Another controversial topic - use of the bombers

[PMN1]

At what point did the allies have the ability to sustain the required offensive against the German oil facilities and the German transportation network to make that offensive successful had the FULL weight of RAF Bomber Command, the US 8th Air Force and 15th Air Force been used.

[B-24WillowRun]

I am a little confused as to what you are asking. I think, please clear it up if not, that you want to know if it would have been earlier had the full resorces of the Air Forces been used?

That is a hard question. As for the Oil, when the 15th made it into western Itally they were able to maintain raids on the oil and transportation, that would be some time in early 44, I think. But my dates might be off, I am not looking at material but trying to remember stuff. But then also remember that the air Force was diverted to tactical targets to soften up France for the Normandy Landings. I think that if things were a perfect thing it might have been sooner, but that would have been saying the Germans in Italy left.

So to close when the 15th got into Italy and settled down things got interesting. But if the AAC would have adopted escort fighters as the norm, say use P-38s earlier then we might have had a little differnt story. I am ranting and drifting, so good bye.;)

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by B-24WillowRun

I am a little confused as to what you are asking. I think, please clear it up if not, that you want to know if it would have been earlier had the full resorces of the Air Forces been used?
;)


Well anything that took Bomber Command away from bouncing the rubble of German cities even though the industries were rapidly being disperesd was like sunlight to a vampire as far as Arthur Harris was concerned and suggestions that Bomber Command concentrate on oil targets was no exception. I think there were several in the USAAF with the same views though they came round sooner or were told to shut up, something not easily done with Harris.

IF RAF Bomber Command, the 8th Air Force and 15th Air Force had turned their full weight of heavies on oil and transportation targets (something not easily dispersed) sooner would it have had the same effect as it did when they were historically turned on these targets.

I've read that RAF raids on oil targets tended to be more successful because of the larger bombs being used and the longer duration of the raids kept the firecrews in the shelters for longer giving the fires a chance to get a hold.

'Target:Hitler's Oil' by Ronald Cooke and Roy Conners Nesbit makes for an interesting read on the subject as does 'Bomber Command' by Max Hastings

[B-24WillowRun]

Thanks for that. You now could make an argument, but I am not shore if oil still should be the first move. Transport yes, but communications and comand. Also controll of the air. But realistically, the range to the oil say in Polesti was really the drive. As I said, when the 15th got into to Italy, they could have tried to focus more.

I just had a thought, if bomber comand would have used more fighter escourts, this more for the USAAC then they could have also done damage and helped save bombers. :)

[simon]

Or Ball bearings... Schweinfurt really scared the Reich.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by simon

Or Ball bearings... Schweinfurt really scared the Reich.


Worried the American crews a bit as well I imagine

[simon]

Indeed, according to most accounts if the Americans could have repeated Schweinfurt 10 times the Germans would have had no industry left. Of course the downside would have been that the 8th AAF would have ceased to exist as well!

PMN1 you seem very knowledgable, any idea why Bomber commmand didn't back the US up on Schweinfurt and bombed Peenemunde instead? Just interested really.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by simon

Indeed, according to most accounts if the Americans could have repeated Schweinfurt 10 times the Germans would have had no industry left. Of course the downside would have been that the 8th AAF would have ceased to exist as well!

PMN1 you seem very knowledgable, any idea why Bomber commmand didn't back the US up on Schweinfurt and bombed Peenemunde instead? Just interested really.


Arthur T Harris and his uncontested support from Churchill (until Dresden).

Having said that flattening Peenmunde is said to have delayed the V programme for about 6 months. It may have also made Hilter concentrate facilities under expensive thick concrete shields - perfect tagets for Tallboys and Grand Slams.

I'm never read of what Harris's views on the Peenamunde raid or the German V programme were but given that his took his bombers away from bouncing the rubble.....

[B-24WillowRun]

Ball Baerings were very important. but the resurch site at Pedamunda (very poor spelling sorry) with the V programs was a good pick. The 8th would have had a very hard time to keep up the raids, but if the RAF had halped a little at night with one or two missions it could have helped. Also I should look at some stuff but what if the 15th Air Force bombed the bearings fro Italy? Again I need to look at the dates amd range.

Trains were very importent. In the end the reich still had some good production but could not get it to the front because of the lack of transport, and oil!;)

[Wuzak]

As I understand it, strategic bombing by the allies was successful in slowing the increase in production of the war industries, but not successful it shutting it down.

The biggest effect strategic bombing had on the German war effort was when the Allies concentrated on oil and transport. What was the use of shiny new equipment when it didn't have the necessary fuels to run it and/or couldn't be transported to where it was required.

Transportation problems also had effects on production.

[Kutscha]

A link to the US SBC, http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#taoo

Don't quote me on this Wuzak, or others, but I seem to remember that, possible by Speer, the the SBC cost Germany around 30% of its production.

PMN1, I would say not until mid 1944 when the P-51 was around in large enough numbers to provide good escort support for the heavies and this is when, according to the link, oil became a primary target. Were not most oil production plants rather deep in Germany (Luena being almost as far as Berlin)? Also, the US was still perfecting its heavy bomber tactics.

Also the first half of 1944, cost the LW dearly in fighters, and pilots.
http://img.villagephotos.com/p/2005-12/1114844/thtrloss.gif

Would the deep penatration of Germany been possible earlier?

[Ricky]

I do remember reading somewhere that they discovered the most effective method of disrupting the German transport net was in mining the various waterways along which barges moved. A LOT of raw materials and manufactured goods were moved by barge at the time, and when Bomber Command started to mine waterways it caused big problems.

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by Ricky

I do remember reading somewhere that they discovered the most effective method of disrupting the German transport net was in mining the various waterways along which barges moved. A LOT of raw materials and manufactured goods were moved by barge at the time, and when Bomber Command started to mine waterways it caused big problems.


The dispersion techniques and pre-fab maunfactrung Speer used depended on communications, especially in the case of the U-boats, the canals, once they were effectively targeted production schedules went out of the window.

[PMN1]

Target:Hitler’s oil, Allied attacks on German oil supplies 1939-45 by Ronald C. Cooke and Roy Conners Nesbit

Apart from the oil plants and transport network, there were other weak points in the German economy, which would have been very worthwhile targets for attacks by the Anglo-American strategic bombers. These were plants producing key war chemicals such as synthetic nitrogen, methanol (synthetic wood alcohol), tetraethyl lead and synthetic rubber. Nitrogen was vitally important in the manufacture of explosives and V2 rocket fuel; it was also essential in the production of agricultural fertilizer. Tetraethyl lead was an indispensable ingredient of aviation fuel; without it the Luftwaffe’s fighter aircraft would have been deprived of 40 per cent of their engine power and have been hopelessly outclassed in combat. With the almost complete cessation of imports of natural rubber from overseas on the outbreak of war, the production within Germany of synthetic rubber, needed for many types of wheeled vehicle, assumed great importance.

In the case of some of these products, for example nitrogen, the plants that manufactured them were very few in number and of large capacity. Direct attacks on them would probably have had an even more crippling affect than the raids on the oil installations. Although, the Western Allies know a great deal about German industry even before the war began, the military leaders did not appreciate the crucial importance of the chemical industry or of the close interdependence between certain branches of production, as between the manufacture of oil, chemicals, synthetic rubber and explosives. This information came to light only after the war, when American and British survey teams carried out post mortem investigations in Germany into the effectiveness of Allied strategic bombing.

None the less, manufacture of the above key items was greatly hampered as a by-product of the oil-offensive, although this fact was not fully realised at the time. When the oil plants at Luena and Ludwigshaven were temporarily put out of action, Germany was deprived of 63% of its current output of nitrogen, 40% of its synthetic methanol and 65% of its synthetic rubber production.

[Trexx]

Good work, PMN1.

I concur with your analysis.

I’d add:

It should be noted that there was a concerted effort to rain as many bombs as possible upon Germany as soon as possible and as long as possible from the onset of Strategic Bombing Campaign. There was no holding back or stall in the plan. Endless reams and volumes have been written upon the subject. Originally there was debate to decide what to blow to pieces first and where the hands on the clock should be for ‘bombs away’. The only real interuption was the amphibious D-Day landings and weather. Remember, England was referred to as a ‘permanent aircraft carrier’ by the Allies. Everything and anything that was possible to increase the volume and ferocity of the bombing raids was tried. The Americans, at times where characterized as ‘foolhearty’ and ‘hardheaded’ when it came to the action of bombing. They rushed into it quickly and purposely. Regardless of losses, they kept bombing. In fact, the most conspicuous ‘correction’ by the United States Army Air Force was to adjust their public relations and recruitment practices to gloss over the carnage. They also did bring better fighter escort into the picture, eventually too.
Also this fact must be takin into account: Despite the ever increasing destruction by bombing, German industry steadily INCREASED their production. Much to the chagrin of the Allies (they found out after the war). The debate remains, as to how much SLOWER the increase was compared to if it was unhindered.
Another point is the effectiveness of ‘Fith Column’ and sabatours to destroy and/or hinder production. It’s been said that a single, well placed sabatour could create as much disruption to indusrry as a 500 plane raid.

[pmjwright]

This is quite an interesting discussion. There is no doubt, especially now in hindsight, that the strategic bomber offensive could have been done much smarter (and thus more effectively) than it was. To me, the the SBO was inconsistent, indecisive (in terms of where the efforts should be focussed on) and incomplete in how it attacked German industry and its transportation structure.

Granted, there is always the need to "blunt the tip of the spear"--bombing of airfields, navy yards and U-boat pens, command and control networks, and transportation networks to disrupt materials reaching the fronts. But WW2 was very much a war of attrition. By focussing bombing efforts heavily on the key materials and/or key components (eg the ball bearings) of German industry/economy such as those mentioned by PMN1 and others, the German ability to wage war could have been curtailed much quicker than it was. The oil offensive could have taken place much earlier than it was. With so many possible targets, the priorities needed to be effectively established.

Above all, that massive tonnage of "rubble bouncing" the RAF did could have been far more effectively deployed. Yes, despite the perceived strategic value in terror bombing and despite the low precision inherent in night bombing during that era.



The SBC planners could have made a major effort to engage Allied manufacturers in identifying those key industries. After all, who knows industry better than the industrialists? Certainly not the military.

Ask GM or Boeing or their suppliers, "what would be the quickest and most effective way of disrupting your production of tanks, planes, batteries, ignition coils, etc, for the longest period?" "If parts or processes are in short supply, which ones can be substituted for and which ones can you not continue your business without?" Then analyze the intelligence, identify those key component factories or key vulnerabilities (eg the nitrogen plants, Schweinfurt), and hit them hard and hit them often.

Consider aircraft factories as just one example. Relatively speaking, assembly lines are low tech operations. Germany managed to increased fighter production throughout 1944 while bombs were raining down on the main assembly plants, largely through dispersal of the factories. An aircraft, or anything else for that matter, could conceivably be assembled in a barn. However, without the necessary components, machine tools, or some key strategic materials, aircraft cannot be assembled ANYWHERE. No tires, no flyers!!

And without the fuel to fly, all the aircraft you can build will be useless...

[montanamotor]

Hi,

Some years ago, I was able to purchase a full set of the book-line "Kriegstagebuch der Deutschen Wehrmacht" (War Diary of the German Wehrmacht).

This is an 11 volume-collection of over 10,000 pages containing EVERY SINGLE KNOWN PAGE that was ever written down from September 1st, 1939 to May 8th, 1945 by the "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - OKW (German General Headquarters), responsible for all three branches WH, WM and WL (Wehrmacht Heer, Wehrmacht Marine and, Wehrmacht Luftwaffe) of the German forces.

In this war diary, among all the other interesting stuff, there is EXPLICITLY summed up, night-by-night, what effect the BRITISH strategic bombing campaing BEFOR Bomber Harris had on the german war effort - i.e. BEFORE the RAF started to bomb bedrooms instead of factories, but were still trying to destroy german industrial capacities at night.

Boys, I am taking the risk of being pounded myself, now - but: Hell, did the brits hit the german industry hard! The list of factories which was destroyed night after night with every new raid is ENDLESS! DESPITE OF all the misses! And there was no reason to exceed or suppress anything for the writers at the Wehrmacht-headquarters. This war-diary was compiled everyday BY professional soldiers FOR professional soldiers - for keeping the records, only. They were sober bookkeepers of the german war effort. And nothing else.

Honestly, I wouldn't believe it myself, if I hadn't read it with my own eyes. But summing all the information up, which I received there, leads me to two conclusions:

a. YES - the RAF DID HIT the german factories hard - VERY hard - and effectively during their night-raids pre-Summer '42, - quite in contrast to what the RAF was - and still is - claiming by themselves.

b. These nightly hits and, successes seem to me to have been deliberately VASTLY UNDERSCORED officially by RAF Big Brass of the Bomber Command - perhaps to justify "bedroom-bombing", instead? You tell me, why.

Of course, the German Ministry of Propaganda had no reason to complain of this swap of targets, also. If you wage a war, it's easier to take 100 homes destroyed than 1 factory. And it makes for great anti-british propaganda, too! But, fact is: Each bomb that hits a home, doesn't hit a smelter!

The conclusion is desastrous for the effect of the "strategic night bombing campaign", Gen. Arther Harris let loose on germany's homes: Nobody will ever knows how much german machinery, raw materials, weaponry, ammo, bits and pieces were NOT destroyed any more by RAF-night bombers, after Bomber-Harris redirected the RAB Bomber Command to civilian targets - but instead, were delivered to the german armed forces and, in return, were responsibe for the death of probably hundred's of thousands of soldiers and civilians ON BOTH SIDES of the front - while the RAF kept on bombing homes and people.

German CIVILIAN losses caused only by "strategic" night bombing during WWII - 500,000.

I don't know exactly the figures, but - I think 1 dead per one ton of bombs comes close. Do you really think, this bombload couldn't have been used with better purpose?

And - YES: I KNOW, who started WWII, and I remember Coventry and London very well, too. (Rotterdam doesn't count - was a defended city then. I have this facts and PROOF from the german War Diary, also.)

Last interesting trivia: As early as September 1941, in the WAR DIARY is LITTERALLY stated that, "...we (the Germans) are not going to win this war any more".

Quote taken from the Official War Diary of the Headquarters of the Deutsche Wehrmacht.

QED.

Cheers!

Montanamotor

[Trexx]

The resilience of German Manufacturing is a testament to Erhard Milch's prowess. (imo)

[simon]

Albert Speer surely?

quote:Gen. Arther Harris

Air Marshall Arthur Harris, the RAF was independant of the British Army and had a separate rank structure.

[Nick Sumner]

That is extremely interesting information Montanamotor - many thanks!

[Kutscha]

quote:the RAF DID HIT the german factories hard - VERY hard - and effectively during their night-raids pre-Summer '42,That seems hard to believe since before Gee, Oboe and the Pathfinders, the RAF BC had a hard time hitting targets.

On oil, the Rumanian oil fields were still in German hands in June 1944 so until the Soviets captured these, the Germans still had oil. These oil fields were still at extreme range for the bombers stationed in the MTO.

from the link I posted earlier:

No subsequent city raid shook Germany as did that on Hamburg; documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed and there is some indication from interrogation of high officials that Hitler himself thought that further attacks of similar weight might force Germany out of the war.

And another:

There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF.

To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.

And another

Official German statistics place total casualties from air attack -- including German civilians, foreigners, and members of the armed forces in cities that were being attacked -- at 250,253 killed for the period from January 1, 1943, to January 31, 1945, and 305,455 wounded badly enough to require hospitalization, during the period from October 1, 1943, to January 31, 1945. A careful examination of these data, together with checks against the records of individual cities that were attacked, indicates that they are too low. A revised estimate prepared by the Survey (which is also a minimum) places total casualties for the entire period of the war at 305,000 killed and 780,000 wounded. More reliable statistics are available on damage to housing. According to these, 485,000 residential buildings were totally destroyed by air attack and 415,000 were heavily damaged, making a total of 20 percent of all dwelling units in Germany. In some 50 cities that were primary targets of the air attack, the proportion of destroyed or heavily damaged dwelling units is about 40 percent. The result of all these attacks was to render homeless some 7,500,000 German civilians.

[montanamotor]

Kutscha,

I was only citing what is written down in the War Diary. Fact is, that you sometimes need only take away a very small bit to render a weapon scrap. A fighter without a gunsight or, an aircraft engine without sparkplugs is USELESS. You simply CAN't start or run a tank, a truck or whatever, if you don't have accumulators.

It's not neccessarily the big targets, that will paralize an industry, but the small ones. Try to build a 1943-style communications-radio without vacuum-tubes, and you'll understand, what I mean.

The impact the Hamburg raids had on Hitler & Co., came mostly due to the fact that it was the very first really heavy attack on a german city and, hence, they were not shure about the population's reaction. Only after that, the Top-Nazis saw that, their germans could, and would, take almost ANY bombing without rioting. And so they soldiered on.

In german publishings, the number of approx. 500.000 civilians killed by strategic bombing stands as a fact. Bombing cities didn't start in 1943, by the way. It was only concentrated on civilian targets from that date.

More later.

Cheers.

Montanamotor

[PMN1]

quote:Originally posted by Kutscha

[quote]

There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF.

To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.

[/i]


These attacks kept production at the plant (of around 5.5 square miles in area) down to only 9% of full capacity.

Some plants were hit again and again and again when they didn't need to be - the Bottrop-Welheim (Ruhroel) hydrogenation plant had its high-compressor house hit by 3 4,000lb and 8 1,000lb bombs in raids on 27th and 31st October 1944 and ceased operation but another 4 attacks were made as the Allies didn't know which is a little strange as I would have thought they would know what is needed to make a plant work.

[Kutscha]

True montana as the attack on Dresden knocked out the Zuiess plant or the attack that knocked out the plant making the wood glue for the Fw154.

What one can't forget that many of these 'little' plants were in 'civilian' areas.

[conrad]

What did the leuna plant make? You did not say. Also I wonder how things would have changed if the Germans had proximity fused shells for their flak guns. It would have made low level precision bombing of factories too expensive to be done on a sustained basis. Only high level area bombing would have ben possible. A great what if.

[Kutscha]

Conrad, Luena was a fuel producing centre.

Some links for you to read:

This is a downloadable pdf file of Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945
Williamson Murray

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Murray_B12.htm

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#taoo

[conrad]

About the British bombing. The other day I was in a bookshop looking through Max Hastings famous book on the subject. Apparently Harris believed that Bomber Command could actually win the war on its own if it pursued a strategy of unrestricted bombing. Bombing military targets was a distraction. This was why he did it.
Even by early 1944, when he'd lost 5000 planes he still believed it. Only the diversion of effort to bombing the channel defences(which he opposed) saved his reputation.

[Trexx]

quote:Originally posted by conrad

About the British bombing. The other day I was in a bookshop looking through Max Hastings famous book on the subject. Apparently Harris believed that Bomber Command could actually win the war on its own...



http://img.villagephotos.com/p/2004-11/897605/GiulioDouhet.gif
The Giulio Douhet controversy still persists, even right now...

Ya know, there's those that say it's been proven and then those that say it's disproven!