS Chenango the same month. Ranger came back from Operation Leader at the end of October and VF-9 and VF-4 switched to F6F’s when they detached from the ship. My friend in the next room tells me he was TAD’d from VF-11 in San Diego and went up to Seattle NAS in the fall of ’42 to brief the VC squadrons forming there on the adventure so far and they were flying FM-1s (and cold it was … all he had were khaki’s - all his blues went down on Yorktown and there were no replacements available). Says there were lots of FM-1s on the west coast for training purposes as well. He can’t think of any squadron that took the FM-1 into combat against the Japanese. True, Eastern built some 1220 FM-1s, (including about 311 for the FAA) but before the first year of production was over they were already delivering the first of what turned out to be 3720 USN and 340 FAA FM-2s. As near as I can glean, FM-1s gradually replaced the VC squadron F4F-4s in the Atlantic and were, in turn, replaced by FM-2s. You have to wonder sometimes though, William “Bush” Bringle’s VOF-1 started in F4Us, traded them in for F6Fs for Operation Dragoon, was redesignated VOC-1 in December 44, switched to FM-2s and finished out the war operating off USS Marcus Island and USS Wake Island, garnering another 20 victories to add to six German planes they picked off over France.

Regards,

Rich

http://ihost.it-mate.co.uk/users/rdkcleon/files/VF-11-Sundowners.jpg

[JoeB]

Leonard wrote:

"And as you know, if you really want to fill in the blanks on early WWII USN aviation in the Pacific, John’s First Team(s) are the place to go."

So, based on such works (seems you're highly familiar with) why quote the old ratio's based on just claims? They are still somewhat interesting I agree, but the issue is not that just that claims exceeded losses; that's almost always true in all air wars and no bad reflection necessarily on air crews claiming. The issue is that it's hard to say in any particular case by how much. For example Lundstrom has documented it pretty extensively for 1942 (published, I always hoped he'd go on to later). But that doesn't mean the claim/loss ratio was the same later in the war (and it certainly can't be assumed it was the same for other air arms). So not only is say 19:1 for Hellcats almost certainly not a real number, but it can't really be compared apples to apples with F4F or any other ratio's, because we don't know (unless there is such a reference?) how accurate F6F unit claims later in the war were on a comphrehensive basis, like we do more or less for F4F units in 1942. Though from specific examples it seems they tended to be more accurate (having the clear upper hand against the enemy seems to be a factor leading to a higher proportion of claims checking out as real enemy losses).

Joe

[GregP]

This is fun.

A Wildcat is a Wildcat, and they didn't HAVE a great kill ratio.

I bet I can find some obscure sub-type of a Japanese or German aircraft that shot down one Allied plane without loss in one mission. That makes its kill ratio infinite. Would you claim it was a great plane? Naaahhhhhhhh .....

The Wildcat was pretty good for the 1930s, and was all we had when WWII broke out. But a great fighter? I doubt it. Better than the Hellcat, Corsair, and Mustang? Not even if you're on drugs!

This is a case, plain and simple, of making statistics lie to prove a point. Get real.

The Wildcat was a scrappy little fighter that did a pretty good job until better planes came along. When they DID, the Wildcat was, pure and simple, obsolete. No one with an ounce of credibility gives kill ratios for sub types, with one notable exception: Most authorities DO concede that the liquid-cooled Fw 190s were a different type than the radial-engine Fw 190s. Still, the Fw 190 is usually quoted in kill ratio statistics as a single type.

The only thing the "FM" designation did was to discriminate the manufacturers among each other. It was a Wildcat.

What's next? Will you be telling me that the P-51s with Aeroproducts instead of Hamilton-Standard propellers were credited with a higher kill ratio than the Hellcat? Who cares? A P-51 with a Merlin engine is as good as any OTHER Merlin P-51 in battle, until you get to the P-51H, and very few of THEM saw combat. They were FAST and AGILE ... but are STILL P-51s, and don't get a separate identity when kill ratios are talked about. The kill ratio for the P-51 was 4950 air-to-air kills against 2520 combat losses. It ain't even CLOSE to the Hellcat, ratio-wise. Sure, the P-51 also destroyed 4218 on the ground, but the USA doesn't COUNT ground victories.

So, phooey on your "FM". Your numbers are not credible to me or anyone else with an honest approach to the subject.

Oh yeah, just for the record, there were 7900 Wildcats produced, 11100 Corsairs, 8600 P-38s, and 12275 Hellcats. Wildcats shot down 1006 enemies, Corsairs shot down 2140, and the Hellcat shot down 5156 enemy planes.

So, your are telling me that the Wildcat's 1006 is better than the Hellcat's 5156?

I don't think so ... 5156 is greater than 1006, even if you do it in the metric system or with set theory.

[JoeB]

Quote R. Leonard:
"He can’t think of any squadron that took the FM-1 into combat against the Japanese. True, Eastern built some 1220 FM-1s, (including about 311 for the FAA) but before the first year of production was over they were already delivering the first of what turned out to be 3720 USN and 340 FAA FM-2s. As near as I can glean, FM-1s gradually replaced the VC squadron F4F-4s in the Atlantic and were, in turn, replaced by FM-2s. "

VC-33 (Coral Sea), VC39 (Liscombe Bay) and VC-41 (Corregidor) were equipped with FM-1's or a mixture of them and F4F-4's in late 1943 early '44 Gilberts/Marshalls ops (Liscombe Bay sunk by I-176 in former). Per Y'Blood "The Little Giants". Cross referencing with Frank Olynyk's victory listings though it doesn't seem those units scored before converting to FM-2's, might have missed something.

FM-1's on the Altantic CVE's didn't shoot down any planes. The only US Wildcat CVE Wildcat encounter with German a/c was 22 Dec 1943 when a VC-6 (Core) FM-1 came upon a German Do-217 which was fired on but gradually outdistanced it and escaped into a squall (Y'Blood "Hunter Killer"). Ranger Wildcats of VF-4 shot down a Ju-88 and an He-115 (both confirmed in German records) off Norway in Operation Leader in Oct 1943, but those were F4F's. The victories in Southern France were by F6F's as noted.

As to FM-2 v. F4F besides debating how similar they were as planes, the conditions under which they fought in air combat were very different. The extremely high ratio for FM-2's is partly a function of intercepting lots of unescorted bombers and kamikaze's and relatively few real fighters, as well as its considerable superiorty to the F4F. Whereas the bulk of F4F claims and losses are against extremely serious '42-early '43 JNAF fighter opposition, though a lot of the victories are also non-fighters. So mixing those numbers isn't that meaningful either.

On FM-2's potential, RN FM-2's fought an engagement 26 Mar 1945, albeit small sample and late in war with corrsponding questions of German pilot quality, where they downed 2 or 3 Bf-109G's (of JG5 from its records, not just RN claims, loss of third unclear).

Joe

[JoeB]

That's I-175 v. Liscombe Bay, typo.

Joe

[simon]

Errr Greg, you may wish to edit your post, because I'm telling you now 5,156 isn't greater that 7,900 whichever way you work the maths! :D

[Ricky]

Simon, I *think* he means that as 7900 Wildcats produced shot down 1006 enemies, and 12275 Hellcats shot down 5156 enemy planes...

(pause for use of a calculator)

One enemy kill per 7(ish) Wildcats,
One enemy kill per 2(ish) Hellcats

Although kills per production figures open up a whole new can of worms.
[:o)]

(edit - just read your post properly Simon - sorry to doubt you, Greg did do a typo!!)

[simon]

Well for the record I'll state that from his posts I completely agree with Rich, according to his posts which I have no reason to doubt and in which he uses the experiences of a man who actually flew the type in combat, the FM Wildcats were in all aspects but airframe a completely different fighting aircraft from the F4Fs. I wouldn't propose to second guess the pilot, that is enough for me to agree that it should be considered separately.

"Will you be telling me that the P-51s with Aeroproducts instead of Hamilton-Standard propellers were credited with a higher kill ratio than the Hellcat? Who cares? A P-51 with a Merlin engine is as good as any OTHER Merlin P-51 in battle"

Not really, but I would suggest that the success rate of the Merlin P-51s should be considered seperately from the successes of the P-51 and P-51A. Which is effectively what has been done by considering the F4F and FM seperately, since the two had apparently different characteristics. Incidently if you could get such a precise breakdown of P-51 claims then I for one would be interested in reading it.

"Your numbers are not credible to me or anyone else with an honest approach to the subject"

Well I count myself as having an honest approach to the subject, and I find the numbers credible. In any case we have a generally mature and polite forum here, let's not degenerate into hurling insults please gentlemen. We're adults, let's keep it civil.

Yes the quality and intent of the opposition will affect the kill-loss ratios of the type, and I think crucially here, no-one is claiming that the FM series Wildcats were the best fighter aircraft of the war, just that these statistics show that under certain circumstances they could be extremely effective.

That cannot be denied.

Greg, it is up to you whether you choose to accept Rich's figures or not. I'm sure no-one will mind either way. For me it is interesting and useful to hear of the distinction between the two types of Wildcat. You are of course correct that one could probably find an aircraft with an infinite kill-loss ratio (For example the FW187 served in combat and as far as I'm aware none were lost to enemy guns, this could be one example), however this is not what is trying to be achieved here.

As far as Rich's veteran ace and the USN are concerned there were enough differences between the F4Fs and FMs to classify them separately, that's logic enough for me to agree with. And finally so far after the event what is there to be achieved by deliberately milking the numbers? Are General Motors going to suddenly be inundated with orders for FM Wildcats from airforces around the world? Is anyone likely to proclaim the FM Wildcat the best fighter of the war? Is the USN going to be heralded as the best airforce of all time because of the evidence?

Unlikely on all accounts. So please accept it for what it is, an interesting statistic.

[simon]

One thing I did neglect to say.

Welcome on board JoeB, good to have another new face!

[robert]

Rich & JoeB:

Thanks for the info - very much appreciated.

Barrett Tillman's Wildcat Aces of World War 2 states, "By VJ-Day, FMs of 38 composite squadrons had been credited with some 432 aerial kills". Since we have the figure of 422 in the Pacific, wouldn't that make the remaining ten kills against the western Axis nations?

[BuzzLightyear]

Greg, May I suggest Barrett Tillman's book Wildcat: The F4F in WWII? It may lay to rest some of the notions you have about the plane.

I'm sort of taken back you your analogy that one Merlin powered Mustang is as good as another Merlin powered Mustang when speaking collectively of Wildcats. You see, there were significant difference between the F4F-4 and the FM-2 Wildcats, including the engine :).

The FM-2 was lighter than the F4F-4, but could carry more ordinance. It was faster in level flight by about 20 mph. It's initial climb rate was 3,650 fpm, versus 1,950 for the F4F-4. It had a longer range, and a higher ceiling. The FM-2 used the Wright R-1850-56, some with water-injection, making 1,350hp (dry). The 1200 hp P&W R-1830-86 (never any water injection).

There is no question, all Wildcats were not created equally.

[R Leonard]

JoeB -

"VC-33 (Coral Sea), VC39 (Liscombe Bay) and VC-41 (Corregidor) were equipped with FM-1's or a mixture of them and F4F-4's in late 1943 early '44 Gilberts/Marshalls ops (Liscombe Bay sunk by I-176 in former). Per Y'Blood "The Little Giants". Cross referencing with Frank Olynyk's victory listings though it doesn't seem those units scored before converting to FM-2's, might have missed something."

Thank you much, JoeB, for the clarification. I'll add that tidbit to my information hoard. I wonder what was the mix of F4F-4s to FM-1s. FWIW I checked my father's logs and found he first checked out in the FM-1 AND the FM-2 in October of 1943 after returning from the Solomons and while assigned to ComFleetAirWest in the fighter tactics development/training shop working for his old VF-42 XO, Jimmy Flatley.

Apples to apples and oranges to oranges is pretty much the issue. I think that John has pretty much settled the hash for the December 41 through November 42. A big piece of the puzzle revolves around the accuracy of the reporting. If you read closely, and not to slam our friends in the USMC, it generally appears that the USN squadrons were much more meticulous in their reporting of credits than were the USMC squadrons, especially in the period up to and including Midway. I've long suspected that the difference revolves around experience levels and the sometime chaos that occurred in the sky over Guadalcanal. Hence, even with the qualifier of more modern investigation into the numbers, I tend to stick to the official reports.

That decision is predicated on a couple of concepts, first, some of those who tout the achievements of others in other air forces sometimes tend to be rather dismissive of any questioning of their numbers and get all wrapped up in the personalities end of the business. "My guy, Otto Stehdinbed, shot down XYZ Klingon airplanes and anyone who says otherwise is a GD liar, but your guy, Jimmy Snowflake, couldn't have possibly achieved his score, so you're twice the GD liar." Ends up with lots of finger pointing, name calling, and other sundry unpleasantness with which I just don't wish to deal. I mean, goodness, if you want to talk about inflated scores, look at what the Japanese squadrons were reporting around Guadalcanal. Poor guys couldn't figure out where all the US planes were coming from when they'd annihilated them just the day before. I don't believe that folks can have it both ways, one side accepted without question and the other side being profoundly flawed. So, I only dabble in British claims in as much as they involve the FAA carrier based units and absolutely do not deal in any way shape or form with Japanese, German, Italian, Russian, French, or anyone else’s claims, at all.

Secondly, with regard to the accuracy of the USN reports, an understanding of the reporting process and it's evolution becomes important. By 1943 assignment of ACIOs to squadrons had become the norm and rather than some enthusiastic yeoman recording the experiences of a keyed up pilot returning from a mission there were some rather steely-eyed and trained to be skeptical folks sitting on the other side of the table. The USN was hot on accurate reporting and the ACIOs were the tip of the spear to achieve the highest level of accuracy possible. I know ACIOs from the 1944-1945 period who served in CV based squadrons who wouldn’t award a claim if it wasn’t on film … no picture, no credit. The same applied for credit for the destruction of ground targets, especially defuelled aircraft. By the end of the war it was not uncommon, in the absence of some spectacular explosion or obvious fire, for ACIOs to be the guys who decided whether a gunnery run on a parked airplane resulted in its destruction or just damage. Gun cameras, available in the F4F and on, eventually became the great leveler of claims for the USN. Ah! You ask, but why weren’t they used to tally scores in the early days? That would be a good question. Cameras were generally used as a training aid in the USN F4F squadrons, primarily in target sleeve firing, to examine a pilot’s firing run technique. I’ve also found some references to electrical problems in VF-6 F4Fs on Enterprise that were traced to the camera system, reports of which led to their disconnection in at least one other squadron, VF-3. Bottom line was that gun camera use as a claim verifier simply wasn’t a practice in the early carrier operations – perhaps no ACIOs available to do the analysis might have something to do with it … remember prior to 1943 squadron intelligence, material, and administrative officers were also the pilots – and at the height of operations around Guadalcanal, besides a lack of ACIOs, there simply neither the facilities for processing, nor an impetus for such a practice, nor, I suspect, a particularly high priority placed on replacement film. My money would be on the theory that there were perceived by the folks on the scene simply more productive ways to spend one’s energy. As you get away from the activities around the Solomons and into the realm of late 1943 and on CV operations, the information, in my opinion, becomes increasing accurate.

"As to FM-2 v. F4F besides debating how similar they were as planes, the conditions under which they fought in air combat were very different. The extremely high ratio for FM-2's is partly a function of intercepting lots of unescorted bombers and kamikaze's and relatively few real fighters, as well as its considerable superiorty to the F4F. Whereas the bulk of F4F claims and losses are against extremely serious '42-early '43 JNAF fighter opposition, though a lot of the victories are also non-fighters. So mixing those numbers isn't that meaningful either."

Agree with your F4F vs. FM-2 victories sources and causes. I think, if I follow you, your last sentence on types of adversaries is also well taken. Sometimes the gross numbers don’t lend themselves to a completely accurate interpretation. Fortunately, in the case of USN statistics, they break out enemy aircraft shot down as fighters or bombers. True, the two categories each encompass a bunch of nefarious characters, but it is better than one big number. The USN statistics for the last year of the war break out actual types shot down by USN types, though there remain some catch-all groupings, such as “Flying Boats,” “Transports’” and “Trainers”. So for, example, (and shying away from more controversial USN types, though corresponding statistics exist) F6F pilots for the period 1 September 1944 through 15 August 1945 were credited the following (format = Japanese Type – USN Credit to USN Loss):

A6M2 series - 1,000 to 75
Ki-43 - 396 to 26
Ki-61 - 275 to 11
Ki-41 - 283 to 9
Ki-84 - 114 to 12
J2M - 33 to 9
N1K - 28 to none
Ki-27 - 59 to 1
Unidentified S/E VF - 90 to 6
Total S/E VF - 2,278 to 149

D3A - 215 to none
D4Y - 134 to 1
B5N - 26 to none
B6N - 105 to none
Ki-51 - 21 to none
C6N - 36 to none
Other VB-VT Types - 14 to 1
Total VB-VT Types - 551 to 2

E13 - 50 to none
F1M - 18 to none
A6M2-N - 15 to none
E16 - 6 to none
Total Floatplanes - 89 to none

G4M - 185 to 6
Ki-46 - 48 to none
P1Y - 118 to none
J1N - 20 to none
Ki-45 - 46 to 1
Ki-21 - 33 to none
Ki-49 - 12 to none
Ki-48 - 27 to none
G3M - 18 to none
Ki-67 - 6 to none
Unidentified 2/E Combat types - 17 to 1
Total 2/E Combat types - 530 to 8

Flying Boats - 17 to none
Transports - 36 to none
Trainers - 17 to none
Unidentified - 0 to 1
GRAND TOTAL - 3,518 to 160

Also re: your F4F, FM, and F6F in European waters research seems to parallels my findings. If you haven't already you should take a look at Robert Cressman's latest tome on USS Ranger (CV-4). He goes into great detail on Torch and Leader.

Thanks again for the VC squadron info.

Regards,

Rich

http://ihost.it-mate.co.uk/users/rdkcleon/files/VF-11-Sundowners.jpg

[R Leonard]

Robert -

Re - your last

No, I think that's either a function of how one counts or, more likely, an intrusion of the editing bug. FM victories in the Atlantic/European theater were all Fleet Air Arm, no VC squadrons involved.

And "Wildcat" is dedicated to ...

Regards,

Rich

http://ihost.it-mate.co.uk/users/rdkcleon/files/VF-11-Sundowners.jpg

[R Leonard]

"This is fun."

Gee, read something like this and you have to ask yourself, "Does this deserve a civil response or is it the wild rants of someone going off the deep end when he can’t have his own way and to be ignored?" I will split the difference:

Oddly enough, Greg, I do get your point on type variations.

What you apparently do not get is that I am not the guy who decided how the USN wanted to record its wartime activities – though I will confess at least meeting some of the folks involved in the far distant past. Presentation of their data compilation is a reporting of the recording of history itself, from the actual documents themselves, with presentation of their reasoning and data assignment methods. How the USN, in my opinion, chose to present the information becomes of historic interest in and of itself.

If you have a problem with the USN post-war data gathering and compilation methodologies, then I suggest you take that up with the USN, though, as I regret to inform you that almost all, if not all, of the folks involved in that data gathering and compilation are no longer with us, I seriously doubt the USN will have either the time or inclination to make changes just to satisfy you.

I will not comment on your various statistics, I have no interest in correcting your errors.

I have only exchanged posts with you on only a few occasions and each time it becomes increasingly unpleasant. Your opinions in this matter and others, such as F8Fs and climb to time, from my perspective, are shrouded in some sense of omniscience that leads you to disparage and attack rather than engage in reasoned discourse. Your comments are often enough apparently without any historic basis and are naught but your opinions.

While you are certainly entitled to your opinions, you would do well to couch them as opinions and not facts.

Your tendency, when faced with facts that do not parallel your thoughts, is to go for aspersions, accusations and ridicule. Mindful of their source and not wishing to contribute to the discord, I shall not consider your posts here in the future. It is, as they say, “a done deal.”

RAL

[JoeB]

Quoting R. Leonard
"I wonder what was the mix of F4F-4s to FM-1s."

According to Y'Blood VC-39 11 FM-1 and 5 F4F-4 when Liscombe Bay was deployed for Gilberts op (where sunk). VC-33 still F4F-4 at that time, but VC-41 all FM-1. By Marshalls op VC-33 was 5 FM-1, 9 F4F-4; VC-41 6 FM-1, 3 F4F-4. So apparently the two types seem to have been through the re-supply pipeline without distinction, which I guess makes sense.

"Secondly, with regard to the accuracy of the USN reports, an understanding of the reporting process and it's evolution becomes important."

That's a very interesting discussion and certainly corresponds with the apparent trend toward a higher % of USN claims corrsponding to Japanese losses later in the war than earlier, though it's not as weel defined later. From what I've read the same was even more true of USAAF. In early going PTO they were often extremely hard pressed, whole organizations liable to perhaps be captured, not just possibly defeated in the air. And claim accuracy was low. Other extreme in Europe late in the war 8th AF accuracy was often quite high. US prop claims v. Me-262's is something I studied (with some published works of both sides) and the P-51 v. 262 claims were highly accurate, underclaims on particular days were not unusual and overall ratio ~80%. I think USAAF ETO case one factor may have been the British influence of emphasis on operations analysis: the importance for your intelligence effort of trying to determine how many enemy you were really destroying as opposed to positive morale factor of awarding victories, somewhat opposing considerations. Plus as you said once things settle into a routine and organizations are not as hard pressed things like careful verification are just more feasible.

I agree also Japanese claim accuracy ratio's were almost always low. One packaged up case is the 1939 border war with the USSR. The JAAF claimed 1100-1200 per most sources, the Soviets lost somewhat over 200 in combat per most, but some to AA (the Soviets claimed 600+ JAAF to around 100 actually lost).

"So for, example, (and shying away from more controversial USN types, though corresponding statistics exist) F6F pilots for the period 1 September 1944 through 15 August 1945 were credited the following (format = Japanese Type – USN Credit to USN Loss):"

That's fascinating. Do you mind if I ask the source? Another thing I'd comment on just anecdotally from the later war, where a wide variety JAAF or JNAF types might encountered where the Japanese side is known the type id's are not all that accurate. For example in Henry Sakaida's book on the N1K (George) equipped 343rd Air Group, the US victory claims against them were not always or even usually counted as "Georges", though the *number* of 343rd a/c claimed destroyed reasonably corrsponded to reality (while the 343rd's claims, again, were noticeably less accurate than the US ones).

I wonder for example if the unfavorable ratio shown v. Ki-84's (Franks) could be partly a tendency to confirm an id of the capable Frank as the opponent when the action was not successful, whereas some Franks successfully engaged might be included as other types.

Joe

[R Leonard]

"I wonder for example if the unfavorable ratio shown v. Ki-84's (Franks) could be partly a tendency to confirm an id of the capable Frank as the opponent when the action was not successful, whereas some Franks successfully engaged might be included as other types."

Well, except I got bit by my own personal editing bug. Ki-84 losses to F6F losses should have read:

<center> 114 to 12 </center>

Sorry for the bum steer, I should be more careful. Post has been edited with corrections, everything should add up correctly now.

Data is from "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics - World War II"

Joe, send me a PM when you get a chance.

Regards,

Rich

http://ihost.it-mate.co.uk/users/rdkcleon/files/VF-11-Sundowners.jpg

[GregP]

All this stuff is fun. Sorry folks, a Wildcat is a Wildcat and the FM series is just anonther Wildcat. All else is bull. Show me a significant differnece in performance, in armament, top speed, diving speed, rate of roll, abilty to take battle damage, or mistic cognitive dissonance with regard to motivational committance.

If YOU think differently, that's OK. I don't, and never will.

It is not anywhere NEAR the Hellcat in ability as a fighter aircraft, but it IS a very scrappy 1930's fighter that did OK until other, more modern fighters came around.

If you happen to be a revisionist, don't confine yourself to the Wildcat, go for EVERYTHING. So, which fighter subvariant had the best kill ratio of all WWII fighters and thus is the champion?

I don't give a rat's behind. The Hellcat is the best Naval fighter in US Navy Aviation history, period, with a kill ratio of 19:1. It also happens to be the best piton engine fighter of all times, if you consider kill ratio alone. I happen to consider kill ratio to be the best indication of a fighter aircraft's ability to kill the enemy. If you don't, that's OK.

The FM series of Wildcats were OK, but nothing to write home about. Just Wildcats. Joe Foss did well with a Wildcat, but David McCampbell did better in a Hellcat.

One on one, there is a great large debate over which WWII fighter (or bomber)aircraft is the best. Personally, I feel the winner is VERY dependent on who is flying it.

Put Erich Hartmann in a Spitfire 21 and it would be the best. Put Erich Hartmann in a P-40 and it would be the best. I'd bet on Hartmann if he were flying a Miles Magister that happened to be armed. If he flew an armed ultralight, it would be very hard to kill. If pilot skill is the "dipstick," then Erich Hartmann, Gerhard Barkhorn, or Gunther Rall would surely be at the top.

If planes are considered as a factor, then the Supermarine Spitfire (late war versions), the Commonwealth CAC-15 (only version), the Martin-Baker MB-5 (only version), the North American P-51 (Merlin or better), the Focke Wulf Fw 190 (any of them), the Messerschmitt Bf 109(post E models), and the Russian Yakovlev Yak-7/9, especially the Vk-105-powered opnes, must be considered as the best of all times. I would add the Italian Reggianne Re-2005, Macchi MC-205, and the Fiat G-55. I might also be persuaded to include the Nakajima Ki-84 Frank and the N1K-2J Kawanishi Shinden-Kai. Nothing else comes close, despite the VL Pyorrmyrsky and other worthy prototypes.

So, which is it?

Depends on the mission and depends on the pilot and the mission.

The Wildcat has no place on this list, FM or otherwise, and is a mediocre fighter aircraft at best ... better than a Buffalo, but not as good as a Hellcat or a Bearcat, the next two offerings from Grumman.

Come back? Think otherwise? Then WHY and for what reason?

No more beer ...

[BuzzLightyear]

Greg:

You said, "Depends on the mission and depends on the pilot and the mission." Seems this should be sufficient to explain the FM-2s kill ratio you so vehemently disagree with.

I come to this board for the civilized nature of debate. I'm rather disappointed in this thread.

[simon]

OK Greg, I'll indulge...

F4F-4
Powerplant: 1,200hp P&W Twin Wasp
Performance: Max Speed 318mph at 19,400ft, Cruise 155mph, ceiling 39,400ft
Range: 770 miles
Weights: empty 5,758lb, max 7,952lb
Dimensions: Span 38ft, length 28ft 9in, height 9ft 2 1/2in, wing area 260 sq ft
Armament: 6 .50 cals, 2 x 100lb bombs

FM-2
Powerplant: 1,350hp Wright Cyclone
Performance: Max Speed 332mph at 28,800ft, Cruise 164mph, ceiling 34,700ft
Range: 900 miles
Weights: empty 5,448lb, max 8,271lb
Dimensions: Span 38ft, length 28ft 10 3/4in, height 9ft 11in, wing area 260 sq ft
Armament: 4 .50 cals, 2 x 250lb bombs or 6 x 5 inch rockets.

Altogether a more capable aircraft and to use your own analogy if it is enough to consider all Merlin Mustangs in the same category (Excluding the Alison engined examples), then surely it is enough to consider the Twin Wasp Wildcats separately from the Cyclone Wildcats. If not then you have to consider the P-51 and P-51A when assessing the Mustang's success as a fighter.

"It is not anywhere NEAR the Hellcat in ability as a fighter aircraft"

..and none of us ever said it was, check back if you don't believe me, I'm not making this up.

"If you happen to be a revisionist, don't confine yourself to the Wildcat, go for EVERYTHING. So, which fighter subvariant had the best kill ratio of all WWII fighters and thus is the champion?"

Who's being a revisionist? All that's been said is two things. First against an enemy that was so short of trained pilots they had to crash into things to stand a chance of delivering their bombload and so short of resources that fighter escorts were an unnaffordable luxury the FM Wildcats did remarkably well.

Second that both the principle operators and the pilots themselves saw enough difference in the two to consider them separately.

" (the WIldcat) ...IS a very scrappy 1930's fighter..."

Not really it didn't enter service anywhere until 1940.

"I happen to consider kill ratio to be the best indication of a fighter aircraft's ability to kill the enemy. If you don't, that's OK."

Kill Ratio is a useful indicator but it is not the be all and end all. There are too many variables that come into play not least of which is the quality and quantity of the enemy.

Much has been discussed of the Hellcat's legendary kill-loss ratio before so I wont repeat too much just summarise. The Hellcats gained most of their kills after the Japanese Navy was already in serious decline. With better pilots and tactics the Hellcats would not have had such an easy time.

"Put Erich Hartmann in a Spitfire 21 and it would be the best. Put Erich Hartmann in a P-40 and it would be the best. I'd bet on Hartmann if he were flying a Miles Magister that happened to be armed. If he flew an armed ultralight, it would be very hard to kill. If pilot skill is the "dipstick," then Erich Hartmann, Gerhard Barkhorn, or Gunther Rall would surely be at the top."

I really struggle to see the relevance of this, besides showing that its best to consider aircraft types as a group (Which is what Rich's statistics do) rather than individual examples.

"The Wildcat has no place on this list (of best fighters), FM or otherwise, and is a mediocre fighter aircraft at best."

I will state again for purposes of drumming the point home. No-one is claiming the Wildcat, F4F, FM or otherwise to be the Greatest Fighter of All Time, just that it racked up an impressive number of kills against an enemy that fundamentally wasn't too interested in shooting back!

You really are arguing against yourself on this one Greg, no-one is disagreeing with you on that.

Anyway this is not the best fighter thread, and that's really where the latter dicussion belongs.

"No more beer ..."

Probably a good idea.

[GregP]

Sorry Buzz. Maybe my good-natued ribbing is coming across wrong. OK, I'll tone it down.

[GregP]

Hey Simon,

If YOU think an FM Widcat is a world-beater and different from a 1200 HP Wildcat, that's OK. Go for it. Heck, it has another 15 or so MPH on the older version. It is still slower than almost everything else in WWII that was a fighter. It is even slower than a Zero!

To me, it is a Wildcat and always will be. I've never seen the victory credits for the P-40 broken out by P-40B, P-40C, etc. and don't expect to see it. I've never seen the victory creadits for the P-51 broken out by subtype either, and don't expect to see it.

I've ALSO never seen the victory credits for the Spitfire broken down by sub type either ... and the Spits went through Merlin and Griffon engine variants ... and that seems at least as significant as the FMs, huh? The first Spit had a 2-bladed propeller. Later versions had 3, 4, 5, and 6-bladed propellers including contra-props. Do they deserve a separate classification?

Why start differentiating with the Wildcat? Makes no sense to me but, hey, go for it if you like the concept. But, do it for all the fighter types, not just the Wildcat.

So, how many victories did the Bf 109 E-3 have? What about the Bf 109 K-4, or the G-6? Or G-10?

Do the breakout if you like, I have no comment except to say that I will consider the Bf 109 as a series, and will do the same with the Wildcats. If you wish to do otherwise, so be it. I will simply absorb the information and classify it by standard means, and will thank you for the effort. All I ask for is an electronic file with the particulars.

But, I won't agree with the premise.

However, my agreement is NOT necessary, or perhpas even desirable. If I can help, I will; just ask. The information collected will certainly prove interesting and will add to what I have at this time ... assuming we get ACCURATE data, that is.

Accurate data is hard to find.

[simon]

"Hey Simon,

If YOU think an FM Widcat is a world-beater and different from a 1200 HP Wildcat, that's OK."

Honestly Greg, I'm starting to think that you're deliberately misreading my posts ;). One last time and quoted directly from my last post:

"I will state again for purposes of drumming the point home. No-one is claiming the Wildcat, F4F, FM or otherwise to be the Greatest Fighter of All Time, just that it racked up an impressive number of kills against an enemy that fundamentally wasn't too interested in shooting back!"

OK? What room for confusion am I leaving here? [}:)]

"Why start differentiating with the Wildcat? Makes no sense to me but, hey, go for it if you like the concept. But, do it for all the fighter types, not just the Wildcat"

Actually you also did this when applying the proviso that all Merlin engine Mustangs are equal, thereby discounting the Alison ones, are these no longer Mustangs because of their engine? ;)

"However, my agreement is NOT necessary, or perhpas even desirable. If I can help, I will; just ask. The information collected will certainly prove interesting and will add to what I have at this time ... assuming we get ACCURATE data, that is.

Accurate data is hard to find."

Agreed on all counts, but this is similar to something I said early on in this debate which you may have missed:

"...please accept it for what it is, an interesting statistic"

[andyo2000]

I'm going to agree with Simon that aircraft kill ratios aren't always indicative of how good an aircraft is.

For example, the F-15 Strike Eagle has never lost a plane in combat. They've shot down many others. However, all of their opponents are poorly trained, and flying poorly-maintained, poorly-equipped 1960s Soviet-knockoffs. Now, you could look at the ratio and decide that it's the best plane ever, but you have to look at other factors.

What planes were the Hellcat up against? The Wildcat? The Hellcat is probably more likely to fly later models of Jap fighters. And so on. So look at everything, not just the ratios.

[JoeB]

Greg P: "1. If YOU think an FM Widcat is a world-beater and different from a 1200 HP Wildcat, that's OK. Go for it. Heck, it has another 15 or so MPH on the older version. It is still slower than almost everything else in WWII that was a fighter. It is even slower than a Zero!

2. I've ALSO never seen the victory credits for the Spitfire broken down by sub type either ... and the Spits went through Merlin and Griffon engine variants ... and that seems at least as significant as the FMs, huh? The first Spit had a 2-bladed propeller. Later versions had 3, 4, 5, and 6-bladed propellers including contra-props. Do they deserve a separate classification?"

1. Seems like a two part question. If someone agreed with what you said the (claimed) kill ratio, relative to the opposition they faced, was the key statistic for evaluating fighters in some absolute sense, then you could criticize them for playing with stats quoting the FM kill ratio. But it seems most, including me, don't agree with your premise. I don't think claimed ratio's are the be all and end all, they are too relative (to the opposition, and to the claim accurcacy of a given air arm in a given situation). So to me it just adds information to break down the statistics as far as possible. But in any case an evaluation of the actual enemy losses is needed to draw any conclusion at all. This may be taken partly for granted for late WWII Allied claims (that they are &gt;50% of enemy losses, sometimes considerably greater) but it can't be taken for granted at all for air warfare history in general. Some quoted ratio's for some planes are based on claims overstated enough to be quite misleading. eg. the A6M's ratio in Japanese literature down to today, or the MiG-15's in Russian language literature, some of each of which have washed through to English language sources from time to time.

2. Along the same lines I would find an overall 1939-45 claimed kill ratio for the Spitfire as a single type quite meaningless. Not really the same plane 1939 and 1945, not the same realtive quality of opposition all along, and not the same claim accuracy all along (RAF claim accuracy sometimes quite low, sometimes quite high, from my limited reading of two sided accounts).

Joe

[GregP]

Good points Joe, Andy, and Simon. OK, I seem to have a gift for being misunderstood or stating things badly, so maybe I can clear it up as follows:

1) I agree that a Spitfire I is a far different critter than a Spitfire XIV. No argument. However, I am not clear on exactly how to differentiate what models of which fighter aircraft of all sides should be differentiated, nor am I sure the information exists to such a degree of detail and accuracy at this time that we can make the correct breakouts.

2) If we can clear up what differentiates the "break point" for each type, I am all for it.

3) Until we decide that, I simply prefer to gather victories by type. I am having enough trouble doing just that! If you can help, I'd appreciate it. I am looking for a file that differentiates losses by victor and victim, but have yet to see it except in very small sections that are essentially useless ... you know, claims for one doigfight and things like that.

4) I have over 120 books on WWII aircraft in my library. NONE of them attempt to differentiate kills among the various versions of a single type. I asked the US Navy the same question, and THEY did't differentiate kills by subtypes, either ... as far as they told me. Of course, my inquiry was about 10 years ago, so their stance could have changed since then. I picked the Navy because the Air Force isn't all that interested either, and they didn't exist in WWII.

This is not much of an issue to me and I apologize profusely if anyone has taken offense at my comments, and apparently you have. If you HAVE the information, I ask that maybe you share it. If you DON'T have the information, then why are we squabbling over this subject?

I made the assumption, perhaps incorrectly, that anyone wishing to differentiate kills by victor and victim aircraft types probably HAS the information in order to do that task. Perhaps I was right, perhaps wrong.

But I didn't mean to start such a flap over it.

I have offered several times to share my database and do so again. Anyone interested enough to argue in this forum is interested in many of the same subjects as I am, and I will shre my data without cost to you. It's not very expensive to mail a CD to Italy or England; I have done both.

So, if YOU happen to have the information that would allow us to make the differentiation, please share it. I'll pay for the data if you want me to do so.

But ... I quit this fight since it seems counterproductive to the forum. Apparently, there are some real feelings on this issue, and I had not realized that.

To me, it's just data ... and more is better. Sorry ... go in peace.

[BuzzLightyear]

Just for interest:

http://members.cox.net/us.fighters/fm2news.jpg

Courtesy Naval Aviation News, August 1944